Weatherred v. State
963 S.W.2d 115, 1998 WL 21913, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 673 (1998)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 702, expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification is admissible if it is sufficiently relevant to the facts of the case and is based on a sound, reliable scientific methodology. A trial court's exclusion of such qualifying expert testimony, especially in a case heavily reliant on eyewitness identification, constitutes a reversible error that affects the defendant's substantial rights.
Facts:
- Bill Strawn was murdered in Montgomery County, Texas.
- The appellant, Weatherred, who lived approximately 600 miles away, was identified as a suspect due to jealousy over his former girlfriend's relationship with Strawn.
- Two eyewitnesses, N.R. (a 12-year-old) and B.M., briefly saw a man near the crime scene on the morning of the murder for only a few seconds.
- Prior to a live lineup, both witnesses were shown multiple photographic displays (a hunting photo and a photo spread) in which Weatherred was the only individual common to all displays.
- Witness N.R. initially could not identify anyone from the photographs.
- Witness B.M. identified Weatherred from the photographs and also saw a newspaper photograph of him.
- Several months after the incident, both N.R. and B.M. positively identified Weatherred in a live lineup and were unshakable in their identification at trial.
- The State's case was otherwise circumstantial, with no physical evidence such as fingerprints, hair, or fiber linking Weatherred to the scene.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Texas charged appellant Weatherred with Capital Murder in a Texas trial court.
- Weatherred was previously convicted for this crime, but the Court of Appeals reversed that conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.
- In the second trial, the defense sought to introduce expert testimony from Dr. Kenneth Deffenbacher on the reliability of eyewitness identification.
- The State objected, and the trial court sustained the objection, excluding the testimony.
- The jury convicted Weatherred of Capital Murder, and his punishment was assessed at life imprisonment.
- Weatherred (appellant) appealed the conviction to the Texas Court of Appeals, arguing that the exclusion of his expert witness was reversible error.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a trial court abuse its discretion by excluding expert testimony on the psychological factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identification when the proffered testimony is shown to be both relevant to the facts of the case and based on a reliable scientific foundation under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 702?
Opinions:
Majority - Walker, Chief Justice
Yes. The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to admit the expert testimony. Expert scientific testimony is admissible under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 702 if it satisfies a two-prong test of relevance and reliability, as established in Kelly v. State. Here, the testimony of Dr. Deffenbacher was relevant because it was sufficiently tied to the facts of the case—specifically, the brief viewing times, the significant delay before identification, and the potentially biasing effect of showing the witnesses multiple photos of only the appellant. The testimony was also reliable because it was based on established principles of cognitive psychology, supported by peer-reviewed literature, and generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. Because the State's case rested heavily on the eyewitness testimony, which the expert would have called into question, its exclusion affected the appellant's substantial rights and was not harmless error.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Stover, Justice
No. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert testimony. The credibility of eyewitnesses is a matter within the common understanding of the jury, which can be adequately tested through cross-examination without the need for an expert. The concepts of memory fading and potential bias from seeing multiple photos are not so complex that they require expert explanation. Furthermore, the expert's testimony failed the reliability prong of the Kelly test because the expert, Dr. Deffenbacher, could not quantify a specific potential rate of error for eyewitness misidentification, admitting it would be 'difficult to predict precisely just how much increase in error there might be.' This lack of precision renders the testimony speculative and unhelpful, and the trial court's decision to exclude it should be affirmed.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the application of the Daubert/Kelly standard in Texas to expert testimony from the “soft sciences,” particularly the psychology of eyewitness identification. It establishes that such testimony is not a per se invasion of the jury's role but rather a potentially crucial tool for the defense that must be evaluated on its scientific merits. The ruling signals that trial courts must seriously consider the relevance and reliability of this type of evidence rather than dismissing it as a matter of “common sense.” This precedent makes it more likely that defendants in cases hinging on eyewitness testimony can introduce expert evidence to educate jurors on scientifically recognized factors that can undermine identification accuracy.
Unlock the full brief for Weatherred v. State