Washington State Grange v. Brandt
148 P.3d 1069 (2006)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
When a deed creates a fee simple determinable followed by an executory interest that is void under the rule against perpetuities, the void executory interest is stricken, but the fee remains determinable, creating a possibility of reverter in the grantor.
Facts:
- In 1950, Raymond and Margaret Gorze conveyed a parcel of land to the Orchard Grange No. 346 by statutory warranty deed.
- The deed contained a clause stating, 'the land herein deeded reverts back to original plot in event it is no longer used for Grange purposes.'
- The Orchard Grange used the parcel for parking and vehicular access.
- In 1964, the Gorzes contracted to sell the remainder of their property, the 'original plot,' to Robert and Myrna Brandt, finalizing the sale with a deed in 1984.
- In 2004, the Orchard Grange dissolved, and the parcel ceased to be used for 'Grange purposes.'
- The Washington State Grange succeeded the Orchard Grange's interest in the property.
- In 2005, the Brandts obtained a quitclaim deed from the estate of Margaret Gorze, which they claimed transferred the Gorzes' reversionary interest in the 1950 parcel to them.
Procedural Posture:
- The Washington State Grange filed an action against Robert and Myrna Brandt in the trial court to quiet title to the disputed property.
- The trial court granted the Grange's motion for summary judgment.
- The trial court ruled that the 1950 deed's reversionary clause was void in its entirety under the rule against perpetuities, resulting in the Grange holding a fee simple absolute interest.
- The Brandts, as appellants, appealed the trial court's summary judgment order to the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a reversionary clause in a deed, which attempts to create an executory interest that violates the rule against perpetuities, become entirely void, thereby vesting a fee simple absolute title in the grantee?
Opinions:
Majority - Dwyer, J.
No. The reversionary clause does not become entirely void to vest a fee simple absolute in the grantee; instead, the invalid executory interest is stricken, leaving the grantee with a fee simple determinable and creating a possibility of reverter in the grantor. The deed's language 'reverts back to original plot' attempted to create an executory interest in the 'then owner' of the plot. This interest is void under the rule against perpetuities because it might not vest within 21 years of a life in being. However, striking the void executory interest does not convert the grantee's estate into a fee simple absolute. The durational language, 'in event it is no longer used for Grange purposes,' created a fee simple determinable. When a fee simple determinable is followed by a void executory interest, the determinability remains, and a possibility of reverter arises in the grantor by operation of law. Therefore, when the Orchard Grange ceased using the property for Grange purposes, its determinable fee ended, and the property reverted to the Gorzes or their heirs and assigns.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the modern application of the ancient rule against perpetuities to defeasible fees in Washington. The court's holding prevents a grantee from receiving a windfall (a fee simple absolute) when an executory interest is voided. By preserving the grantor's original intent to create a limited, determinable estate, the decision establishes that only the invalid future interest is stricken, not the condition that limits the preceding estate. This approach reinforces the distinction between an estate's duration and the validity of a subsequent interest, providing a clear precedent for how to resolve similar title disputes involving void future interests.
Unlock the full brief for Washington State Grange v. Brandt