White v. New Hampshire Department of Employment Security et al.
455 U.S. 445 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
A post-judgment request for attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 1988) is not a motion to alter or amend the judgment subject to the 10-day filing deadline of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Such requests are considered collateral to the merits of the underlying action.
Facts:
- Richard White sued the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (NHDES), claiming it failed to make timely determinations of unemployment compensation entitlements.
- White alleged these delays violated the Social Security Act and the Due Process Clause.
- After the lawsuit began, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, which was formalized in a consent decree.
- The settlement agreement and consent decree were silent on the matter of attorney's fees.
- Five days after the judgment, White's counsel contacted NHDES to discuss attorney's fees.
- Approximately four and a half months after the final judgment was entered, White's counsel filed a formal motion seeking an award of attorney's fees as the prevailing party.
Procedural Posture:
- Richard White sued the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (NHDES) in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire.
- The District Court certified the case as a class action and granted relief to the petitioner.
- NHDES appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
- While the appeal was pending, the parties reached a settlement, and the case was remanded.
- The District Court approved a consent decree and entered a final judgment on January 26, 1979.
- White filed a post-judgment motion for attorney's fees, which the District Court granted.
- NHDES, the appellee, appealed the fee award to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the motion for fees was an untimely motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e).
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the issue.
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Issue:
Does a post-judgment motion for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 constitute a motion to alter or amend the judgment, thereby making it subject to the 10-day time limit of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Powell
No, a post-judgment motion for attorney's fees under § 1988 is not a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e). Rule 59(e) is intended for motions that ask a court to reconsider and change its decision on the merits of the case. A request for attorney's fees, however, raises legal issues that are collateral to the main cause of action and does not seek to change the judgment itself, but rather seeks what is due because of the judgment. The court's decision on fees requires a separate inquiry that can only begin after a party has prevailed on the merits. Applying the strict 10-day limit would be impractical in civil rights litigation, where multiple 'final' orders may be issued, and would discourage private settlement of fee disputes.
Concurring - Justice Blackmun
No, the motion is not governed by Rule 59(e). While agreeing with the majority's conclusion, this opinion argues the Court should have gone further to resolve the circuit split completely by also holding that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d) and 58 (governing costs) do not apply either. The better approach, which the court should have explicitly adopted, is that post-judgment fee requests are collateral claims governed by local district court rules, as held by the Eighth Circuit. This would provide clear guidance to federal courts and lawyers and prevent future litigation on the correct procedure.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies a crucial procedural point for civil rights litigation by decoupling motions for attorney's fees from motions to alter or amend a judgment on the merits. By defining fee requests as 'collateral,' the Court prevents prevailing parties from inadvertently forfeiting their statutory right to fees due to the very short 10-day deadline of Rule 59(e). The ruling promotes judicial economy by discouraging lawyers from filing protective fee motions after every interim order and encourages settlement of fee issues. It also empowers district courts to manage their dockets by allowing them to create local rules that establish reasonable deadlines for filing fee petitions.
