1. No, Congress didn't give the EPA a blank check. The law tells the EPA to set standards that are 'necessary' to protect public health—no more, no less. This is a clear enough instruction, or 'intelligible principle,' to be constitutional.
2. No, the EPA cannot consider costs. The law's text is very clear: it's all about health. If Congress wanted the EPA to worry about money when setting these health standards, it would have said so, just like it did in other parts of the law.

I agree with the result, but I'm worried that our 'intelligible principle' rule is too weak. Someday, Congress might give an agency a task that is so huge and important that it's clearly a job for lawmakers, even if there's a so-called 'intelligible principle.' We might need to revisit this issue in the future.

I agree with the outcome, but we should just be honest and admit that the EPA is making laws here. That's okay, as long as Congress gave it proper instructions. The Constitution doesn't say Congress can't delegate its power, only that it has the power to begin with.

I agree the EPA can't consider costs, and the law's history proves it. Congress wanted to force companies to invent new, cleaner technology, even if it seemed impossible or expensive at the time. The law smartly allows for costs to be considered later, when states and companies figure out *how* to meet the clean air goals, not when the goals themselves are being set.

The Clean Air Act is clear that the EPA can't consider costs when setting air quality standards, only when applying them. The Act gives the EPA a clear goal of protecting public health with a safety buffer, which is enough guidance to make the law constitutional. It doesn't give the EPA too much power that belongs to Congress.

I agree the Clean Air Act gives the EPA enough guidance. But I worry there could still be a constitutional problem with the Act giving too much power to the EPA. The Constitution talks about 'legislative Powers' belonging to Congress. I'm not sure our rule about needing 'intelligible principles' always stops Congress from giving away too much power. I'd be open to looking at that question more in the future.

I agree the EPA didn't get too much power. But the Court should just admit the EPA got 'legislative power' that's allowed because the Act has enough limits. Calling it something else is silly. What matters is the type of power, not who has it. When Congress passed this part of the Clean Air Act, it gave legislative power to EPA within the Constitution's rules.

I agree with most of the Court's decision. The history and setup of the Clean Air Act make me think Congress intentionally didn't let the EPA consider costs for air quality standards. The Act wants to force technology to get better to meet tough health standards. It lets costs be considered for some other decisions, and Congress can always change the law if needed.

No. The Clean Air Act is clear that the EPA can't consider costs when setting air quality standards, only when applying them. The Act gives the EPA a clear goal of protecting public health with a safety buffer, which is enough guidance to make the law constitutional. It doesn't give the EPA too much power that belongs to Congress.

No. I agree the Clean Air Act gives the EPA enough guidance. But I worry there could still be a constitutional problem with the Act giving too much power to the EPA. The Constitution talks about 'legislative Powers' belonging to Congress. I'm not sure our rule about needing 'intelligible principles' always stops Congress from giving away too much power. I'd be open to looking at that question more in the future.

No. I agree the EPA didn't get too much power. But the Court should just admit the EPA got 'legislative power' that's allowed because the Act has enough limits. Calling it something else is silly. What matters is the type of power, not who has it. When Congress passed this part of the Clean Air Act, it gave legislative power to EPA within the Constitution's rules.

No. I agree with most of the Court's decision. The history and setup of the Clean Air Act make me think Congress intentionally didn't let the EPA consider costs for air quality standards. The Act wants to force technology to get better to meet tough health standards. It lets costs be considered for some other decisions, and Congress can always change the law if needed.

"Congress... does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes."

—itself, the statutory factor was a provision of the Clean Air Act, Section 109 (b)(1), that directed EPA to set ambient air quality standards at levels "requisite to protect the public health" with "an adequate margin of safety."

T] he degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of the power congressionally conferred

The anti-delegation doctrine requires only that Congress provide an "intelligible principle" when enacting legislation, and "[i] n the history of the Court we have found the requisite `intelligible principle'lacking in only two statutes, one of which provided literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the other of which conferred authority to regulate the entire …

Stat. §§ 6.84 and 6.855, WEC asks this court to conclude the legislature "hid [][an] elephant [] in [a] mousehole [.]"

Rather, the text of the provision at issue, "interpreted in its statutory and historical context and with appreciation for its importance to the [Clean Air Act] as a whole, unambiguously bar [red] cost considerations from the" standard-setting process.

It is thus not the Latin canons, ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis, that shed light on the application of the statutory phrase but Justice SCALIA's more pertinent and easily remembered English-language observation that Congress "does not... hide elephants in mouseholes."

Had Congress intended RFRA to initiate a change so huge, a clarion statement to that effect likely would have been made in the legislation.

