Washington Metropolitan Washington Area Transit Authority v. Young
731 A. 2d 389, 1999 D.C. App. LEXIS 131, 1999 WL 420640 (1999)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The doctrine of last clear chance allows a contributorily negligent plaintiff to recover if the defendant had a superior opportunity to avoid the accident, requiring proof that the plaintiff was in a position of danger, was oblivious to or unable to extricate himself from that danger, the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the plaintiff's peril, and the defendant, with available means, could have avoided the injury but failed to do so.
Facts:
- Mr. Young was traveling westbound on Calvert Street on his bicycle, intending to proceed onto Cleveland Avenue, an intersection he frequently navigated.
- A Metro bus, driven by Willie Lewis, was also traveling westbound on Calvert Street, in the left lane, and was stopped at a red light ahead of Mr. Young.
- As the light turned green, both the bus (slightly ahead and to Mr. Young's left) and Mr. Young (in the right lane) entered the intersection.
- The bus began to bear right as if continuing onto Cleveland Avenue but then made a sudden, sharp right turn into 29th Street, cutting across Mr. Young's path in the curb lane.
- Mr. Young attempted to avoid the bus by braking and turning to the right, but his bicycle struck the middle of the bus's right side, causing him to lose his balance and fall under the bus.
- Mr. Young was dragged a short distance, and when the bus stopped, its right rear wheel was on top of his left leg, pinning him for nearly an hour until rescue workers could free him, resulting in severe injuries.
- Witness Colleen Morgan testified that the bus made a wide right turn and that Mr. Young could not have done anything to avoid the collision, but the bus could have stopped if the driver had seen Mr. Young earlier.
- WMATA's Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for right turns instruct drivers to maintain a low speed, keep a foot on the brake, and check mirrors for vehicles and pedestrians during the turn, and SOPs for mirror adjustments indicate the right exterior mirror should show objects near the bus's rear.
Procedural Posture:
- Mr. Young (bicyclist) sued the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) in a District of Columbia trial court for negligence following a collision.
- A jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Young, awarding him $925,000 in damages.
- The jury, using a special verdict form, found that both the bus driver and Mr. Young were negligent, but concluded that the bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, holding WMATA ultimately responsible.
- WMATA filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) with the trial court, arguing insufficient evidence for the last clear chance doctrine.
- The trial court denied WMATA's motion for JNOV.
- WMATA, as appellant, appealed the trial court's denial of its JNOV motion to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, with Mr. Young as appellee.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does sufficient evidence exist to support a jury's finding that a bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid an accident with a bicyclist, despite the bicyclist's contributory negligence, thus warranting the denial of the transit authority's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict?
Opinions:
Majority - TERRY, Associate Judge
Yes, sufficient evidence existed to support the jury's finding that the bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, thus properly denying WMATA's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of WMATA's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, finding that a reasonable jury could have concluded that Mr. Young satisfied the elements of the last clear chance doctrine. Regarding the second element (inability to extricate oneself from peril), the court reasoned that the jury could reasonably infer from Mr. Young's failed attempts to brake and turn, Ms. Morgan's testimony that he couldn't avoid the accident, and the accident itself, that he was inextricably caught. Expert testimony was not required for this assessment by an average layperson. For the third element (defendant's actual or constructive knowledge of peril), the court noted that WMATA's SOPs and diagrams indicated that a properly adjusted right exterior mirror should show objects near the bus's rear. The jury could infer that the driver should have seen Mr. Young in the mirror if it were properly positioned, or, after seeing him in the interior mirror, taken further precautions before turning. Finally, for the fourth element (defendant's ability to avoid), the court concluded that if the driver reasonably should have seen Mr. Young before initiating the turn, he could have avoided the accident by stopping or aborting the turn, as supported by Ms. Morgan's testimony and WMATA's SOPs to ensure clearance. The court also found no reversible error in the jury instructions on concurrent negligence or in the admission of WMATA’s SOPs as evidence of the standard of care, citing Garrison v. D.C. Transit System, Inc., noting that SOPs, while not conclusive, are some indication of required care and any potential prejudice was mitigated by explanatory testimony.
Analysis:
This case reaffirms the narrow applicability of the last clear chance doctrine as an exception to the absolute bar of contributory negligence in the District of Columbia. It clarifies that lay testimony and reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to prove a plaintiff's inability to extricate themselves from peril, even without expert testimony, especially in common vehicle accident scenarios. Furthermore, the decision solidifies the principle that a company's internal Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) can be admissible evidence of a standard of care in negligence actions, even if not strictly mandatory, if they demonstrate a level of expected conduct relevant to the circumstances, potentially influencing future cases involving organizational negligence.
