Warner v. Florida Jai Alai, Inc.
1970 Fla. LEXIS 2741, 235 So. 2d 294 (1970)
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Rule of Law:
For a business owner to be liable for injuries caused by one patron to another, the injured party must allege that the owner had actual or constructive knowledge of the specific risk posed by the particular individual who caused the harm, not merely knowledge of a general potential risk.
Facts:
- Betty M. Warner was a paying patron at a jai alai fronton operated by Florida Jai Alai, Inc.
- The fronton contained both a cashier's window for cashing winning tickets and a bar in close proximity.
- After cashing a winning ticket, Warner turned from the window to place her money in her purse.
- At that moment, a patron in a drunken condition pushed and assaulted Warner, causing her to fall and sustain injuries.
- Warner alleged that the area was unsupervised and that Florida Jai Alai, Inc. should have known that patrons would travel between the bar and other areas.
- She further alleged the fronton failed to police or supervise the area, permitting the drunken patron to cause her injury.
Procedural Posture:
- Betty M. Warner filed a negligence complaint against Florida Jai Alai, Inc. in the Circuit Court of Seminole County (trial court).
- The Circuit Court dismissed Warner's third amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
- Warner (as appellant) appealed the dismissal to the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District.
- The District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal.
- Warner (as petitioner) then sought a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of Florida to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Does a complaint for negligence against a business owner state a cause of action when it alleges a general duty to supervise patrons and that a drunken patron injured the plaintiff, but fails to allege the owner had knowledge of the specific risk posed by that particular patron?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. A complaint for negligence against a business owner fails to state a cause of action if it does not allege the owner had actual or constructive knowledge of the particular risk posed by the individual who caused the harm. The majority found no jurisdictional conflict with prior decisions that would warrant a review of the lower court's holding. By discharging the writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court effectively left in place the District Court of Appeal's decision, which held that knowledge of a general risk (like patrons drinking) is insufficient to establish a duty; the proprietor must have knowledge of the specific risk posed by the particular offending individual.
Dissenting - Adkins, J.
Yes. A complaint for negligence against a business owner states a cause of action by alleging a duty to protect patrons from a specific, foreseeable class of risks, such as those posed by drunken patrons, and that a breach of this duty proximately caused the injury. The dissent argued that a business inviting the public onto its premises, especially one that serves alcohol, has a duty to exercise reasonable care, which includes supervising patrons to prevent foreseeable harm. The dissent reasoned that it is a factual question for a jury whether the fronton owner could have foreseen that an unsupervised, drunken patron would injure another person and whether the failure to supervise was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Therefore, dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action was improper.
Analysis:
By declining to review the case, the Supreme Court let stand the District Court of Appeal's more restrictive standard for premises liability, requiring knowledge of a 'specific risk' from a particular individual. This decision makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to sue business owners for injuries caused by third parties, as they must prove more than just a generally foreseeable danger. The dissenting opinion is significant because it articulates a broader, more plaintiff-friendly view of a proprietor's duty, grounding it in the general foreseeability of harm from a class of individuals (e.g., intoxicated patrons), a standard many other jurisdictions follow.
