Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Johnson
699 A.2d 404, 1997 WL 528320, 1997 D.C. App. LEXIS 205 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
The doctrine of last clear chance, which allows a contributorily negligent plaintiff to recover if the defendant had the final opportunity to avoid the harm, applies even when the plaintiff's negligence arises from an intentional act of suicide. There is no suicide exception to the last clear chance doctrine in the District of Columbia.
Facts:
- Devora Johnson had a history of serious mental illness, which included seven hospitalizations.
- On March 20, 1986, Devora Johnson intentionally jumped onto the subway tracks in front of an oncoming train operated by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA).
- Johnson's undisputed intent was to commit suicide.
- The WMATA train conductor delayed engaging the emergency brake.
- Evidence indicated that Johnson's death could have been avoided if the conductor had not delayed braking.
- The train struck and killed Devora Johnson.
Procedural Posture:
- Eleanor and Franklin Johnson (plaintiffs) sued the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
- The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of WMATA.
- The Johnsons appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (an intermediate federal appellate court) reversed the summary judgment.
- The case went to trial, which resulted in a mistrial.
- A second jury trial resulted in a verdict for the Johnsons, finding WMATA liable under the last clear chance doctrine.
- WMATA appealed again to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, arguing Johnson's assumption of risk barred recovery.
- Finding no controlling D.C. precedent, the U.S. Court of Appeals certified the legal question to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (the highest court for D.C. law).
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Issue:
Does the doctrine of last clear chance apply to allow recovery when a plaintiff's contributory negligence and assumption of risk stemmed from an intentional act of suicide?
Opinions:
Majority - Ruiz, Associate Judge
Yes, the doctrine of last clear chance applies even when the plaintiff's conduct was an intentional suicide attempt. The court holds that District of Columbia law does not recognize a suicide exception to the well-established last clear chance doctrine. The court's reasoning is twofold. First, there is no precedent in D.C. jurisprudence to support creating such an exception. Second, the court is unprepared to hold that a person intending suicide, as a matter of law, always “assumes the risk” in a manner that bars recovery, as the knowledge and voluntariness requirements of that defense do not comfortably fit the circumstances of suicide, especially given Johnson's history of mental illness. The court dismissed policy arguments that this holding would incentivize suicide as purely speculative. The primary focus of the last clear chance doctrine is on the actions of the defendant and whether they acted reasonably to prevent injury to a person in harm's way, regardless of that person's intent.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the last clear chance doctrine in the District of Columbia as a robust, plaintiff-friendly rule that mitigates the harshness of the traditional contributory negligence bar to recovery. By explicitly rejecting a 'suicide exception,' the court emphasizes that the defendant's final opportunity to prevent harm is the paramount consideration, reinforcing the doctrine's focus on the last negligent act as the legally significant cause. This precedent makes it difficult for future defendants to argue that a plaintiff's particularly egregious or intentional self-endangerment automatically bars recovery if the defendant still possessed a final, reasonable chance to prevent the ultimate harm.
