Warsham v. James Muscatello, Inc.
189 Md.App. 620, 985 A.2d 156, 2009 Md. App. LEXIS 197 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
A plaintiff who has knowledge of a risk, appreciates that risk, and voluntarily confronts it assumes the risk of injury as a matter of law. The 'rescue doctrine,' which can negate the voluntariness element, does not apply in non-emergency situations where the peril is not imminent and reasonably safe alternatives exist to address the potential hazard.
Facts:
- E. Daris Warsham worked for Master's, Inc., which leased property from James L. Muscatello, Inc.
- An ongoing problem with water pooling in the shared parking lot, of which Warsham was aware, had existed since at least the fall of 2004.
- On the morning of March 9, 2005, Warsham arrived at work and saw the pooled water had frozen into a large, plainly visible patch of ice approximately ten feet in diameter.
- Warsham initially avoided the ice by walking on the grass and through bushes to enter his office.
- Shortly thereafter, Warsham observed a co-worker, Danny High, drive a van onto the ice patch.
- Warsham went outside, verbally warned High about the ice, and High exited his van without incident.
- After warning High, Warsham retrieved a bucket of salt and began spreading it on the ice to prevent others from falling.
- While attempting to salt the area, Warsham chose to walk across the ice patch, where he slipped, fell, and sustained injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- E. Daris Warsham filed a negligence suit against James L. Muscatello, Inc. in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, a state trial court.
- Muscatello, Inc. moved for summary judgment, arguing the suit was barred by the doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Muscatello, Inc.
- Warsham, as appellant, appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, an intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Is a plaintiff barred from recovery by the doctrine of assumption of the risk as a matter of law when he is injured after knowingly confronting an obvious icy hazard while attempting to remedy it to protect others from potential future harm?
Opinions:
Majority - Hollander, J.
Yes. A plaintiff is barred from recovery by the doctrine of assumption of the risk as a matter of law when he voluntarily confronts a known and appreciated danger in a non-emergency situation. To establish the defense of assumption of the risk, a defendant must show the plaintiff (1) had knowledge of the risk, (2) appreciated the risk, and (3) voluntarily confronted the risk. Warsham conceded the first two elements, as he was aware of the ice and its danger, having warned another person about it. The dispositive issue was voluntariness. The court found that the 'rescue doctrine,' which can render an action involuntary, applies only in situations of imminent peril, such as a fire or a runaway vehicle. Here, no one was in immediate danger when Warsham chose to walk on the ice; he was merely attempting to prevent a potential future risk. Because there was no 'emergency in progress' and Warsham had reasonably safe alternatives—such as throwing salt from the edge, posting a sign, or contacting the landlord—his decision to walk on the ice was a free and voluntary choice, thereby barring his claim.
Analysis:
This decision narrowly construes the 'rescue doctrine' exception to the assumption of the risk defense in Maryland, limiting its application to situations involving imminent and exigent peril. The court reinforces that a plaintiff's well-intentioned or commendable motive for confronting a known risk does not, by itself, negate the voluntariness of their actions. The ruling makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to overcome an assumption of the risk defense in 'slip and fall' cases, even when they are acting as a 'good Samaritan,' if the danger is not immediate and safer alternatives are available. It solidifies the principle that a plaintiff's choice to encounter a known risk, when not compelled by an emergency, is a superseding act that bars recovery.
