Wetherill v. University of Chicago
1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14393, 15 Fed. R. Serv. 768, 570 F. Supp. 1124 (1983)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Evidence of an organization's routine practice is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 406 to prove that its conduct on a particular occasion conformed with that practice, provided there is sufficient evidence of a uniform protocol and the testimony from a sample of participants is consistent on the core elements of the practice.
Facts:
- In the early 1950s, the University of Chicago and its hospitals, under the direction of Dr. William Dieckmann, conducted a medical study involving the administration of diethylstilbestrol (DES) to pregnant women.
- The mothers of Rachel Wetherill and Maureen Rogers were patients at the hospital and were given DES as part of this study during their pregnancies.
- Wetherill and Rogers allege they suffered injuries as a result of their mothers' ingestion of DES while they were in utero.
- The plaintiffs claim their mothers were subjected to the experimental treatment without their knowledge or consent.
- The University of Chicago contends it had an established protocol for the study, which included informing patients about the experiment and obtaining their consent to participate.
Procedural Posture:
- Rachel Wetherill and Maureen Rogers each filed lawsuits against the University of Chicago in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (a federal trial court).
- Each complaint alleged three counts: battery, malpractice (negligence), and strict liability.
- The cases proceeded through discovery and reached the final pretrial order stage, making them ready for trial.
- Plaintiffs filed motions in limine (pretrial motions to exclude evidence) seeking to bar the University from introducing evidence of its purported 'routine practice' of obtaining patient consent for the study.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 406, is evidence of a university hospital's routine practice of obtaining informed consent from participants in a large-scale medical study admissible to prove that the plaintiffs' mothers consented, even when direct evidence from their specific treating physicians is unavailable?
Opinions:
Majority - Shadur, District Judge
Yes, evidence of the university hospital's routine practice of obtaining informed consent is admissible under FRE 406. The court found that evidence of a consistent organizational practice is relevant to prove conformity on a specific occasion, even without direct eyewitnesses for that occasion. The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments for exclusion, reasoning that: 1) There was sufficient evidence that a uniform protocol for obtaining consent was communicated to all participating physicians, making it an 'organizational' practice. 2) The testimony from four of the twenty-one physicians and several patient participants was a large enough sample to establish a routine practice, as the standard for an organization is less stringent than for an individual's habit. 3) Minor variations in witnesses' recollections after 30 years about peripheral details did not undermine the consistency of their testimony on the core practice of explaining the study and seeking consent. The court also held the evidence was not excludable under FRE 403 because its probative value in rebutting the plaintiffs' central claim was high and not substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. Finally, the testimony was not inadmissible hearsay because it was offered to prove that the statements of consent were made, not for the truth of the matters asserted within those statements.
Analysis:
This opinion provides a key interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 406, demonstrating its practical application in cases involving historical events where direct evidence is scarce. The ruling establishes that circumstantial evidence of a routine practice can be sufficient for admissibility, even if it comes from a relatively small sample of participants in a large organization. This lowers the evidentiary bar for defendants in such cases to introduce evidence of their standard procedures to rebut claims of misconduct in specific instances. The decision emphasizes the distinction between the admissibility of evidence and its ultimate weight, leaving it to the jury to determine the credibility and persuasiveness of the routine practice testimony.
