White v. Brown
559 S.W.2d 938 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
When the language of a will is ambiguous, there is a strong legal presumption that the testator intended to convey a fee simple absolute, and this presumption will overcome language that could be interpreted as creating a lesser estate, such as a life estate.
Facts:
- Jessie Lide drafted a holographic will stating, 'I wish Evelyn White to have my home to live in and not to be sold.'
- The will reiterated, 'My house is not to be sold.'
- Evelyn White, the testatrix's sister-in-law, had lived with and cared for Jessie Lide for approximately 25 years until Lide's death.
- Jessie Lide died a widow with no children, and her heirs at law were her nieces and nephews.
- The will also made an unrestricted bequest of personal property to Sandra White Perry, Lide's niece and Evelyn White's daughter.
- Lide's two surviving sisters quitclaimed any interest they had in the property to Evelyn White.
Procedural Posture:
- Evelyn White, the devisee, filed a suit for construction of the will in the chancery court (trial court).
- The defendants were the heirs at law of Jessie Lide.
- The Chancellor held that the will conveyed only a life estate to Evelyn White.
- The Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court, affirmed the Chancellor's decision.
- Evelyn White appealed to the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
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Issue:
Does a will that devises a home to an individual 'to live in and not to be sold' convey a fee simple absolute, or does the restrictive language limit the conveyance to a life estate?
Opinions:
Majority - Brock, J.
Yes, the will conveys a fee simple absolute. Tennessee statutes create a strong presumption against partial intestacy and favor construing a devise as a fee simple unless the intent to create a lesser estate is expressed clearly. When a will's expression is doubtful, the doubt is resolved against the limitation and in favor of the absolute estate. Here, the language 'to live in' is ambiguous and does not clearly state an intent to create only a life estate. The prohibition 'not to be sold' is construed not as evidence of intent to create a life estate, but as an invalid restraint on alienation that is void as a matter of public policy because it is inconsistent with a fee simple interest.
Dissenting - Harbison, J.
No, the will conveys a life estate. The testatrix's intent to limit the estate is clear from her repeated and emphasized directive that the house was 'not to be sold.' The majority reaches its conclusion only by striking this language from the will. The testatrix knew how to make an outright gift, as she did with her personal property. A more natural interpretation that honors the testatrix's apparent intent is that she wished to provide her sister-in-law a place to live for her lifetime without the power to sell it, which is precisely the effect of a life estate.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the strong preference in property law for construing ambiguous wills in favor of a fee simple absolute and against partial intestacy. It demonstrates that courts will often resolve ambiguity by invalidating a restraint on alienation rather than interpreting the restraint as evidence of intent to create a lesser estate like a life estate. This decision serves as a significant precedent for cases involving poorly drafted wills, emphasizing that any language intended to limit an estate must be exceptionally clear to overcome the statutory presumption that the testator's entire interest was conveyed. It signals to future courts that a direct prohibition on sale will likely be voided if the grant itself is not explicitly limited to the beneficiary's lifetime.
