Walton v. Arizona
497 U.S. 639 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
A capital sentencing scheme does not violate the Sixth or Eighth Amendments where a judge, rather than a jury, finds the aggravating circumstances required for imposition of the death penalty, the defendant bears the burden of proving mitigating circumstances, and a facially vague aggravating factor has been given a constitutionally sufficient narrowing construction by the state's highest court.
Facts:
- On March 2, 1986, Jeffrey Walton and two codefendants, Robert Hoover and Sharold Ramsey, planned to rob someone at random.
- In a bar parking lot, they robbed Thomas Powell, an off-duty Marine, at gunpoint and forced him into his car.
- The trio drove Powell out into the desert, where Walton and Hoover forced him to the ground while they debated his fate.
- Walton then marched Powell into the desert, forced him to lie down, placed a foot on his neck, and shot him once in the head.
- Walton later told his codefendants that he had “never seen a man pee in his pants before.”
- Powell did not die immediately; he was blinded and rendered unconscious but later regained consciousness.
- Powell floundered in the desert for approximately a week before dying from dehydration, starvation, and pneumonia.
Procedural Posture:
- A jury in an Arizona trial court convicted Jeffrey Walton of first-degree murder.
- Following a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court judge found two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.
- The trial court judge sentenced Walton to death.
- Walton (appellant) appealed his conviction and sentence to the Arizona Supreme Court.
- The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the death sentence.
- The United States Supreme Court granted Walton's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does Arizona's capital sentencing scheme, which allows a judge to find aggravating circumstances, places the burden on the defendant to prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence, and includes an 'especially heinous, cruel, or depraved' aggravating factor, violate the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice White
No. The Arizona capital sentencing scheme does not violate the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. First, the Sixth Amendment does not require that a jury, rather than a judge, make the specific factual findings authorizing the imposition of the death penalty. Aggravating circumstances are not elements of the offense of murder but are sentencing standards to guide the choice between death and life imprisonment. Second, placing the burden on the defendant to prove the existence of mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence is constitutionally permissible, so long as the State retains the burden of proving the elements of the offense and the existence of aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Third, the statute's requirement that the court 'shall' impose death if aggravating factors exist and mitigating factors are not 'sufficiently substantial to call for leniency' does not create an unconstitutional mandatory sentencing scheme, as the sentencer is free to consider all relevant mitigating evidence. Finally, although the 'especially heinous, cruel or depraved' aggravating factor is facially vague, the Arizona Supreme Court has provided a limiting construction that gives sufficient guidance to the sentencer, distinguishing this case from those where juries were given unconstitutionally vague instructions.
Concurring - Justice Scalia
No. The Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence contains two contradictory lines of precedent that cannot be reconciled. The first, from Furman v. Georgia, requires States to channel and limit the sentencer's discretion to impose the death penalty to ensure consistency. The second, from Lockett v. Ohio, forbids States from placing any limits on the sentencer's discretion to decline to impose the death penalty by considering any and all mitigating evidence. This contradiction has created an incoherent and unworkable body of law. Because the Lockett line of cases has no basis in the text of the Eighth Amendment and is irreconcilable with Furman, it should be abandoned. Therefore, any claim that a sentencer's discretion to consider mitigating evidence was unconstitutionally restricted is invalid. The Furman-based claim regarding the vagueness of the aggravating factor fails for the reasons stated by the majority.
Dissenting - Justice Blackmun
Yes. The Arizona statute violates the Eighth Amendment in three ways. First, requiring a defendant to prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence unconstitutionally precludes the sentencer from considering relevant evidence that does not meet this standard, in violation of Lockett. Second, by requiring the death penalty unless the defendant proves mitigating circumstances are 'sufficiently substantial to call for leniency,' the statute creates an unconstitutional 'presumption of death' and imposes capital punishment even when aggravating and mitigating factors are in equipoise. Third, the 'especially heinous, cruel, or depraved' aggravating circumstance, even as construed by the Arizona Supreme Court, remains unconstitutionally vague because its definitions of 'cruelty' (victim's mental anguish) and 'depravity' (relishing the murder) are so broad they fail to genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, providing no meaningful guidance to the sentencer.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. First, the Sixth Amendment requires a jury determination of any fact that operates as an element of a capital offense. Under Arizona law, the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance is a necessary prerequisite for imposing the death penalty, making it the functional equivalent of an element of capital murder. Therefore, these facts must be found by a jury, not a judge. Second, Justice Scalia's assertion that Furman and Lockett are irreconcilable is wrong. Furman properly requires states to narrow the class of death-eligible offenders through objective criteria (the base of the pyramid), while Lockett correctly allows for individualized, discretionary consideration of mercy for the small number of offenders who remain in that narrowed class (the apex of the pyramid). The two principles are complementary, not contradictory.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes. The death penalty is in all circumstances a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. It is inconsistent with the fundamental premise that even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity. The Court's decision reflects a loss of sight of its responsibility to ensure the ultimate sanction is imposed only in accordance with constitutional principles.
Analysis:
This decision significantly reinforced state authority in structuring capital sentencing schemes, granting deference to judicial fact-finding and the allocation of evidentiary burdens. By characterizing aggravating circumstances as sentencing factors rather than elements of the crime, the Court solidified a crucial distinction that keeps such findings outside the purview of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial right. The ruling also established that a facially vague aggravating factor can be constitutionally saved by a state appellate court's narrowing construction, creating a higher bar for vagueness challenges, especially in judge-sentencing systems where judges are presumed to know and apply such constructions. This case thereby limited the reach of prior decisions like Godfrey v. Georgia and Maynard v. Cartwright that had invalidated sentences based on vague factors presented to juries.
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