Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Johnson
1999 D.C. App. LEXIS 50, 1999 WL 104564, 726 A.2d 172 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to allow recovery for a plaintiff who voluntarily and intentionally invited the harm that befell them, such as by attempting suicide, even if the defendant could have prevented the injury.
Facts:
- On March 20, 1986, Devora Johnson jumped from a subway station platform into the path of an oncoming Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) train.
- Devora Johnson jumped of her own volition and with the intention of committing suicide.
Procedural Posture:
- Devora Johnson sued the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) in a District Court.
- The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of WMATA.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (intermediate appellate court) reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for trial in an opinion known as 'Johnson I'.
- The first trial resulted in a mistrial.
- At the second trial, the District Court instructed the jury to determine if WMATA had the last clear chance to save Ms. Johnson and if the train operator breached the standard of care.
- The jury found WMATA liable.
- WMATA appealed the jury verdict to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (appellant).
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (in 'Johnson II') certified a question of District of Columbia law to the D.C. Court of Appeals (highest court for D.C. law).
- A division of the D.C. Court of Appeals issued an opinion answering the certified question.
- The D.C. Court of Appeals en banc subsequently vacated the division's opinion and set the case for rehearing.
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Issue:
Under District of Columbia law, may a plaintiff who has voluntarily assumed an unreasonable risk of incurring a particular injury, specifically by intentionally attempting suicide, recover from a defendant who failed to take the last clear chance to prevent that injury?
Opinions:
Majority - Farrell, Associate Judge
No, the doctrine of last clear chance may not be invoked when a plaintiff has voluntarily and intentionally invited the particular harm that occurred. The last clear chance doctrine is intended to allow recovery despite a plaintiff's contributory negligence, not intentional self-harm. It presupposes a plaintiff who was oblivious to their peril or would have wanted to extricate themselves, which is contrary to a suicidal act. Instead, the principle of assumption of risk applies; by purposely inviting harm, Ms. Johnson relieved WMATA of any duty it otherwise owed her, including a duty to take the last clear chance. Even where a plaintiff's conduct is reckless, the law often leaves both parties where it finds them if the defendant's conduct is also reckless, but this case involves deliberate intent. Public policy also supports this outcome by maintaining disincentives for voluntary self-destruction, rather than creating a perverse incentive for suicide by allowing compensation for heirs. Existing deterrence mechanisms, such as criminal sanctions for intoxicated train operators, sufficiently encourage careful conduct. Awarding damages for deliberately invited harm is incompatible with a tort system designed to compensate for injuries caused by the fault of others.
Dissenting - Wagner, Chief Judge
Yes, for the reasons stated in Parts I and III of Judge Ruiz's dissenting opinion, the last clear chance doctrine should apply. Recovery should be allowed against a defendant who willfully or wantonly failed to prevent the decedent's death, even if the decedent intentionally placed herself in a position of peril from which she could not extricate herself.
Dissenting - Ruiz, Associate Judge
Yes, the last clear chance doctrine should apply, permitting recovery by Ms. Johnson's family and estate against the reckless train operator. The majority's exclusive focus on Ms. Johnson's conduct ignores the train operator's subsequent reckless behavior, which was the immediate cause of her death and occurred after she jumped onto the tracks. Traditional assumption of risk does not excuse a defendant from liability for failing to exercise due care or for subsequent reckless conduct, especially for a common carrier charged with a public duty, which is explicitly exempted from certain assumption of risk defenses. Furthermore, if a defendant's negligence supersedes the plaintiff's intentional conduct as the proximate cause of injury, the defendant should be liable. The majority's premise that Ms. Johnson acted with requisite voluntariness and knowledge is questionable, given her history of serious mental illness. Society's condemnation of suicide suggests that such an act is unreasonable, and there should be an evidentiary presumption against its voluntariness for tort liability purposes. Denying recovery here revives an outdated, punitive attitude towards suicide, punishing the victim's family rather than holding accountable a train operator who acted recklessly and unlawfully (operating intoxicated). The case of District of Columbia v. Peters concerned an intervening act breaking a causal chain, whereas here, Ms. Johnson's act preceded the operator's recklessness, making his actions the immediate cause of death, thus calling for the application of last clear chance.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the limits of the last clear chance doctrine in the District of Columbia, affirming that it cannot be invoked when a plaintiff's injury results from a voluntary and intentional act of self-harm, such as suicide. The ruling distinguishes between contributory negligence or recklessness, where the doctrine may apply, and deliberate intent to incur injury, where it does not. It underscores the policy consideration against providing a potential incentive for suicide through civil recovery and reinforces the common law principle that intentional self-harm generally relieves others of a duty to prevent that harm. Future cases involving intentional acts that precede a defendant's alleged 'last clear chance' will likely cite this case to limit liability.
