Welder v. Hitchcock
1981 Tex. App. LEXIS 3629, 617 S.W.2d 294 (1981)
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Rule of Law:
Under Texas law, the renunciation of an intestate share only affects the distribution of that specific disclaimed share, which passes as if the disclaimant had predeceased the decedent. Such a renunciation does not alter the overall method of distribution for the entire estate from per stirpes to per capita.
Facts:
- Tom F. Welder died intestate (without a will) on January 23, 1977.
- At the time of his death, Welder had no surviving spouse, children, or parents.
- His heirs consisted of one living brother, Amos G. Welder, Sr., and the children of two previously deceased brothers, Henry T. Welder and Raymond J. Welder, Sr.
- Henry T. Welder was survived by one child, Elizabeth Welder Harris.
- Raymond J. Welder, Sr. was survived by four children (the appellants).
- Amos G. Welder, Sr. was survived by two children.
- Approximately seventy-four days after Tom F. Welder's death, his surviving brother, Amos G. Welder, Sr., legally renounced his entire share of the inheritance.
Procedural Posture:
- The probate of Tom F. Welder's estate was initiated in the County Court of Bee County, Texas, the court of first instance for probate.
- Upon motions from the parties, the case was transferred to the District Court in the same county.
- The trial court granted a motion to sever the action for descent and distribution from a separate action for partition.
- All parties filed motions for summary judgment regarding the method of distribution.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for the appellees (descendants of Amos and Henry Welder), ordering a per stirpes distribution of the estate.
- The descendants of Raymond J. Welder, Sr. (appellants) appealed the trial court's order to the Court of Civil Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a renunciation of an intestate share by a surviving heir under Section 37A of the Texas Probate Code alter the method of distribution for the entire estate from per stirpes to per capita by creating a legal fiction that the renouncing heir predeceased the decedent for all inheritance purposes?
Opinions:
Majority - Nye, Chief Justice
No. A renunciation under Section 37A of the Texas Probate Code does not alter the overall method of distribution for the entire estate; it only affects the disposition of the disclaimed share. The court reasoned that the statutory language 'the property subject thereof shall pass as if the person disclaiming had predeceased the decedent' refers only to the specific share being renounced, not the entire estate. Reading the disclaimer statute (§ 37A) in harmony with the rules of descent and distribution (§ 43), the court found no legislative intent to change the default per stirpes distribution scheme when heirs are of an unequal degree of kinship. The court further noted that interpreting the statute as the appellants urged would allow a disclaiming heir to manipulate the distribution of the entire estate, a result contrary to the legislature's intent, which was primarily to clarify disclaimer law for tax purposes.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of Texas's disclaimer statute, confining its effect to the specific share being renounced and preventing it from being used to manipulate the entire estate's distribution scheme. It reinforces the stability and predictability of the established per stirpes distribution rules under Section 43 of the Probate Code, ensuring an individual heir's post-mortem decision does not fundamentally alter the shares of all other heirs. The ruling solidifies the understanding that disclaimers are primarily for redirecting a specific inheritance (often for tax planning) rather than re-engineering the entire estate plan.
