Ward v. Illinois
52 L. Ed. 2d 738, 431 U.S. 767, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 106 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
A state obscenity statute satisfies the Miller v. California requirement that proscribable sexual conduct be 'specifically defined' if the state's highest court has authoritatively construed the statute to incorporate the Miller examples, even without an exhaustive list of prohibited conduct, provided the overbreadth is not real and substantial.
Facts:
- In October 1971, appellant Ward sold two publications, 'Bizarre World' and 'Illustrated Case Histories, a Study of Sado-Masochism,' from his store in Illinois.
- Illinois Rev. Stat., c. 38, § 11-20 (a)(1) (1975) prohibits the sale of obscene matter, and § 11-20 (b) defines 'obscene' as appealing predominantly to prurient interest and going substantially beyond customary limits of candor.
- Before Ward's prosecution, the Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Sikora (1965), had already construed the Illinois obscenity statute to reach materials depicting 'sadism and masochism.'
- Following Miller v. California, the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Ridens (1974) construed § 11-20 to incorporate parts (a) and (b) of the Miller standards, but retained the 'utterly without redeeming social value' standard for part (c).
Procedural Posture:
- Ward was charged in an Illinois state trial court (bench trial) with selling two obscene publications in violation of § 11-20 (a)(1).
- Ward was found guilty and sentenced to one day in jail and fined $200.
- Ward's conviction was affirmed in the Illinois state appellate courts.
- The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Ward's conviction, rejecting his challenge to the constitutionality of the Illinois obscenity statute under Miller and his claim that the publications were not obscene.
- Ward appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which noted probable jurisdiction.
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Issue:
Does an Illinois obscenity statute, as authoritatively construed by the Illinois Supreme Court, satisfy the 'specifically defined' sexual conduct requirement of Miller v. California, thus making it constitutional, particularly as applied to sado-masochistic materials?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice White
Yes, the Illinois obscenity statute, as authoritatively construed by the Illinois Supreme Court, satisfies the 'specifically defined' sexual conduct requirement of Miller v. California. The Court found that Illinois complied with Miller's requirements, both because prior Illinois Supreme Court cases (People v. Sikora, People v. DeVilbiss, Chicago v. Geraci) had already given detailed meaning to the Illinois law, making it clear that sado-masochistic materials were covered, and because the Illinois Supreme Court expressly incorporated parts (a) and (b) of the Miller guidelines, including the examples of proscribable sexual conduct, into its construction of the statute in People v. Ridens (post-Miller remand) and People v. Gould. The Miller examples were illustrative, not exhaustive, and the statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Ward's conduct, nor is it overbroad because any overbreadth is not 'real and substantial'.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
No, the Illinois obscenity statute is 'clearly overbroad and unconstitutional on its face.' This dissent reiterates Justice Brennan's long-held position, expressed in his dissenting opinions in Miller v. California and Ridens v. Illinois, that obscenity statutes attempting to regulate content are inherently overbroad and violate the First Amendment.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
No, the Court's decision silently abandons a cornerstone of the Miller v. California test. Miller promised that no one would be prosecuted for obscenity unless the materials depicted 'hard core' sexual conduct 'specifically defined by the regulating state law.' The Illinois statute, even as construed by its Supreme Court, has not limited its scope to the Miller examples or any other specifically defined category. The majority's reliance on 'notice' from prior cases or allowing a description of 'kinds' of conduct undermines Miller's promise of fair notice and specific definition, effectively withdrawing a core protection against vagueness in obscenity law.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the Miller v. California standard for state obscenity statutes, affirming that states need not provide an exhaustive statutory list of proscribed sexual conduct. Instead, authoritative judicial construction that incorporates Miller's explanatory examples is sufficient. This ruling provides greater flexibility for states in regulating obscenity while potentially weakening the 'fair notice' aspect of Miller that the dissents emphasize. It signals the Court's willingness to defer to state court interpretations that align with the spirit of Miller, even if not perfectly mirroring its suggested statutory drafting.
