Washington v. HOVENSA LLC
55 V.I. 1265, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14920, 652 F.3d 340 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
A domicile once established is presumed to continue, placing a heavier burden of production on the party asserting a change in domicile, and a party's self-serving affidavit of intent regarding domicile should not be disregarded unless clearly contradicted by an inconsistent course of conduct.
Facts:
- On April 5, 2006, Gloria Washington was injured while driving a rental car on Hovensa’s property in the Virgin Islands when improperly trained Triangle employees allegedly shattered her driver’s side window with a sandblast.
- At the time of the incident and when she filed her complaint, Washington, originally from St. Croix, had several strong ties to Texas, including owning a home in Baytown where her daughter lived, maintaining a Texas driver's license and vehicle, having a Texas bank account and primary care doctor, paying Texas taxes, and receiving mail there.
- In December 2005, Washington, who was employed by a Texas corporation, went to St. Croix for a work assignment as a pipe inspector at the Hovensa refinery, which she testified was for an 'indefinite' period.
- Upon arriving in St. Croix, Washington rented and furnished an apartment, lived in close proximity to several family members (including her mother, sister, and brothers) with whom she socialized, and began a romantic relationship with a V.I. resident.
- Washington's employer provided her with a $100 per diem to cover her rent and other living expenses during her assignment in St. Croix.
- Washington later submitted an affidavit stating that when she traveled to St. Croix, she intended to return to Texas when her project was complete and to continue to live in Texas.
Procedural Posture:
- On July 24, 2006, Gloria Washington filed a complaint against Hovensa, LLC and Triangle Construction and Maintenance, Inc. in the District Court of the Virgin Islands, asserting diversity of citizenship.
- Following discovery, Washington filed a Motion to Extend Expert Deadlines, which the Magistrate Judge denied after finding she failed to establish good cause.
- Triangle filed an Emergency Motion for Physical Examination of Washington at her expense, which the Magistrate Judge granted, and Washington's subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied.
- Defendants Hovensa and Triangle then filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, arguing that Washington was domiciled in the Virgin Islands, not Texas, thus destroying diversity.
- The District Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that Washington was domiciled in the Virgin Islands.
- Washington, as appellant, appealed the District Court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the Magistrate Judge's rulings on discovery motions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
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Issue:
Did the District Court err in determining that Gloria Washington was domiciled in the Virgin Islands, thereby lacking subject-matter jurisdiction, by improperly applying the presumption of continued domicile and disregarding her affidavit of intent to return to Texas?
Opinions:
Majority - Rendell
No, the District Court erred in concluding that Gloria Washington was domiciled in the Virgin Islands, as it failed to properly apply the legal principles governing domicile determination, specifically the presumption of continued domicile and the treatment of self-serving affidavits. The court reasoned that an established domicile is presumed to continue until shown to have changed, which places a heavier burden of production on the party (here, the defendants) seeking to prove a new domicile. The District Court's opinion did not demonstrate that it gave appropriate weight to Washington's substantial ties to Texas, which supported her established domicile there. Furthermore, the District Court erred in completely disregarding Washington's affidavit of intent to return to Texas by citing Korn v. Korn, because, unlike Korn, Washington's course of conduct (e.g., maintaining Texas property, licenses, accounts, and receiving a per diem) did not clearly contradict her stated intent. The court also found that the District Court made a factual error in concluding that Washington's 'business, domestic, and social life was centered in St. Croix,' noting a lack of supporting evidence in the record for frequent socialization or extensive business life beyond her temporary employment. Finally, the court found the District Court's analogy to Krasnov v. Dinan in reasoning about the indefinite nature of Washington's job to be inapt because, unlike the defendant in Krasnov, Washington had an established residence in Texas to which she intended to return.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the application of the presumption of continued domicile, emphasizing that while the burden of persuasion for diversity jurisdiction remains with the plaintiff, the burden of production shifts to the party asserting a change in domicile. It also refines the standard for disregarding self-serving affidavits of intent, requiring a strong showing of inconsistent conduct rather than mere self-service. Future cases will likely see stricter scrutiny of lower court domicile determinations, particularly concerning the weight given to established ties versus temporary residency and the balance between declarations of intent and actual conduct. This ruling underscores the importance of a comprehensive factual analysis guided by these legal presumptions and precedents.
