Weaver v. Graham
450 U.S. 24 (1981)
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Rule of Law:
A state law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it is applied retrospectively to a crime and it disadvantages the offender by making the punishment more onerous. A statute that reduces the opportunity for a prisoner to earn "gain time," thereby lengthening their period of incarceration, constitutes a more onerous punishment.
Facts:
- On January 31, 1976, petitioner Weaver committed the crime of second-degree murder in Florida.
- At the time of the offense, Florida law (§ 944.27(1)) provided a formula for prisoners to earn 'gain time' for good conduct at a rate of 5, 10, or 15 days per month, depending on the number of years served.
- On May 13, 1976, Weaver was convicted and sentenced to 15 years in prison.
- In 1978, the Florida Legislature enacted a new statute (§ 944.275(1)) that reduced the monthly gain-time credits to 3, 6, or 9 days per month.
- Beginning on January 1, 1979, the Florida Department of Offender Rehabilitation applied this new, less generous formula to all prisoners, including Weaver.
- The application of the new statute was projected to extend the time Weaver must serve in prison by over two years.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioner Weaver, acting pro se, sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court of Florida, the state's highest court.
- The Supreme Court of Florida summarily denied the petition, relying on its holding in a companion case, Harris v. Wainwright.
- Weaver petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a state statute that reduces the amount of monthly 'gain time' for good conduct that a prisoner can earn violate the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause when applied to a prisoner whose crime was committed before the statute's enactment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Marshall
Yes, the Florida statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. For a criminal law to be ex post facto, it must be retrospective, meaning it applies to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender. The Florida law is retrospective because it is applied to Weaver, whose crime predates the law, changing the legal consequences of his past act. The law is disadvantageous because it constricts Weaver's opportunity to earn early release, making the 'quantum of punishment' for his crime more onerous. The state's argument that gain time is an 'act of grace' and not a 'vested right' is irrelevant to an ex post facto analysis, which focuses not on the prisoner's entitlement but on the legislature's power to increase punishment retroactively. While the new legislative scheme also introduced other discretionary ways to earn gain time, these do not compensate for the reduction in the automatic, non-discretionary gain time available for simple good conduct.
Concurring - Justice Blackmun
Yes, the judgment should be reversed. While I would personally find that the new statute operates only prospectively on credits yet to be earned and does not enhance the original sentence, existing Court precedents, particularly Lindsey v. Washington and Greenfield v. Scafati, compel the conclusion that the law is an unconstitutional ex post facto violation. Therefore, I am bound by stare decisis to concur in the Court's judgment.
Concurring - Justice Rehnquist
Yes, the judgment should be reversed. This is a close case that requires comparing the two statutory schemes 'in toto' to determine if the new one is more onerous. I am persuaded, though not without doubt, that the new statute is more onerous because the substantial reduction in automatic gain time accrued solely for good conduct is not sufficiently offset by the new availability of discretionary gain time. This does not mean that any reduction in automatic gain time could never be offset by a sufficient increase in discretionary opportunities. Florida is also not compelled by this decision to grant prisoners like Weaver the benefits of the new discretionary provisions while they remain under the old automatic gain-time formula.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of the Ex Post Facto Clause to prison administration and sentence-reduction credits. It establishes that the 'quantum of punishment' is not limited to the length of the sentence imposed but also includes the opportunities for early release available at the time of the offense. By rejecting the 'act of grace' or 'vested right' distinction in this context, the Court prevents legislatures from retroactively increasing the actual time a prisoner serves by altering gain-time or parole eligibility rules. This decision solidifies the principle that the legal consequences of a criminal act are fixed at the time the act is committed and cannot be made more burdensome thereafter.
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