Warren v. United States
1981 D.C. App. LEXIS 381, 436 A.2d 821 (1981)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant's statements made in a presentence report, prepared after a prior conviction that was subsequently reversed, are inadmissible as evidence of guilt in a retrial. Furthermore, the cumulative effect of multiple evidentiary errors, such as the improper admission of prior consistent statements and presentence report content, can constitute reversible error if it substantially influences the jury's verdict.
Facts:
- In 1972 and 1973, over an eight-month period, a dozen women reported being kidnapped and sexually assaulted by persons riding in a green Chevrolet Vega or similar car.
- Police arrested John Davis on February 11, 1973, and Morris J. Warren on April 21, 1973, based on descriptions of the car and driver.
- Sharon Williams, Debra Waters, and Marilyn Reed were among the women who reported being kidnapped and sexually assaulted.
- Sharon Williams died in an unrelated incident after Warren's first trial but before his retrial.
- Debra Waters could not be found despite good-faith efforts by the prosecution to locate her for the retrial.
- Marilyn Reed was diagnosed by two psychiatrists as suffering from severe mixed psychoneurosis with suicidal tendencies, and they agreed that testifying again would likely lead to severe psychosis or possible suicide.
- After his initial conviction (later reversed), Morris J. Warren made statements to a probation officer for a presentence report, claiming he knew Marilyn Reed and Sharon Williams and alleging consensual sexual relations with them.
Procedural Posture:
- Morris J. Warren and John Davis were tried jointly in September 1973 for multiple counts of kidnapping and sexual assault.
- A jury found Warren guilty of eleven counts related to four separate incidents.
- On December 30, 1976, Warren's convictions were reversed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals due to prejudicial misjoinder with John Davis.
- The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on the D.C. Court of Appeals' reversal.
- Before his retrial, Warren moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of a speedy trial and prejudicial pretrial publicity, to sever the counts of the indictment, and to suppress certain post-conviction statements.
- The government moved pretrial to introduce the transcripts of the prior trial testimony of four complaining witnesses (Sharon Williams, Debra Waters, Marilyn Reed, and Linda Jenkins).
- On May 30, 1978, Superior Court Chief Judge Harold H. Greene denied most of Warren’s motions (except suppressing statements to police officers) and ruled admissible the prior testimony of Sharon Williams, Debra Waters, and Marilyn Reed (but not Linda Jenkins).
- Warren's retrial began on October 24, 1978.
- The trial court dismissed counts relating to Linda Jenkins and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (ruling they merged into armed kidnapping charges).
- The jury convicted Warren on all remaining counts.
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Issue:
Did the trial court commit reversible error by admitting complainants' detailed prior consistent statements and Morris J. Warren's statements from a presentence report into evidence during his retrial?
Opinions:
Majority - Kelly
Yes, the trial court committed reversible error by admitting inadmissible prior consistent hearsay statements and statements Morris J. Warren made to a probation officer in a presentence report, which collectively constituted reversible error. The court found that Marilyn Reed was psychologically unavailable to testify because expert psychiatric testimony established a high likelihood of severe psychological injury, including psychosis or suicide, if she were forced to testify again, thereby extending the common law definition of unavailability. Debra Waters was found unavailable because the government made a good-faith, reasonable effort to locate her without success. D.C. Code § 14-303, pertaining to party unavailability, was deemed inapposite for non-party witnesses, thus common law and constitutional standards governed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance of the rape charges because the offenses exhibited unique and distinctive characteristics (e.g., green sportscar, teamwork, victim age, pickup location, weapon, deserted locations) establishing a "signature crime" or modus operandi, making evidence of each offense reciprocally admissible to prove identity under Drew v. United States. The total pretrial delay of 22.5 months did not violate Warren's speedy trial rights under Barker v. Wingo, as institutional delays and complex pretrial motions were neutral factors, not deliberate prosecutorial tactics, and Warren suffered no actual prejudice to his defense. However, the court erred by allowing extensive reading of complainants' pretrial suppression hearing testimony (beyond identification) and police officers' testimony relating detailed reports of the crimes. These were improper "rehabilitation" because they were introduced in the government's case-in-chief at retrial without new impeachment by the defense, constituting mere repetition and not falling under the "prior recorded testimony" exception as the first trial testimony was already available. Crucially, the trial court erred by allowing a probation officer to read Warren's statements from a presentence report to the jury. D.C. Super. Ct. Cr. R. 32(b)(1) and Gregg v. United States explicitly state that a presentence report shall not be disclosed unless the defendant has been found guilty, and Warren's initial conviction having been reversed meant he was not "found guilty" for retrial purposes. Using this information, collected for sentencing and without counsel, as evidence of guilt was fundamentally unfair and highly prejudicial, effectively undermining his defense. The cumulative impact of these admitted hearsay statements and the presentence report statements substantially influenced the jury's verdict, forming a significant, repetitious, and officially-imbued part of the government's case, particularly given the absence of live complainant testimony and the lack of a credible defense theory.
Concurring - Kern
Yes, the judgment of conviction must be reversed because the trial court erred by allowing the government to present Morris J. Warren's statements from a presentence report to the jury during its case-in-chief at the retrial. The admission of Warren's incriminating statements from the presentence report violated Super. Ct. Cr. R. 32(b)(1) and the Supreme Court's mandate in Gregg v. United States. This error was substantial and not harmless, especially since Warren did not testify and his defense at the second trial focused on misidentification. The significant impact of this highly-incriminating material on the jury, in a case where the defense challenged the identity of the perpetrator, was too great to be considered harmless error under the Kotteakos test. While agreeing with the majority on the presentence report error, I find the trial court's admission of the other hearsay evidence to have been harmless error under the circumstances.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the standards for "psychological unavailability" of a witness, balancing the confrontation clause with extreme mental health risks. It also strongly reaffirms the strict limitations on the use of presentence reports, emphasizing that their purpose is for sentencing, not for proving guilt at trial, especially after a prior conviction has been vacated. The decision highlights the dangers of cumulative error, where multiple evidentiary mistakes, though perhaps individually harmless, can collectively undermine the fairness of a trial, particularly when crucial testimony is presented by transcript rather than live witness, making it difficult for the jury to assess credibility.
