Wardlaw v. Peck
1984 S.C. App. LEXIS 475, 282 S.C. 199, 318 S.E.2d 270 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
A false oral statement imputing serious sexual misconduct is slanderous per se, meaning it is actionable without proof of special damages, for persons of any gender. The defamatory meaning of allegedly slanderous words is a question of fact for the jury, to be determined by the words' ordinary and popular meaning as understood by the audience in context.
Facts:
- Robert Newton Peck, an author, was invited to speak at a convocation at Erskine College.
- Mary Jo Wardlaw, a student, was assigned to pick Peck up from the airport but failed to meet him due to confusion.
- Angered by the mistake, Peck told the college chaplain that he would "deal with Mary Jo the next day in convocation."
- During the mandatory convocation in front of approximately 600 students and faculty, Peck repeatedly referred to Wardlaw as "Mary Jo Warthog."
- Peck compared Wardlaw to a brutish fictional character, mimicked an ape-like walk he attributed to her, and said she was late because she walked that way.
- Peck then stated that he had a recurring nightmare that "Mary Jo and Roger Findley [a male student] were breeding under his sink."
- As a result of Peck's speech, Wardlaw suffered embarrassment, humiliation, and emotional distress.
Procedural Posture:
- Mary Jo Wardlaw sued Robert Newton Peck in a South Carolina trial court for slander and outrageous conduct.
- The trial judge struck the cause of action for outrageous conduct.
- The case proceeded to trial on the slander claim alone.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of Wardlaw, awarding her actual and punitive damages.
- Peck, the defendant, appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals of South Carolina, becoming the appellant; Wardlaw is the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a speaker's public statement that a female student was "breeding" with a male student constitute slander per se, and is a state statute making a false imputation of unchastity to a female actionable without proof of special damages an unconstitutional gender-based classification?
Opinions:
Majority - Bell, Judge
No, the statement can constitute slander per se and the statute is not an unconstitutional gender-based classification. The court holds that the defamatory meaning of words is a question for the jury, and that the common law of South Carolina makes false imputations of serious sexual misconduct actionable per se for people of any gender, thus saving the statute from constitutional challenge. The court reasoned that the modern rule of slander rejects the old doctrine of 'mitior sensus' (interpreting words in their most innocent sense) in favor of letting a jury decide the meaning of words as they would be ordinarily and popularly understood by the audience. While Peck's statement may have been intended as a joke, its defamatory meaning was a question of fact for the jury, which found against him. Regarding the statute, the court first determined that Wardlaw's emotional distress did not qualify as 'special damages,' which requires proof of a material, pecuniary loss. This made it necessary to address the statute's constitutionality. The court explained the statute was remedial legislation enacted in 1824 to correct an unjust common law rule that denied women a cause of action for imputations of unchastity without special damages. Rather than invalidating the statute for being gender-specific, the court extended the common law protection to men, holding that a false imputation of serious sexual misconduct is actionable per se for any person. This judicial expansion eliminated the unconstitutional gender discrimination, thereby upholding both the verdict and the underlying principle of the statute.
Analysis:
This decision is significant for modernizing defamation law in South Carolina by firmly rejecting antiquated interpretive rules like 'mitior sensus' and affirming the jury's central role in determining a statement's meaning. The court's most impactful holding is its method of resolving the equal protection challenge. Instead of striking down the gender-specific statute, it cured the potential constitutional defect by judicially extending the common law protection to the previously excluded group (men). This approach serves as a precedent for courts to modernize and save archaic statutes by evolving common law principles to reflect contemporary standards of gender equality, rather than simply invalidating the legislation.
