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Warth v. Seldin

Supreme Court of United States
422 U.S. 490 (1975)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

To have standing to challenge a municipality's exclusionary zoning practices in federal court, a plaintiff must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating a particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant's actions and will likely be redressed by a favorable court decision.


Facts:

  • The town of Penfield, New York, a suburb of Rochester, enacted a zoning ordinance that allocated 98% of its vacant land to single-family detached housing.
  • The ordinance imposed strict requirements on lot size, setback, and floor area, increasing the cost of housing.
  • Only 0.3% of Penfield's vacant land was zoned for multi-family residential structures, and development was still subject to restrictive requirements.
  • Several low- and moderate-income individuals (Ortiz, Reyes, Sinkler, and Broadnax), some of whom were members of minority groups, desired to live in Penfield but were unable to find affordable housing.
  • Taxpayers from the neighboring city of Rochester claimed Penfield's policies forced Rochester to provide more low-income services, thereby increasing their tax burden.
  • The Rochester Home Builders Association, representing construction firms, alleged its members were prevented from building low- and moderate-cost housing in Penfield.
  • The Penfield Better Homes Corp., a member of the Housing Council, had its 1969 application for a zoning variance to build moderate-income housing denied by Penfield officials.
  • Metro-Act of Rochester, a housing advocacy organization, included members who were Penfield residents and claimed they were being deprived of the benefits of living in a racially and ethnically integrated community.

Procedural Posture:

  • Various organizations and individuals sued the town of Penfield and its officials in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York.
  • The complaint alleged the town's zoning ordinance was unconstitutional and violated federal civil rights statutes.
  • Rochester Home Builders Association, Inc. filed a motion to intervene as a party-plaintiff.
  • The original plaintiffs filed a motion to add Housing Council in the Monroe County Area, Inc. as a party-plaintiff.
  • The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that none of the parties had standing to sue, and denied the motions to intervene and add parties.
  • The original plaintiffs and the proposed intervenors (appellants) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
  • The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment, agreeing that none of the parties had standing.
  • The petitioners sought and were granted a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court.

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Issue:

Do petitioners, including low-income individuals who desire to live in a town, taxpayers from an adjacent city, and organizations representing residents and builders, have standing under Article III to challenge the town's allegedly exclusionary zoning ordinance without alleging a specific, concrete injury directly caused by the ordinance that a court's remedy could redress?


Opinions:

Majority - Justice Powell

No. None of the petitioners have standing because they failed to allege a distinct and palpable injury to themselves that is fairly traceable to the town's zoning practices and would likely be redressed by the requested relief. To establish a case or controversy under Article III, a plaintiff must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome, not a generalized grievance. The low-income petitioners did not allege that but for Penfield's ordinance, a specific housing project they could afford would have been built; their inability to find housing may be a consequence of market economics rather than the ordinance. The Rochester taxpayers' alleged injury is too speculative and indirect, resting on the actions of Rochester officials (who are not parties), and impermissibly asserts the rights of third parties. The associations lack standing because their claims also fail: Metro-Act asserts a generalized grievance and third-party rights not granted by statute; Home Builders fails to allege a specific, current project being thwarted, making its claim for prospective relief unripe and its claim for damages too individualized for associational standing; and the Housing Council's claim relies on a past, non-live controversy involving one of its members.


Dissenting - Justice Douglas

Yes. The petitioners have standing and should be allowed to proceed. The Court reads the complaint with 'antagonistic eyes' and uses standing as an artificial barrier to prevent the federal courts from addressing festering social problems like class- and race-based segregation. The associations represent the communal desire to live in a desegregated community, which is a sufficient interest to establish standing. The Court should lower these technical barriers and allow the case to be decided on the merits after all the facts have been developed at trial.


Dissenting - Justice Brennan

Yes. At least three groups of petitioners—the low-income individuals, the Home Builders association, and the Housing Council—have alleged sufficient facts to establish standing. The Court's opinion reflects an 'indefensible hostility to the claim on the merits' and imposes an impossible pleading burden, effectively requiring plaintiffs to prove their case before discovery. The very success of Penfield's exclusionary scheme, which prevents any low-income projects from ever becoming concrete, is being used as a shield against suit. The alleged harms—such as substandard housing and increased commuting costs—are concrete injuries directly caused by the town's actions, and the builders' past futile attempts are sufficient to show a continuing controversy.



Analysis:

Warth v. Seldin significantly heightened the Article III standing requirements for plaintiffs challenging exclusionary zoning ordinances in federal court. By demanding a highly specific and demonstrable causal link between the ordinance and a plaintiff's particularized injury, the decision made it extremely difficult for individuals and groups to mount generalized attacks on such laws. The ruling effectively requires a plaintiff to identify a specific, viable housing project that was blocked by the ordinance, a standard that is often impossible to meet when a zoning scheme is so restrictive that such projects are never even proposed. Consequently, this case shifted much of the legal battle over exclusionary zoning from federal courts to state courts, some of which apply more lenient standing rules.

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