Yes, this punishment was cruel and unusual. The sentence was completely out of proportion to what he did. For a minor paperwork crime, he was sentenced to 15 years of 'hard and painful labor,' had to wear chains on his wrists and ankles, lost all his rights as a citizen (like being a father or owning property), and would be watched by the police for the rest of his life. This is harsher than what many robbers or other serious criminals get. The meaning of 'cruel' isn't stuck in the 1700s; it evolves with our sense of justice, and this punishment is cruel by modern standards.

No, the punishment was legal. The 'cruel and unusual' rule was created to stop torture and barbaric *types* of punishments, like being burned at the stake. It wasn't meant to let judges decide that a prison sentence is simply 'too long.' It's the legislature's job to set punishments they think will prevent crime, not the court's. The judges in the majority are overstepping their role and acting like lawmakers. Besides, if the extra punishments like the chains were the problem, the court should have just removed those parts of the sentence instead of throwing out the entire case.

Yes, the 15-year punishment of hard labor in chains and other penalties is too extreme for just lying on an official document. The harshness of the punishment doesn't match how bad the crime was, since no one was actually hurt. What counts as cruel and unusual punishment can change over time as society's ideas about fair punishment change. The cruel and unusual punishment rule is supposed to keep up with kinder, more humane ideas of justice. The punishment here, with its hard painful labor, chains, loss of rights, and permanent loss of freedom, is cruel and unusual. It's way too much time in prison and the effects last forever, which is cruel.

I don't agree with how the majority is reading the cruel and unusual punishment rule. I think they're going against the actual words and unfairly limiting Congress's power to decide punishments for crimes. The rule was meant to stop the really barbaric punishments of the past and stop judges from making up unusual punishments, not to let judges second-guess the punishments Congress picks. If we read it the way the majority does, Congress couldn't really punish crimes at all. The extra parts of the punishment, even if they're too harsh, can be separated from the main 15 years in prison part. Just having to wear chains doesn't automatically make a punishment cruel and unusual, it might be needed to stop prisoners from escaping. So I dissent.

"[I] t is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense."

The Eighth Amendment "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."

—a constitutional provision "*** is enacted, it is true, from an experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth …

"Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who have formed their conception of the relation of a state to even its offending citizens from the practice of the American commonwealths, and believe that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense."

—concluding that punishment of fifteen years in a prison camp was grossly disproportionate to the crime of falsifying a public record

The Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has long required that the punishment for a crime "should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense."

—the United States Supreme Court was interpreting the "cruel and unusual" punishment clause of the Bill of Rights of the Philippine islands.

As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments" requires that the "punishment for crime*** be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense."

—interpreted the Eighth Amendment as requiring as "a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense," and held that a punishment of a fine, plus twelve years in jail, involving wearing of chains, and deprivation of civil rights during that time, followed by perpetual disqualification from political rights, and subjection to …

In 1910, the Court struck down a sentence of twelve years' imprisonment, in chains and at hard and painful labor, for falsifying a public document.

Yes, the punishment of 'cadena temporal' violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition, extended to the Philippines, is not limited to torturous methods but also forbids punishments that are grossly disproportionate to the offense. The sentence of at least 12 years of imprisonment at hard and painful labor, while constantly in chains, followed by a lifetime of surveillance and the permanent loss of all parental authority, marital rights, and property rights, is so disproportionate to the crime of falsifying a 616-peso entry that it shocks the conscience. This punishment is far more severe than those imposed for more serious crimes like robbery or embezzlement in the United States, demonstrating its excessive and unusual character. The cruel and unusual punishment clause must be interpreted progressively, adapting to society's evolving standards of justice, rather than being frozen by historical examples from the time of its enactment. Because the law mandates these inseparable penalties as a unified whole, the entire statutory punishment is unconstitutional.

No, the punishment does not violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The historical purpose of the Eighth Amendment was to outlaw barbarous and torturous *methods* of punishment (e.g., drawing and quartering), not to empower the judiciary to review the *severity* or *length* of a legislatively prescribed sentence like imprisonment. By evaluating the proportionality of the sentence, the majority usurps the core legislative function of defining crimes and prescribing punishments that are deemed necessary to address local conditions and deter crime. The legislature, not the court, is responsible for weighing factors like the tendency to commit certain crimes and the need for stern remedies. Furthermore, even if the accessory penalties were deemed excessive, they are separable from the main punishment of imprisonment; the proper remedy would be to strike down the illegal portion of the sentence, not invalidate the entire law and dismiss the case.

Yes, the punishment of fifteen years of cadena temporal and associated penalties for the crime of falsifying public documents is disproportionate and therefore constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The severity of the punishment does not match the gravity of the offense, as the offense did not result in harm or intent to harm. The Eighth Amendment's scope is not static and must be interpreted in light of evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. The meaning and vitality of the Constitution have developed against narrow and restrictive construction. The cruel and unusual punishments clause is progressive and may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by humane justice. The punishment imposed here, which includes hard and painful labor, chains, loss of civil rights, and perpetual limitation of liberty, is of a cruel and unusual character. It is cruel in its excess of imprisonment and in its irrevocable and perpetual consequences.

I cannot agree with the interpretation given to the cruel and unusual punishment clause, as it is repugnant to the natural import of the language and curtails the legislative power to define and punish crime by asserting judicial supervision over that power. The clause was intended to prohibit the barbarities of past methods of punishment and restrain judicial discretion in imposing unusual punishments, not to limit legislative discretion in determining the adequacy of punishment. If the clause is interpreted as the majority holds, it would deprive Congress of its legitimate authority to punish crime. The accessory punishments here, even if abusive of legislative discretion, are separable from the main punishment of imprisonment. The mere fact that a chain is to be carried does not make the punishment cruel and unusual, as it may be necessary to prevent escape. I therefore dissent.

Weems v. United States

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