Wemark v. State
1999 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 276, 1999 WL 1052019, 602 N.W.2d 810 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
A defense attorney's breach of duty in advising a client to reveal the location of a crime's instrumentality does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel unless the defendant can also prove that the disclosure was prejudicial, meaning there is a reasonable probability the trial's outcome would have been different without the error.
Facts:
- Robert Wemark's wife, Melissa Wemark, was found stabbed to death in their home.
- Police discovered Wemark at an abandoned farmhouse with self-inflicted gunshot wounds after he had cleaned the crime scene and washed bloody clothing.
- Wemark gave conflicting accounts, first claiming his wife fell on a knife and later admitting he stabbed her.
- After months of searching, police were unable to locate the murder weapon.
- During trial preparations, Wemark disclosed to his defense attorneys that he had hidden the knife under the basement steps.
- Believing they had an ethical obligation to disclose this information, Wemark's attorneys advised him to reveal the knife's location to the State's medical expert during an examination.
- Wemark followed this advice, the expert informed the prosecutor, and the State recovered the knife.
- The knife was subsequently introduced as evidence against Wemark at his murder trial.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert Wemark was convicted of first-degree murder in a state trial court and sentenced to life imprisonment.
- Wemark's judgment and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.
- Wemark filed an application for postconviction relief in the district court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.
- The district court denied the application, finding counsel's actions were reasonable trial strategy and that no prejudice resulted.
- Wemark (appellant) appeals the district court's denial of his application to the Supreme Court of Iowa.
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Issue:
Does a defense attorney provide ineffective assistance of counsel by advising a client to reveal the location of a crime's instrumentality when that information was learned through a confidential communication and the attorney did not take possession of the instrumentality?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Cady
No. While counsel's performance was deficient, it did not constitute ineffective assistance because the defendant failed to prove that the error resulted in prejudice. To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove both that counsel failed to perform an essential duty and that a reasonable probability exists that, but for the error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Here, the attorney-client privilege protects a client's communication about the location of an instrumentality of a crime, and counsel has no legal duty to disclose that information if they do not take possession of the evidence itself. Therefore, defense counsel breached an essential duty by advising Wemark to reveal the knife's location based on a faulty ethical premise. However, Wemark failed to establish the second prong, prejudice. The evidence of his guilt was overwhelming, including his confession, attempts to cover up the crime, prior threats, and the nature of the victim's wounds. Given this abundance of evidence, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different had the knife not been introduced, so the claim for ineffective assistance of counsel fails.
Analysis:
This case provides a critical clarification on the boundaries of attorney-client privilege concerning physical evidence and the high threshold for proving ineffective assistance of counsel. It reinforces that a lawyer's duty of confidentiality regarding client communications about evidence is breached by disclosure, but this breach is not constitutionally ineffective unless it satisfies the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. The decision underscores that even a significant professional error by defense counsel may not be sufficient to overturn a conviction if the other evidence of guilt is overwhelming. This sets a strong precedent that separates ethical violations from constitutional violations, impacting how future ineffective assistance claims based on disclosure of privileged information are litigated.
