Whatley v. State

Indiana Supreme Court
2010 Ind. LEXIS 382, 2010 WL 2284251, 928 N.E.2d 202 (2010)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A building's primary purpose, such as being a church, does not prevent it from being classified as a 'youth program center' for sentence enhancement purposes, provided it regularly offers programs or services for individuals under 18. The determination is based on the activities conducted within the structure, not its primary identity, the content of its programs, or its external appearance.


Facts:

  • In March 2008, Walker Whatley was at his home, which was located approximately 795 feet from the Robinson Community Church (RCC).
  • RCC regularly hosted numerous programs for people under 18, including Sunday services for children, mentoring programs, a Girl Scout troop, a weekly Bible study for teens, and children's and teen choirs.
  • Police arrested Whatley at his home on an unrelated warrant.
  • During a search incident to the arrest, an officer discovered a bag in Whatley's pocket containing 3.2459 grams of cocaine.

Procedural Posture:

  • The State charged Whatley in trial court with possession of cocaine as a Class A felony, enhancing the charge from a Class C felony due to the proximity to a youth program center.
  • A jury found the enhancement was supported by the evidence, and the trial court sentenced Whatley to a term of 85 years.
  • Whatley, as appellant, appealed to the Indiana Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court.
  • The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, finding RCC did not qualify as a 'youth program center,' and remanded with instructions to enter the conviction as a Class C felony.
  • The State, as petitioner, sought transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court, the state's highest court, which was granted.

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Issue:

Does a church that regularly provides a variety of faith-based and other programs for minors qualify as a 'youth program center' under Indiana's sentencing enhancement statute?


Opinions:

Majority - Sullivan, J.

Yes. A church that regularly provides programs for minors qualifies as a 'youth program center' under the statute. The statutory definition focuses exclusively on whether a building provides programs or services for youth on a regular basis. Neither the building's primary identity as a church, the religious content of its programs, nor its other ancillary uses are relevant to this determination. The court rejected the argument that the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied, reasoning that an objective observer could have discovered RCC's status by observing children regularly entering and exiting or by inquiring about its programs. The defendant's actual knowledge of the center's status is not required, as presence in a protected zone is a strict liability element.


Dissenting - Boehm, J.

No. A structure should not be considered a 'youth program center' for a dramatic sentence enhancement unless it is clearly identifiable as such from its external appearance. Due process requires that criminal statutes provide fair notice of prohibited conduct and its consequences. The majority's broad, activity-based interpretation violates this principle by potentially classifying any location with regular youth activities, like a private home hosting scout meetings, as a protected zone. The term 'youth program center' should be confined to structures obviously dedicated to youth activities, like a YMCA or Boys & Girls Club, or those with clear external signage, which was not the case here.



Analysis:

This decision significantly broadens the application of drug-free zone sentence enhancements by establishing a functional, activity-based test for what constitutes a 'youth program center.' The ruling clarifies that the primary identity of a building, such as a church, is irrelevant; only the regular presence of youth programming matters. This precedent lowers the bar for prosecutors seeking enhancements, as it eliminates any requirement for a location to be officially designated or externally marked as a youth center. Consequently, the case expands the number and type of locations that qualify as protected zones, reinforcing the strict liability nature of these sentencing statutes.

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