Watson v. Regional Transportation District
1988 WL 93259, 762 P.2d 133 (1988)
Rule of Law:
A driver's negligence cannot be imputed to an owner-passenger in a negligence action against a third party for personal injuries unless the owner-passenger is personally negligent and that negligence is a proximate cause of their injury, thereby rejecting the 'both-ways' rule of imputed comparative negligence based on a fictional right to control.
Facts:
- Jayma Watson was riding as a passenger on a motorcycle operated by her husband, Randy Watson.
- The Watsons were traveling west on their motorcycle behind an RTD bus on Arapahoe Avenue.
- The RTD bus stopped for a stoplight, began a right turn, and then stopped again before completing the turn.
- Randy Watson applied the motorcycle's brakes, causing it to skid sixty-three feet and strike the rear of the RTD bus.
- Jayma Watson suffered severe injuries to her right leg and foot in the collision.
- Jayma Watson jointly owned the motorcycle with her husband but did not have an operator's license and did not know how to operate the motorcycle.
- At the time of the accident, the Watsons were running errands prior to traveling to Longmont with friends.
Procedural Posture:
- Jayma Watson brought a negligence action against RTD in Boulder County District Court (trial court) for her injuries.
- RTD moved for partial summary judgment, arguing Randy Watson was negligent as a matter of law and his negligence must be imputed to Jayma Watson.
- The trial court initially granted partial summary judgment, finding Randy Watson negligent as a matter of law and imputing his negligence, but later rescinded the 'negligent as a matter of law' finding while maintaining the imputation ruling.
- Prior to trial, Watson's counsel subpoenaed a videotape made by RTD's counsel, and the trial court ordered RTD to produce it for submission to the jury, though not allowing Watson's counsel to preview it.
- The case proceeded to a jury trial where both videotapes were admitted into evidence.
- At the close of evidence, the trial court directed a verdict on Randy Watson's negligence, instructing the jury that he was negligent as a matter of law and his negligence was chargeable to Jayma Watson due to co-ownership and right to control.
- The jury returned a verdict finding RTD 51% negligent and Jayma Watson 49% negligent, with total damages of $100,000.
- The trial court entered judgment in favor of Watson and against RTD for $51,000.
- RTD and Watson each filed post-trial motions (for judgment notwithstanding the verdict/new trial and C.R.C.P. 59 relief, respectively), both of which the trial court denied.
- Watson appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court), contending the trial court erred by imputing Randy Watson's negligence to her.
- RTD cross-appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, arguing the trial court erred in refusing to give certain jury instructions regarding Randy Watson's duty of care.
- The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the imputation of Randy Watson's negligence to Jayma Watson but reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial due to defects in the jury instructions (in favor of RTD's cross-appeal).
- Watson petitioned for certiorari to the Colorado Supreme Court to review the imputation of negligence issue, and RTD cross-petitioned for certiorari to resolve the work product question.
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Issue:
1. Does the negligence of a vehicle operator, who is also a co-owner, get imputed to an injured passenger-owner who is suing a third party, merely because of their co-ownership, joint occupancy, and a common purpose? 2. Did the trial court err in permitting the jury to view a videotape filmed by RTD's counsel, which RTD claimed constituted privileged attorney work product?
Opinions:
Majority - Lohr, Justice
No, the negligence of a vehicle operator should not be imputed to an injured owner-passenger in a negligence action against a third party based on joint ownership, occupancy, and common purpose; an owner-passenger's recovery is limited only by their personal negligence. Furthermore, the trial court did not err in permitting the jury to view the videotape filmed by RTD's counsel. The Court determined that the rule of imputed comparative negligence, as expressed in Moore v. Skiles, is based on a legal fiction unsupported by valid policy considerations. The 'right to control' upon which the imputation is based no longer resembles reality in the context of modern motor vehicles, as a passenger has no practical capacity to control a moving automobile. While vicarious liability initially arose to provide financially responsible defendants, extending this 'both-ways' to curtail liability for injured plaintiffs is logically infirm and frustrates the goal of broadened liability. The Court emphasized that 'architectural symmetry' is an insufficient justification for a rule that shields wrongdoing and limits recovery for injuries received through no fault of the plaintiff. Instead, an owner-passenger’s recovery should be limited only if they are personally negligent and that negligence is a proximate cause of their injury. Therefore, the Court overruled Moore v. Skiles and its progeny. Regarding the work product issue, the Court held that the videotape depicting bus turns at a public intersection was not absolutely protected work product, as it did not reflect counsel's mental processes. Watson demonstrated a substantial need for the videotape and an inability to obtain its substantial equivalent without undue hardship, as RTD controlled the driver for experiments. Thus, the trial court properly admitted the videotape.
Analysis:
This case represents a landmark shift in Colorado tort law by abolishing the 'both-ways' rule of imputed comparative negligence for owner-passengers, a doctrine rooted in the fictional 'right to control' from Moore v. Skiles. The decision aligns Colorado with a growing number of jurisdictions that prioritize individual fault and reject legal fictions that curtail liability without strong policy justification. By requiring an owner-passenger's recovery to be limited only by their personal negligence, the court significantly enhances the ability of injured, non-negligent owner-passengers to recover damages from negligent third parties. This ruling clarifies that the focus in comparative negligence should be on actual fault, not imputed fault, thereby broadening liability for negligent third parties and potentially impacting how vehicle co-ownership is considered in accident litigation.
