Yes, the treaty overrides the state law. The 1783 peace treaty between the U.S. and Britain was a promise that British people could collect all the money they were owed. This treaty is the 'supreme law of the land,' which means it's more powerful than any state law. The Virginia law was a 'lawful impediment' (a legal roadblock) that the treaty was designed to remove. Therefore, Hylton still has to pay his original British creditor, regardless of the Virginia law.

No, the treaty shouldn't cancel what was already done legally. Hylton followed a valid Virginia law when he paid the state, and that should count as a settled debt. The treaty was a promise for what should happen in the future, not a tool to go back in time and undo completed legal actions. To force Hylton to pay a second time is unfair because he acquired a legal right to be free from the debt when he followed the law.

Yes, the peace agreement is more important than the Virginia rule, so the Virginia men still have to pay the British men directly. The court in Virginia was wrong to say they didn't have to pay. The agreement also tells different parts of the government what they need to do, and state laws can't get in the way of that.

I agree that the peace agreement cancels out the Virginia law and lets the British men get their money back from the Virginia men who originally owed it. The words in the agreement are clear in what they mean. The agreement was made by the United States and is the most important law, which the states have to follow. Paying the state under the Virginia law doesn't get rid of the debt, because the agreement removes anything that would legally stop the British from getting paid back for real debts from before the war.

I agree that the Virginia law is canceled by the peace agreement. When the United States became independent, they had to follow the rules countries have with each other. Taking away people's debts has been seen as a bad thing by European countries for a long time. The fourth part of the agreement is written to handle this situation, including debts from before. A state law can't overrule an agreement that is the highest law.

I think the clear meaning of the fourth part of the agreement is to cancel out any laws that hurt the person owed money from getting it back from the person who originally owed it. The agreement is talking about debts how they were first made between the person owed and the person owing, getting rid of any legal things in the way so the money can be gotten back as if those laws were never made. The words in the agreement are absolute and required. The agreement, approved by the Constitution, is as strong as the Constitution itself and more important than any state law.

I don’t agree with the other judges because they think canceling old debts is okay for keeping things orderly, but that isn’t fair. I believe that if a person makes a promise to pay, that promise should be kept because breaking it hurts individual trust. I differ from the majority because they focus only on the state’s need to fix things, while I think protecting personal agreements is just as important.

When the United States declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement.'3 Dall. 199, at 281, 1 L. Ed. 568.

And there are other early indications from the Supreme Court that no mandate in the Constitution requires Congress to follow strictly the law of nations.

The creditor, however, claimed that this state-sanctioned repayment did not count because a provision of the 1783 Paris Peace Treaty between Britain and the United States said that " `the creditors of either side should meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value... of all bona fide debts, theretofore contracted'"; and that provision, the creditor argued …

No one can doubt that a treaty may stipulate, that certain acts shall be done by the Legislature; that other acts shall be done by the Executive; and others by the Judiciary

A treaty cannot be the Supreme law of the land, that is of all the United States, if any act of a State Legislature can stand in its way

—where the Supreme Court ruled that a Virginia Statute was unconstitutional because it was in conflict with the Treaty of Paris of 1783

"Virginia had a right, as a sovereign and independent nation, to confiscate any British property within its territory, unless she had delegated that power to Congress.••.[I] f she had before parted with such power, it must be conceded, that she once rightfully possessed it."

The only case CACI cites that involves recovery from a private party is over two hundred years old, is actually a preemption case, and only tangentially addresses recovery of pre-war debt.

—distinguishing among classes of treaty provisions requiring "execution" by the legislative, executive, and judicial branches

Courts must interpret international law under the ATCA as "it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today."

Yes, the treaty nullifies the Virginia law. A treaty made by the authority of the United States is the supreme law of the land, superior to any state law or constitution. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution applies retroactively to the 1783 Treaty of Peace. The treaty's provision that creditors shall meet with 'no lawful impediment' was intentionally broad to remove all state-level obstacles to debt recovery, including the Virginia statute. Therefore, the payment made under the Virginia law, which constitutes a 'lawful impediment,' is nullified by the treaty, and the original debt is revived.

Yes, the treaty nullifies the Virginia law. The language of the treaty is unequivocal and universal, designed to restore creditors and debtors to their original positions as if the war and the intervening state laws had never occurred. The Virginia act itself is a 'lawful impediment' that is repealed by the treaty, and any payment made under that act is also a lawful impediment that is rendered void. The argument that Virginia could be substituted as the debtor is inadmissible, as the treaty's text clearly refers to the original parties.

Yes, the treaty nullifies the Virginia law. When the United States became independent, it was bound by the modern law of nations, which disfavors the confiscation of private debts. Even if Virginia had the power to enact such a law, the treaty annuls it. The treaty's application to all debts 'heretofore contracted' is clear and conclusive. As the supreme law of the land, the treaty removes any impediment created by the Virginia statute.

Yes, the treaty nullifies the Virginia law. The treaty is the supreme law of the land and overrules all state laws on the subject. The plain and obvious meaning of Article 4 is to nullify from its inception any law that impedes a creditor's right or remedy against their original debtor. The phrase 'no lawful impediment' is as strong and peremptory as language can be to avoid the effects of sequestration, confiscation, or any other legal obstacle.

No, the treaty does not nullify the Virginia law. The payment made by the debtor under the valid 1777 Virginia law was a lawful act that discharged the debt at that time, vesting a right in the debtor. A treaty, while a solemn national promise, does not automatically repeal existing state laws; before the Constitution, this required a specific act by the state legislature. A subsequent repeal of the Virginia law would not retroactively invalidate private rights that were legally acquired and vested under it. The general words of the treaty should not be construed so broadly as to extinguish these pre-existing, lawfully acquired private rights.

Yes. The Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United States supersedes the Virginia law and the payment made under it. The treaty, being the supreme law of the land, removes all lawful impediments to the recovery of debts contracted before the war. Therefore, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Virginia is reversed, and the debt is recoverable from the original debtors. The case also establishes that treaties may require specific actions by different branches of government, and no act of a state legislature can override a treaty.

I agree that the Treaty of Peace nullifies the Virginia law and allows for the recovery of the debt from the original debtors. The words of the treaty are clear and unambiguous in their meaning and intent. The treaty was made under the authority of the United States and is the supreme law of the land, binding upon the states. Paying the state under the Virginia law does not discharge the debt, as the treaty removes all lawful impediments to the recovery of bona fide debts contracted before the war.

I concur that the Virginia law is annulled by the Treaty of Peace. When the United States declared independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations. The confiscation of debts has long been considered disreputable by European nations. The fourth article of the treaty is well expressed to meet this case, extending to debts heretofore contracted. A state law cannot stand against the supreme law of a treaty.

I am of the opinion that the plain meaning of the fourth article of the treaty goes to nullify, ab initio, all laws that impair the creditor's right against his original debtor. The treaty contemplates debts as originally contracted between creditor and debtor, removing all legal impediments so that recovery may be had as if no such laws had been passed. The words of the treaty are absolute and peremptory. The treaty, sanctioned by the Constitution, is of equal force with the Constitution itself and paramount to any state law.

I dissent from the majority because they have overlooked the fundamental constitutional limits that protect private contractual rights. In my view, the state’s act to extinguish debts—purportedly to promote public order—errs by negating preconceived obligations without sufficient legal basis. I maintain that such a measure cannot be justified because the treaty, while designed to enforce public faith, does not grant unlimited power over pre‐existing private debts. My dissent differs from the majority because I believe that preserving individual rights and honoring contractual promises must take precedence over expedient fiscal measures.

Ware v. Hylton

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