No, the law is constitutional. For something to be a 'fundamental right' under the Constitution, it usually has to be something Americans have traditionally been allowed to do. For centuries, our laws have been against assisted suicide. The right to refuse medical treatment is different; that's about your right not to have your body touched without permission. Because there is no fundamental right to assisted suicide, the state only needs a good reason for the ban. Washington has several good reasons, like protecting life, preventing vulnerable people from being pressured into suicide, and avoiding a 'slippery slope' to more dangerous practices.

No, the law is okay. We don't need to decide the bigger question because Washington's law doesn't stop doctors from giving dying patients strong pain medicine, even if that medicine might make them die sooner. Since people aren't being forced to die in terrible pain, the state is allowed to ban assisted suicide to protect people who might be pressured into it. This whole debate is better handled by state governments, not the courts.

No, the law is okay in general. I agree that you can't just strike down the whole law. But I think there might be a specific case in the future where a person is in so much constant, horrible pain that their right to a dignified death is more important than the state's reasons for the ban. So, today's decision might not apply to everyone in every possible situation.

No, the law can stay for now. This is a really tough issue. A dying person's desire for a peaceful death is very powerful. But the state also has a good point that allowing this could lead to a 'slippery slope' where people who aren't really ready to die are put at risk. Because we can't know for sure what would happen, it's better to let state legislatures study the issue, gather facts, and experiment with different solutions.

No. I agree with Justice O'Connor's reasoning.

No. I agree with Justice O'Connor that since the law allows doctors to give pain medication that might hasten death, people are not being forced to suffer. If a state law ever blocked that kind of pain relief for dying patients, we might have to look at this issue again.

No, the law is okay because the Constitution protects really important rights that have been part of our history for a long time, and helping someone commit suicide isn't one of those rights. The state has good reasons to stop people from helping with suicide, like respecting all life, stopping people from ending their lives too quickly, making sure doctors stay as healers, protecting people who might be taken advantage of, and stopping a slippery slope towards allowing other forms of ending life.

Agrees with the main decision but points out that people can still talk and make decisions about this issue in the future. Also, the Court is careful about making new rules about personal freedoms because it's hard to know the right way to do it.

Agrees with the result but says that the Court's decision doesn't mean all similar laws are always okay. The Constitution does protect some personal freedoms very strongly, but helping someone commit suicide isn't one of them.

Agrees with the result because the state has strong reasons to keep the law as it is. There are some freedoms that are really important and protected, but this isn't one of them.

Agrees with the result for the reasons Justice O'Connor gave, including the need for careful thinking about personal freedoms.

Agrees with the result, sharing Justice O'Connor's views and adding more reasons why the Court's decision is important. Reminds that the Constitution protects some freedoms a lot, but not the freedom to help with suicide.

I concur with the main decision but point out that people can still talk and make decisions about this issue in the future. Also, we are careful about making new rules about personal freedoms because it is hard to know the right way to do it.

I concur with the result but note that this decision does not mean all similar laws are always okay. The Constitution does protect some personal freedoms very strongly, but helping someone commit suicide is not one of them.

I concur with the result because the state has strong reasons to keep the law as it is. There are some freedoms that are really important and protected, but this is not one of them.

I concur with the result for the reasons Justice O'Connor gave, including the need for careful thinking about personal freedoms.

I concur with the result, sharing Justice O'Connor's views and adding more reasons why the decision is important. The Constitution protects some freedoms deeply, but not the freedom to help with suicide.

"[T] he Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."

—holding, in case challenging constitutional validity of statute forbidding assisted suicide, that liberty interest at issue should not be defined as an interest in choosing "how to die" or "the time and manner of one's death"; instead the issue was whether the liberty interest protected by the due process clause "includes a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to …

—noting that fundamental rights and liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause include the rights to marry, to raise children, to privacy, to use contraception, and to bodily integrity, as well as the interests protected by the Bill of Rights

"Ordinarily, where a fundamental liberty interest protected by the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment is involved, the government cannot infringe on that right `unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.'"

The Due Process Clause "provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests."

"The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that it has `always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.'"

—listing some, but not all, of those rights and liberty interests recognized by the Supreme Court as fundamental

This court will recognize a fundamental right to sexual privacy if plaintiffs' evidence of our national history, legal traditions, and contemporary practices establishes that such right is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."

No. Washington's prohibition against causing or aiding a suicide does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause protects fundamental rights and liberties that are objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition. An examination of this history reveals a consistent and near-universal legal tradition of rejecting assisted suicide, dating back to the common law. The asserted right is therefore not a fundamental liberty interest. Unlike the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment recognized in *Cruzan*, which is based on the common-law protection against battery, a right to assisted suicide has no similar legal pedigree. The general language in *Planned Parenthood v. Casey* about defining one's own concept of existence does not create a blanket right to personal autonomy for all important decisions. Because no fundamental right is at issue, the statute need only be rationally related to legitimate government interests. Washington's interests—including the preservation of human life, the prevention of suicide among vulnerable populations, the protection of the medical profession's integrity, the shielding of the poor and disabled from coercion, and avoiding a slippery slope toward euthanasia—are legitimate and the ban is rationally related to advancing them.

