Wetzel v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
258 Pa. Super. 500, 1978 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3887, 393 A.2d 470 (1978)
Rule of Law:
In Pennsylvania, a death resulting from the insured's culpable conduct is considered to occur through "accidental means" under an accidental death insurance policy, allowing recovery for an innocent beneficiary, unless the policy specifically excludes coverage for violations of law. This rule rejects denying recovery based on the foreseeability of the injury or general public policy arguments.
Facts:
- Willy C. J. Wetzel and his son, Roy Wetzel, were experts in martial arts, including karate, and operated a school.
- On the day of Willy Wetzel’s death, Roy had been working on his father’s income tax return.
- Willy visited Roy, began reading the completed tax forms, then threw a pen, screamed obscenities, and mumbled about losing his house, car, and everything.
- Willy grabbed a Hawaiian sword, turned, and let out a battle cry called a "kewah," initiating a fight.
- As Willy began removing the sword from its case, Roy attempted to grab the case, but Willy kicked Roy, causing the sword to bend in half.
- A hand-to-hand fight between Willy and Roy ensued for approximately twenty-five minutes.
- Roy made several attempts to reach the telephone to call for help but was stopped each time by Willy’s tactics.
- Roy eventually placed nunchaku sticks around Willy’s head to try to render him unconscious, and shortly after, Roy realized Willy was dead.
Procedural Posture:
- Willy C. J. Wetzel died on March 16, 1975, at the hand of his son, Roy Wetzel.
- Roy Wetzel was tried by a jury for murder and voluntary manslaughter in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County and was found not guilty.
- Mary Margaret Wetzel, Willy's widow, brought a civil suit against the insurance company to recover the accidental death insurance proceeds.
- Both Mary Margaret Wetzel and the defendant insurance company moved for summary judgment in the Court of Common Pleas (the lower court), asking the court to decide if the death occurred through "accidental means" as a matter of law.
- The lower court found that Willy Wetzel’s death did not occur through accidental means, granted the defendant insurance company’s motion for summary judgment, and implicitly denied Mary Margaret Wetzel’s motion.
- Mary Margaret Wetzel, as appellant, appealed the lower court's order to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a death, caused by the insured's own culpable conduct during a violent encounter, qualify as being caused by "accidental means" under an accidental death insurance policy, thereby allowing recovery for an innocent beneficiary, when the policy does not include a "violation of law" exclusion clause and the jurisdiction rejects the "reasonably foreseeable" test?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Cercone
Yes, the death of Willy Wetzel occurred through "violent, external and accidental means" within the meaning of the policy, entitling his innocent beneficiary to recover. The court first noted that insurance contract ambiguities must be construed favorably to the insured and that the policy's intentional self-destruction exclusion (subsection D) did not apply as the death resulted from another's acts. Citing Mohn v. American Casualty Co. and Eisenman v. Homberger, the court affirmed that Pennsylvania law expressly rejects both public policy arguments (e.g., that denying coverage deters crime or that the policy promoted the unlawful act) and the "reasonably foreseeable" test for denying recovery when the insured engages in culpable conduct, particularly when the policy lacks a "violation of law" clause. The court found no evidence the policy was procured in contemplation of the crime, promoted the act, or that denying coverage would deter it. Embracing the "modern legal trend" to consider such occurrences accidental despite the insured's criminal conduct, the court concluded that Mary Margaret Wetzel, as an innocent beneficiary, must recover.
Concurring - President Judge Jacobs
President Judge Jacobs concurred in the result, indicating agreement with the ultimate decision to reverse the lower court's order and allow recovery, but without providing separate reasoning in the text.
Dissenting - Justices Van der Voort and Hester
No, the death did not occur through "accidental means." Justices Van der Voort and Hester dissented, stating they would affirm the lower court's order, which had found that Willy Wetzel's death did not occur through accidental means. No specific reasoning for their dissent was provided in the text.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies Pennsylvania's position that an insured's culpable conduct, even if violent, does not automatically negate "accidental means" coverage under an accidental death policy, especially for an innocent beneficiary, if a "violation of law" exclusion is absent. It mandates that insurers cannot rely on the "reasonably foreseeable" test or general public policy arguments to deny claims in such circumstances. Consequently, this case stresses the importance for insurance companies to clearly and explicitly draft policy exclusions, particularly for criminal acts, to avoid liability in similar situations.
