Whitney v. Fisher
417 A.2d 934, 138 Vt. 468, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1270 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
The common law rule denying a wife a cause of action for loss of consortium for negligent injury to her husband, while allowing such an action for a husband, is an unconstitutional gender-based classification; therefore, a wife has the same common law right as a husband to recover for loss of consortium.
Facts:
- In 1973, Donna Lee Whitney's husband sustained physical injuries.
- As a result of these injuries, Whitney suffered a loss of consortium, including the loss of her husband's affection, aid, cooperation, and conjugal society.
- At the time of the injury, Vermont's common law recognized a husband's right to sue for loss of consortium but did not recognize a corresponding right for a wife.
- In 1977, the Vermont legislature enacted a statute, 12 V.S.A. § 5431, explicitly authorizing a cause of action for loss of consortium for either spouse.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1976, Donna Lee Whitney (plaintiff) filed an action in a Vermont trial court to recover damages for loss of consortium arising from her husband's 1973 injuries.
- The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Whitney.
- The unnamed defendant (appellant) appealed the trial court's judgment to the Supreme Court of Vermont.
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Issue:
Does the common law of Vermont, by denying a wife a cause of action for loss of consortium while granting it to a husband, create an unconstitutional gender-based classification in violation of the principles of equal protection?
Opinions:
Majority - Billings, J.
Yes. The common law rule denying a wife a cause of action for loss of consortium violates equal protection principles because it creates an arbitrary gender-based classification. The court found that a recently enacted statute granting this right to both spouses could not be applied retroactively, so the decision had to be based on common law. The court overruled its prior precedent in cases like Baldwin v. State, which denied this right to women. The court reasoned that there is no non-arbitrary distinction between the interests of a husband and a wife in their mutual society that could justify such a gender-based distinction. Applying the intermediate scrutiny test from federal equal protection jurisprudence, the court concluded there is no state of facts that could reasonably justify a rule denying a woman an action for loss of consortium while recognizing the right in a man, as such a rule does not serve any important governmental objective.
Dissenting - Barney, C.J.
The dissent does not favor the concept of consortium damages as a separate item of recovery at all. The dissent finds no compelling justification for overturning recent precedent, particularly since the underlying injury occurred before both the new statute was enacted and the prior precedent was reaffirmed. Therefore, the law as it stood at the time of the accident should apply.
Dissenting - Daley, J.
The dissent argues that the court should apply the law as it existed at the time the cause of action arose. Since the legislature did not make the new statute, 12 V.S.A. § 5431, retroactive, the court should not create a cause of action for the plaintiff where none existed at the time of her husband's injury. The majority is improperly creating a right 'out of thin air' instead of adhering to established principles of statutory application and precedent.
Analysis:
This decision represents a significant evolution of common law in Vermont, bringing it in line with modern constitutional principles of gender equality. By overruling its own recent precedent, the court demonstrated a willingness to abandon the doctrine of stare decisis when a rule is deemed unjust and unconstitutional. This case solidifies the principle that the marital relationship is a partnership of equals, and the rights and remedies available to protect that relationship must be applied equally to both spouses. It serves as a key example of judicial power to reform tort law to reflect changing societal values and constitutional standards.
