Webb v. McGowin
168 So. 199, 1936 Ala. LEXIS 239, 232 Ala. 374 (1936)
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Rule of Law:
A moral obligation is sufficient consideration to support a subsequent promise to pay where the promisor has received a material and substantial benefit, even if the promisor was not legally obligated to pay for the benefit at the time it was received.
Facts:
- J. Greeley McGowin was the president of a lumber company and was supervising work at a mill.
- Joe Webb, an employee, was in the process of dropping a 75-pound pine block from the upper floor of the mill to the ground below.
- Webb saw McGowin on the floor below, directly in the path where the block would have fallen.
- To prevent the block from striking and killing McGowin, Webb held onto the block to divert its fall.
- In doing so, Webb fell with the block to the floor below, suffering severe bodily injuries that left him crippled for life.
- By his actions, Webb saved McGowin's life but at the cost of his own long-term health.
- In gratitude and recognition of Webb's act, McGowin promised to care for and maintain Webb for the rest of Webb's life by paying him $15 every two weeks.
- McGowin made these payments consistently for over eight years until his death, after which his estate's executors refused to continue them.
Procedural Posture:
- Joe Webb sued the executors of J. Greeley McGowin's estate in the Alabama trial court to recover unpaid installments due under McGowin's promise.
- The defendants (McGowin's executors) filed a demurrer to the complaint, arguing the promise was unenforceable for lack of valid consideration.
- The trial court sustained the demurrer, dismissing Webb's lawsuit.
- Webb, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's dismissal to the Alabama Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the promise was enforceable.
- McGowin's executors, as petitioners, sought a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of Alabama to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Is a subsequent promise to pay for a previously rendered, life-saving service, which resulted in a material benefit to the promisor, enforceable as a valid contract?
Opinions:
Majority - Foster, Justice
Yes, a subsequent promise to pay for a previously rendered, life-saving service is enforceable. The court distinguished between a mere moral obligation based on an 'ethical duty' and a moral obligation arising from a material, substantial benefit that the promisor received. When a person receives a material benefit, such as having their life saved, it creates a moral obligation that is sufficient consideration to make a subsequent promise to pay for that benefit legally enforceable. The court explicitly agreed with the lower court's reasoning that a material and substantial benefit to the promisor, rather than to his estate, falls within the class of benefits that the promisor can choose to compensate with an enforceable promise. The validity of this promise is further strengthened by the fact that the promisee, Webb, suffered severe personal injuries while conferring the benefit upon the promisor, McGowin.
Analysis:
This case establishes a significant exception to the traditional contract law rule that 'past consideration is no consideration.' By allowing a moral obligation to serve as valid consideration, the court moved towards a more equitable and just outcome in situations where one party receives a substantial, unrequested benefit. The decision recognizes that a subsequent promise to pay in such extraordinary circumstances is not a mere gratuity but a ratification of a benefit that carries a strong moral weight. This precedent influences contract law by creating a basis for enforcement where strict adherence to the pre-existing duty or past consideration rules would lead to an unjust result, particularly in cases involving life-saving actions or the prevention of serious harm.
