Weiss v. United States
1994 U.S. LEXIS 1137, 510 U.S. 163, 127 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
The assignment of commissioned military officers to serve as military judges does not require a second appointment under the Appointments Clause if the judicial duties are germane to the duties of a military officer. Furthermore, the lack of a fixed term of office for military judges does not violate the Due Process Clause, as Congress has provided sufficient statutory safeguards to ensure judicial impartiality within the unique context of the military justice system.
Facts:
- Petitioner Weiss, a United States Marine, committed an act of larceny.
- Petitioner Hernandez, also a United States Marine, was involved in the possession, importation, and distribution of cocaine, as well as conspiracy.
- Both Weiss and Hernandez were tried by courts-martial.
- The judges presiding over their trials and subsequent appeals were all commissioned officers in the Armed Forces.
- These commissioned officers had been assigned to serve as judges by their respective Judge Advocates General.
- The officers had not undergone a second presidential appointment and Senate confirmation specifically for their judicial positions.
- The military judges who presided over the cases did not serve for a fixed term of office and could be reassigned to other duties.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioner Weiss pleaded guilty at a special court-martial and was sentenced.
- Petitioner Hernandez pleaded guilty at a general court-martial and was sentenced.
- The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review (an intermediate appellate court) affirmed both petitioners' convictions in separate appeals.
- The Court of Military Appeals (the highest military court) granted review and, in a splintered decision, rejected the constitutional challenges and affirmed Weiss's conviction.
- Relying on its decision in Weiss, the Court of Military Appeals then affirmed Hernandez's conviction.
- Weiss and Hernandez jointly petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Do the current military justice procedures, which allow commissioned officers to be assigned as military judges by a Judge Advocate General without a second presidential appointment and without a fixed term of office, violate the Appointments Clause of Article II and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, respectively?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Rehnquist
No. The system for appointing military judges and their lack of a fixed tenure are constitutional. For the Appointments Clause, the judges were already properly appointed as commissioned officers by the President with Senate consent. Congress did not intend to require a second appointment, as evidenced by its use of the words 'assign' and 'detail' for judges, in contrast to other high-level military positions that explicitly require a new appointment. Applying the 'germaneness' test from Shoemaker v. United States, the duties of a military judge are germane to the duties of a military officer, as officers have traditionally played a significant role in the military justice system. For the Due Process Clause, courts must give great deference to Congress in military affairs. The factors favoring a fixed judicial term are not 'so extraordinarily weighty as to overcome the balance struck by Congress.' Historically, the military justice system has never featured tenured judges, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides numerous statutory safeguards against command influence, which are sufficient to ensure judicial impartiality.
Concurring - Justice Souter
Yes, I join the Court's opinion, but only on the understanding that military judges are 'inferior officers,' not 'principal officers.' If they were principal officers, the current method of selecting them from a large pool of commissioned officers at the discretion of a Judge Advocate General would be an unconstitutional abdication of the President's and Senate's appointment responsibilities. The line between inferior and principal officers is unclear in this case, so deference to the political branches' determination that military judges are inferior officers is appropriate, thereby upholding the statutory scheme.
Concurring - Justice Ginsburg
Yes, I agree with the judgment. The Court's careful and thorough analysis of the petitioners' claims demonstrates that members of the Armed Forces do not abandon their constitutional rights upon entering service. This case confirms that the judiciary's function is to ensure that service members receive equal justice under the law as written in the Constitution, not merely as granted by a military commander.
Concurring in part and concurring in the judgment - Justice Scalia
No, the procedures are constitutional, but the majority's reasoning is flawed. Regarding the Appointments Clause, the 'germaneness' analysis is essential, not optional, because the Judge Advocates General are not constitutionally authorized to appoint officers; the scheme is valid only because the judicial duties are indeed germane to the office of a military officer. Regarding the Due Process Clause, the Court should not be determining whether Congress struck an 'acceptable balance.' The fact that military justice has operated for over 200 years without tenured judges is dispositive. A process with such a deeply rooted historical sanction in our country cannot be a denial of due process.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the judiciary's deferential stance toward congressional authority over military affairs, emphasizing that the military is a 'specialized society' where constitutional protections may apply differently than in civilian life. It clarifies the scope of the Appointments Clause, holding that assigning new duties to already-appointed officers does not require a new appointment so long as the duties are 'germane' to the original office. By upholding the lack of judicial tenure, the Court reinforces that due process in the military context is evaluated based on its unique history and statutory safeguards rather than by direct analogy to the civilian judicial system.