The lower court found that the statute did not provide the agency an "intelligible principle" to guide its exercise of discretion.

Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained repeatedly that Congress may only "confer [] decisionmaking authority upon agencies [,]"

1. No. Section 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power. The statute provides an 'intelligible principle' by instructing the EPA to set standards at a level 'requisite'—meaning sufficient, but not more than necessary—to protect the public health, based on established scientific criteria and with an adequate margin of safety. This guidance is well within the bounds of congressional delegations previously upheld by the Court and is far from the standardless grants of power found unconstitutional in the past. An agency cannot cure an unconstitutional delegation by adopting its own limiting construction; the constitutionality of the statute is a question for the courts.
2. No. The EPA may not consider implementation costs when setting NAAQS. The text of § 109(b)(1) is unambiguous and focuses exclusively on public health. Other sections of the CAA explicitly mention cost as a factor for consideration in implementation, but § 109 does not. Congress does not hide elephants in mouseholes, and such a significant factor as cost would have been explicitly included if Congress had intended for it to be considered in the standard-setting process.

Agrees with the majority's application of the intelligible principle doctrine but writes separately to express concern that the doctrine itself may not be sufficient to prevent all unconstitutional cessions of legislative power. There may be cases where a principle is intelligible, yet the decision delegated is so significant that it is inherently legislative. On a future day, the Court should be willing to reconsider whether its delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from the Constitution's separation of powers.

Agrees with the Court's judgment on the delegation issue but argues the Court should be more candid in its reasoning. Instead of pretending the power delegated to the EPA is not 'legislative,' the Court should acknowledge that it is, and then hold that the delegation is constitutional because it is adequately limited by an intelligible principle. Article I vests legislative power in Congress but does not prohibit Congress from delegating that power, provided it does so with sufficient guidance.

Agrees that the EPA cannot consider costs but would not rely solely on the statutory text. The legislative history of the Clean Air Act, particularly its 'technology-forcing' purpose, makes it clear that Congress intended for the EPA to set health-based standards without regard to economic or technological feasibility. The Act allows for cost and feasibility to be considered during the implementation phase by the states, which provides a necessary safety valve without compromising the health-focused nature of the standards themselves. The statute gives the Administrator sufficient discretion to avoid extreme or absurd results, such as setting standards that would cause more harm than they prevent.

The text of § 109(b) unambiguously bars cost considerations from the NAAQS-setting process. The Clean Air Act permits the EPA to consider costs in implementing the air quality standards but not in setting them. The scope of discretion that § 109(b)(1) allows is well within the outer limits of our nondelegation precedents. Section 109(b)(1) requires the EPA to set standards at a level that is requisite to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety. This requirement is no less an 'intelligible principle' than others the Court has approved, such as setting fair and equitable prices and determining excessive profits. Therefore, § 109(b)(1) does not delegate legislative power to the EPA in contravention of Article I, § 1.

While I agree with the majority that § 109's directive to the EPA is no less an 'intelligible principle' than other directives the Court has approved, I have a concern that there may nevertheless be a genuine constitutional problem with § 109 that the parties did not address. The parties wrangled over constitutional doctrine with barely a nod to the text of the Constitution, which speaks simply of 'legislative Powers.' I am not convinced that the intelligible principle doctrine serves to prevent all cessions of legislative power, and I would be willing to address that question in the future.

I agree with the majority that the EPA's promulgation of the NAAQS does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. However, the Court has two choices in articulating its reasoning: (1) frankly acknowledge that the authority delegated to the EPA is 'legislative power' but nevertheless conclude that the delegation is constitutional because it is adequately limited by the terms of the authorizing statute; or (2) pretend, as the Court does, that the authority delegated to the EPA is somehow not 'legislative power.' I believe the proper characterization of governmental power depends on the nature of that power, not on the identity of the person exercising it. When Congress enacted § 109, it effected a constitutional delegation of legislative power to the EPA.

I join Parts I, III, and IV of the Court's opinion, and agree with the Court's determination in Part II that the Clean Air Act does not permit the EPA to consider costs in setting the NAAQS. However, I would not rest this conclusion solely upon § 109's language or upon a presumption against agency consideration of costs. The legislative history and the statute's structure convince me that § 109's language reflects a congressional decision not to delegate to the EPA the legal authority to consider economic costs of compliance when setting the NAAQS. The technology-forcing objectives of the Clean Air Act help explain why Congress would choose not to grant the EPA powers to consider technological or economic feasibility. The Act does permit some consideration of costs in implementing the air quality standards, and Congress can change the statutory limits if necessary.

Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.

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