Yes. Welsh should be excused from the draft. The law that excuses 'religious' objectors isn't just for people who go to church or believe in God. The real test is whether someone's belief against war is incredibly strong and central to their life—just like religion is for other people. The Court decided it doesn't matter what label you put on your beliefs. If your personal moral code acts like a religion in your life and makes you refuse to fight, that's good enough to be excused.

Yes, but for a different reason. This judge believed the main opinion was twisting the words of the law. He said Congress really did mean for the exemption to be only for religious people. However, he argued that a law giving a special pass only to religious people is unfair and unconstitutional because it favors religion over non-religion. So, to make the law fair, the Court has to include people like Welsh who have equally strong non-religious moral beliefs.

No. Welsh should have to serve in the military. These judges argued that the Court's job is to follow the law that Congress wrote, not to rewrite it. Congress clearly stated the exemption was for 'religious' reasons, and Welsh himself said his reasons were not religious. Therefore, he doesn't qualify. They argued the law was fair because Congress is allowed to make special rules to protect people's freedom of religion.

Yes. The Supreme Court said that Elliott's personal beliefs were just as strong as religious ones, so he qualifies for conscientious objector status. This means that the law protects people with strong moral or ethical beliefs against war, not just those with religious beliefs. The Court also explained that when a law doesn't include everyone it should, they can change it to include those left out. In this case, they chose to include people with strong moral or ethical beliefs. The Court said that people who don't really believe war is wrong or who only object for practical reasons still can't avoid military service.

No. I disagree because I think Congress only wanted to exempt people whose beliefs against war come from their religion. Congress specifically said moral or philosophical views aren't enough. The Court is wrong to now say those views are included. Even if the law is unfair, it's not the Court's job to rewrite it. Welsh didn't have a good reason under the law to avoid serving in the military.

I agree with the result, but not how the Court interpreted the law. I think the Court basically rewrote the law instead of just interpreting it. I would have ruled in favor of Welsh on the grounds that the law violates the First Amendment by favoring religious beliefs over non-religious ones. To be fair, the law should include people who object to war based on strong moral or ethical beliefs, not just religious ones. What matters is how deeply the belief is held, not where it comes from.

It was held that the conscientious objector exemption applied to "... all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war."

—the court reviewed the Selective Service Act and held that individuals adhering to deeply held moral, ethical or religious beliefs could not be excluded from the class of persons entitled to conscientious objector status simply because their beliefs were derived from sources other than traditional religious training and conviction.

—eligibility for exemption from military service as conscientious objector status justified by sincere religious beliefs

Second, the applicant must demonstrate that his beliefs are based on "religious training and belief," interpreted by the Supreme Court to include beliefs that are ethically or morally derived.

In Welsh, the Court explained that if "an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time," his beliefs qualify as religious beliefs that would entitle him to an exemption from the draft.

The Court held that what is necessary for a conscientious objection to be "religious" is "that this opposition to war stem from the registrant's moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong and that these beliefs be held with the strength of traditional religious convictions."

"Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion there exist two remedial alternatives: a court may either declare it a nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to include those who are aggrieved by exclusion

Otherwise the result is an imposition of hardship on a number of persons whom the legislature intended to protect.

—explaining that when a statute is defective because of its failure to extend to some group a constitutionally required benefit, the court may "either declare it a nullity" or "extend" the benefit "to include those who are aggrieved by exclusion

It is unnecessary, therefore, to urge that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment at least permits government, in some respects, to modify and mold its secular programs out of express concern for free-exercise values.

Yes. A conscientious objector exemption under § 6(j) applies to individuals whose opposition to war is based on sincere and deeply held moral or ethical beliefs that occupy a place in their life parallel to that filled by a belief in God in traditionally religious persons. Following the precedent in United States v. Seeger, the Court held that the statute's definition of 'religious belief' is not confined to theistic beliefs. The proper test is whether a sincere belief functions as a religion in the registrant's life. A registrant's own denial that his beliefs are 'religious' is not dispositive, as few are aware of the broad legal meaning of the term. The statutory exclusion for 'essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views' is narrow and applies only to those whose beliefs are not deeply held or are based solely on expediency or policy, not to those whose political or sociological views are grounded in deeply held moral and ethical principles. Because Welsh’s opposition to war stemmed from moral beliefs held with the strength of traditional religious convictions, he was entitled to the exemption.

