Whitt v. Ferris
1992 Ind. App. LEXIS 1088, 1992 WL 161693, 596 N.E.2d 230 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
An easement by way of necessity is implied by law when a property owner conveys a parcel of land that has no outlet to a public road except over the grantor's remaining land. However, an implied easement from prior use requires a showing of reasonable necessity, which is more than mere convenience, and an easement based on a plat map is extinguished if the plat is legally vacated before any lots are sold.
Facts:
- In 1967, John and Mary Kumpf purchased an 88-acre property.
- In 1968, the Kumpfs platted and recorded a subdivision called Beechwood Country Estates, which included streets such as "Tulip Drive," and graded some of the roads.
- Before selling any lots, the Kumpfs legally vacated most of the platted lots and streets, including Tulip Drive, by recording a formal document.
- After the vacation, various parcels were sold. Ferris acquired Lot 5 (abutting a public road) and former Lot 8 (behind Lot 5). Jones acquired Lot 6 (abutting a public road). Stettler acquired former Lot 7.
- Stettler's Lot 7 was landlocked, with the only possible access to a public road being over the path of the former Tulip Drive.
- Ferris and Jones also used the path of the former Tulip Drive to access the back portions of their lots, and all three neighbors used the grassy areas next to the path for parking.
- Bonnie Whitt purchased the surrounding property, which included the land where the former Tulip Drive was located (the "Disputed Parcel").
- Whitt constructed a fence that interfered with her neighbors' use of the Disputed Parcel, though she left an opening for Stettler's driveway.
Procedural Posture:
- Ferris, Jones, and Stettler sued the Whitts in an Indiana trial court, seeking an injunction to prevent the Whitts from interfering with their use of a disputed road.
- The Whitts filed a counterclaim against the plaintiffs for trespass.
- The trial court found in favor of Ferris, Jones, and Stettler, granting each of them a sixty-foot-wide implied easement over the Disputed Parcel and issued a negative judgment on the Whitts' counterclaim.
- The Whitts, as appellants, appealed the trial court's judgment to the Indiana Court of Appeals against Ferris, Jones, and Stettler as appellees.
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Issue:
Do implied easements arise in favor of landowners when a previously platted but legally vacated road is used for access, where the use is not reasonably necessary for some parcels but is the only means of access for another landlocked parcel?
Opinions:
Majority - Conover, Judge
Yes, as to the landlocked parcel, but no as to the others. An implied easement by way of necessity arises for the landlocked parcel because it is essential for access, but an implied easement does not arise from a vacated plat map or from prior use that is merely convenient rather than reasonably necessary. For Stettler, whose Lot 7 is landlocked, a way of necessity is implied by law. This arises because the parcel was severed from a larger tract in a way that left it without access to a public road. Language in Stettler's deed cautioning that access was not included in the description was found to be a warning about lack of public access, not a waiver of a private way of necessity. However, the scope of this easement is limited to what is strictly necessary for ingress and egress—the twenty-foot-wide road—and does not extend to the grassy areas for parking. For Ferris and Jones, no easement exists. An easement from the original plat map fails because the plat was legally vacated before any lots were sold, extinguishing all public and private rights to the platted streets. An implied easement from prior use fails because their use of the path was not reasonably necessary, but merely convenient, as their lots already abutted a public road. Indiana law sets a heavy burden for such easements, and a reasonable alternative access, even if less convenient, defeats the claim.
Analysis:
This decision strictly defines and separates the doctrines of different implied easements. It establishes a strong precedent in Indiana that the legal vacation of a subdivision plat before any lot sales effectively destroys any potential private easement rights that might have arisen from that plat. The case reinforces the high standard for an implied easement from prior use, clarifying that 'reasonable necessity' is significantly more than convenience and requires that no other reasonable means of access exists. Lastly, it affirms the principle that even when an easement by necessity is granted, its scope is narrowly tailored to what is absolutely essential for the stated purpose, thereby protecting the servient estate from an unnecessary burden.