No. There is no generalized right to commit suicide. The Court does not need to address the narrower question of whether a mentally competent, terminally ill person experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of their imminent death. This is because Washington law does not prohibit physicians from providing medication to alleviate suffering, even to the point of hastening death. Given the availability of palliative care, the State’s interests in protecting vulnerable individuals from coercion or mistake are sufficient to justify the ban on assisted suicide. The ongoing, complex debate over this issue is best left to the 'laboratory of the States.'

No. The Washington statute is not invalid on its face, meaning it is not unconstitutional in all or most of its applications. A categorical prohibition on assisted suicide is permissible. However, this holding does not foreclose the possibility that an individual plaintiff in a more particularized, as-applied challenge could prevail. There are situations where a competent, terminally ill individual's liberty interest in avoiding intolerable pain and preserving personal dignity might outweigh the State's general interests. The liberty interest at stake is not merely a right to refuse treatment, but a more profound interest in deciding how, rather than whether, to die when death is imminent.

No. The statute's application has not been shown to be unconstitutional. Using the balancing test from Justice Harlan's dissent in *Poe v. Ullman*, the individual's claim to physician assistance in dying is exceptionally strong, rooted in the concepts of bodily integrity and freedom from suffering. However, the State has equally compelling interests in protecting against the risks of a 'slippery slope,' where the right could be expanded to non-terminal or non-competent individuals, and where subtle coercion could lead to involuntary euthanasia. Given the profound factual uncertainty about the feasibility of containing such a right, as exemplified by the disputed experience in the Netherlands, legislatures are institutionally better equipped than courts to study, experiment with, and address this issue at this time.

No. Concurs in the Court's judgment substantially for the reasons stated by Justice O'Connor.

No. The claimed liberty interest is better formulated as a 'right to die with dignity,' which involves personal control and the avoidance of severe physical suffering. It is unnecessary to decide whether this right is 'fundamental' because Washington's law does not prevent doctors from providing palliative care sufficient to control pain, even if that care risks hastening death. Because the law does not force a dying person to undergo severe pain, it does not infringe upon the core of the asserted interest. Were a state to prohibit such palliative care, the Court might have to revisit the issue.

No. The State's prohibition on assisted suicide is consistent with the Due Process Clause, which specially protects only those fundamental rights and liberties that are deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition. The asserted 'right' to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Clause. The State's interests in protecting life, preventing suicide, maintaining the integrity of the medical profession, protecting vulnerable groups, and preventing euthanasia are compelling and justify the prohibition.

Concurs with the majority's decision but emphasizes that the Court's holding permits the debate on physician-assisted suicide to continue, as it should in a democratic society. Also notes that the Court's reluctance to expand the concept of substantive due process is due to the scarcity of guideposts for responsible decision-making in this unchartered area.

Concurs in the judgments, noting that the Court's holding does not foreclose the possibility that some applications of the statute might be invalid. Recognizes that the Due Process Clause provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests, but the right to assisted suicide is not among them.

Concurs in the judgment, stating that the State's interests are sufficient to defeat the claim that its law is arbitrary or purposeless. Acknowledges the list of fundamental rights and liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause, but agrees with the majority that the right to assisted suicide is not a fundamental right.

Concurs in the judgments for reasons stated by Justice O'Connor, including the importance of continuing democratic debate and the caution against expanding substantive due process.

Concurs in the judgments, sharing the views of Justice O'Connor and emphasizing the legal significance of the Court's decision. Notes that while the Court has recognized certain fundamental rights and liberty interests, the right to assisted suicide does not fall within these categories.

No. We hold that Washington's prohibition on assisted suicide is consistent with the Due Process Clause, which specially protects only those fundamental rights and liberties that are deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition. We conclude that the asserted 'right' to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Clause. We find that the State's interests in protecting life, preventing suicide, maintaining the integrity of the medical profession, protecting vulnerable groups, and preventing euthanasia are compelling and justify the prohibition.

I concur with the majority's determination that Washington's prohibition on assisted suicide does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment. I emphasize that continued debate on physician-assisted suicide is appropriate in a democratic society. I also note that we are reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decision-making in this uncharted area are scarce.

I concur in the judgment. This holding does not foreclose the possibility that some applications of the statute might be invalid. The Due Process Clause provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests, but the right to assisted suicide is not among them.

I concur in the judgment. The State's interests are sufficient to defeat the claim that its law is arbitrary or purposeless. I acknowledge the list of fundamental rights and liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause but agree with the majority that the right to assisted suicide is not a fundamental right.

I concur in the judgment for the reasons stated by Justice O'Connor, including the importance of continuing democratic debate and caution against expanding substantive due process.

I concur in the judgment, sharing the views of Justice O'Connor and emphasizing the legal significance of this decision. I note that while we have recognized certain fundamental rights and liberty interests, the right to assisted suicide does not fall within these categories.

Washington v. Glucksberg

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Issue:

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