Wheat v. Wheat
2003 WL 22519665, 868 So. 2d 83, 2003 La. App. LEXIS 3063 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
An 'independent and disinterested witness' required for 'miss and run' uninsured motorist claims under La. R.S. 22:1406(D)(l)(f) is not required to have actually seen the accident occur, but must be unbiased, uninfluenced by others, not benefit from the claim, and base their conclusions on independent investigation rather than solely on information from the claimant.
Facts:
- On May 19, 1998, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Sidney Wheat was driving on Louisiana Highway 22 in Tangipahoa Parish with his ex-wife, Ann Wheat, and sister, Martha Temples, as passengers.
- Wheat's vehicle struck an object in the roadway, causing him to lose control, leave the roadway, and ultimately strike several trees, injuring all three occupants.
- Sidney Wheat and his passengers did not see anything in the roadway before the impact, and Sidney Wheat initially thought another vehicle had hit him from behind.
- Trooper Clay Smith arrived on the scene to investigate and discovered that Wheat's vehicle had struck a vehicle transmission that had been left in the roadway, and this transmission was not from Wheat's vehicle.
Procedural Posture:
- Sidney Wheat filed a claim with National General Life Insurance Company, his automobile liability insurer, under the uninsured motorist coverage.
- National General Life Insurance Company denied the claim.
- Sidney Wheat filed a lawsuit against National General Insurance Company.
- National General Insurance Company filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that Sidney Wheat was not entitled to coverage under the terms of the policy.
- The trial court (court of first instance) granted National General Insurance Company's motion for summary judgment.
- Sidney Wheat, as appellant, appealed the trial court's judgment to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
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Issue:
Does Louisiana Revised Statute 22:1406(D)(l)(f) and an uninsured motorist policy require an independent and disinterested witness to have actually seen a 'miss and run' accident occur in order to prove that the injury resulted from the actions of an unknown driver?
Opinions:
Majority - logaIDRY, J.
No, Louisiana Revised Statute 22:1406(D)(l)(f) and an uninsured motorist policy do not require an independent and disinterested witness to have actually seen a 'miss and run' accident occur to prove that the injury resulted from the actions of an unknown driver. The trial court misinterpreted Pinkney v. Progressive Specialty Insurance Company, which merely held that the witness established the accident's cause, not that they directly observed it. The statute only requires proof by an independent and disinterested witness that the injury resulted from another vehicle's actions. An 'independent and disinterested witness' must not be influenced by others and unbiased by personal interest, as established in Jackson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Trooper Clay Smith meets this criteria; his conclusions were based on his independent investigation of the scene, not on information from Sidney Wheat, and he has no personal stake in the outcome. The presence of a heavy transmission not from Wheat's vehicle, combined with the nearby junkyard, provided sufficient circumstantial evidence for Trooper Smith to conclude that another vehicle dropped the transmission on the road, thereby linking Wheat's injuries to an unknown driver.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the evidentiary standard for 'miss and run' uninsured motorist claims under Louisiana law, specifically on the definition and role of an 'independent and disinterested witness.' It establishes that direct observation of the accident is not a prerequisite for such a witness. This ruling broadens the types of evidence admissible, allowing objective conclusions drawn from a post-accident investigation (e.g., by a police officer) to satisfy the statutory requirement. This precedent potentially expands avenues for recovery for claimants in accidents where direct eyewitnesses are absent and provides a clearer, less restrictive interpretation of the 'independent and disinterested witness' standard for future cases.
