West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey
1991 U.S. LEXIS 1710, 113 L. Ed. 2d 68, 499 U.S. 83 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
The phrase "a reasonable attorney's fee" in a federal fee-shifting statute, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988, does not authorize a court to award expert witness fees to a prevailing party beyond the standard per diem witness fee set by 28 U.S.C. § 1821.
Facts:
- West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. (WVUH) is a hospital in West Virginia that serves many Medicaid recipients from neighboring Pennsylvania.
- In January 1986, Pennsylvania's Department of Public Welfare implemented new, lower Medicaid reimbursement schedules for services provided by WVUH to Pennsylvania residents.
- WVUH believed the new rates were unlawfully low under federal statutory and constitutional law.
- In preparation for litigation, WVUH hired the accounting firm Coopers & Lybrand and three doctors specializing in hospital finance to serve as experts.
- These experts provided analysis and were prepared to testify about the financial impact and inadequacy of the new reimbursement rates.
Procedural Posture:
- WVUH unsuccessfully challenged the new reimbursement rates in Pennsylvania administrative proceedings.
- After exhausting administrative remedies, WVUH sued Pennsylvania Governor Robert Casey and other officials in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- The District Court found in favor of WVUH on the merits.
- The District Court then awarded WVUH over $100,000 in expert fees as part of its 'reasonable attorney's fee' under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
- The Pennsylvania officials, as appellants, appealed the fee award to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
- The Third Circuit reversed the District Court's award of expert fees, holding they were not authorized by § 1988 beyond the statutory $30 per diem for witnesses.
- WVUH, as petitioner, sought and was granted a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the phrase 'a reasonable attorney's fee' in the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, authorize a federal court to shift expert witness fees to the losing party?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Scalia
No, the phrase 'a reasonable attorney's fee' in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 does not grant courts the authority to shift expert fees to the losing party. The Court reasoned that federal courts are bound by the cost limitations in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1821, which cap witness fees, unless there is explicit statutory authority to the contrary. An extensive review of federal statutes shows that Congress consistently treats 'attorney's fees' and 'expert witness fees' as separate and distinct categories of litigation expenses; dozens of other statutes explicitly authorize shifting both, making their separate mention redundant if 'attorney's fees' were meant to include expert fees. Historical judicial practice similarly treated these as separate items, never shifting expert fees as a component of attorney's fees. The Court distinguished its prior holding in Missouri v. Jenkins, which allowed for paralegal fees, by noting that paralegal services have traditionally been part of the attorney's work product and overhead, whereas expert services have not. The Court concluded it could not supply a legislative omission, as its role is to interpret the statute as written, not to enlarge it.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes, the phrase 'a reasonable attorney's fee' should be interpreted to include expert fees necessary for the successful litigation of a civil rights claim. The majority’s literal interpretation defeats the clear congressional purpose behind § 1988, which was to enable private citizens to vindicate their civil rights by allowing them to recover the full costs of litigation. The legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended to restore the pre-Alyeska practice where courts would shift such fees to make plaintiffs whole. Expert services are functionally analogous to the paralegal services approved for shifting in Missouri v. Jenkins; both are essential litigation support that reduce overall costs by allowing attorneys to focus on legal tasks. Denying recovery for essential expert fees undermines the statute's remedial purpose by creating a significant financial barrier to bringing complex but meritorious civil rights cases.
Analysis:
This decision represents a significant application of textualism in statutory interpretation, prioritizing the plain meaning of the statutory language over arguments based on legislative history and policy goals. By creating a bright-line rule that 'attorney's fees' do not include 'expert fees' unless explicitly stated, the Court limited the financial recovery available to successful civil rights plaintiffs, thereby increasing the economic risks of pursuing complex cases that require expert testimony. This holding was highly controversial and prompted a direct legislative response. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress amended § 1988 to explicitly authorize the shifting of expert fees, effectively overturning this decision for future cases and signaling its disagreement with the Court's narrow interpretation.
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