Yes, but for constitutional reasons, not as a matter of statutory interpretation. The majority opinion misinterprets Congress's intent; the legislative history of § 6(j) clearly shows that Congress intended to limit the exemption to those with theistic beliefs. However, this statutory distinction between theistic religious beliefs and other deeply held moral beliefs violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by granting a preference to religion. To save the statute from being completely nullified, the Court must remedy its unconstitutional under-inclusiveness by extending its coverage to those, like Welsh, who are conscientiously opposed to war on secular moral and ethical grounds. Therefore, the conviction must be reversed not because the statute as written includes Welsh, but because the Constitution requires that it does.

No. The majority ignores the express will of Congress, which deliberately chose not to exempt individuals like Welsh whose objections to war are not rooted in religious training and belief. The Court's role is to enforce statutes as written, not to redraft them. Furthermore, the statute does not violate the Establishment Clause. Congress may have granted the exemption for practical reasons (religious objectors would be poor soldiers) or to accommodate the Free Exercise Clause, avoiding a potential constitutional conflict. Accommodating free exercise values for religious believers does not constitute an unconstitutional establishment of religion simply because it does not also extend to nonreligious objectors. Welsh's conviction should be affirmed.

Yes. I conclude that the conscientious objector exemption applies to individuals whose opposition to war is based on deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, even if these beliefs are not rooted in traditional religion, because the exemption should not be limited to traditional religious beliefs but also include deeply held moral and ethical beliefs against war. For a conscientious objection to be considered 'religious' within the meaning of the statute, it must stem from the registrant's moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong and these beliefs must be held with the strength of traditional religious convictions. Welsh clearly demonstrated that he held these beliefs with the requisite strength and conviction. His conscientious objection to all war was undeniably based in part on his perception of world politics, but § 6(j) does not exclude objectors whose views are founded to a substantial extent upon considerations of public policy. The two groups that obviously do fall within the exclusions are those whose beliefs are not deeply held and those whose objection to war rests solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency.

No. I dissent because I cannot join today's construction of § 6 (j) extending draft exemption to those who disclaim religious objections to war and whose views about war represent a purely personal code arising not from religious training and belief as the statute requires but from readings in philosophy, history, and sociology. Congress clearly intended to exempt only those whose opposition to war is based on theistic beliefs. To include Welsh exempts from the draft a class of persons to whom Congress has expressly denied an exemption. Whether or not § 6 (j) is constitutional, Welsh had no First Amendment excuse for refusing to report for induction. If § 6 (j) is contrary to the express will of Congress in exempting Welsh, as I think it is, then there is no warrant for saving the religious exemption and the statute by redrafting it in this Court to include Welsh and all others like him.

I concur in the result, but cannot subscribe to the Court's construction of § 6(j). I believe the Court has performed a 'lobotomy' on the statute, reading out of it any distinction between religiously acquired beliefs and those deriving from 'essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.' I would reverse Welsh's conviction on the basis that § 6(j), in limiting the draft exemption to those opposed to war because of theistic beliefs, runs afoul of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. To comport with the Establishment Clause, the exemption must encompass the class of individuals that it purports to exclude, those whose beliefs emanate from a purely moral, ethical, or philosophical source. The common denominator must be the intensity of moral conviction with which a belief is held.

Welsh v. United States

Case Podcast

Rule of Law:

The Legal Principle

Facts:

Procedural Posture:

How It Got Here

Issue:

Legal Question at Stake

Opinions:

Majority, Concurrences & Dissents

Analysis:

Why This Case Matters

Gunnerbot