Wallace v. Jaffree
472 U.S. 38 (1985)
Rule of Law:
A state statute that authorizes a moment of silence in public schools for the purpose of meditation or voluntary prayer violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment if the legislative record demonstrates the statute's sole purpose is to endorse or promote religion.
Facts:
- In 1978, Alabama enacted a law (§ 16-1-20) authorizing a one-minute period of silence in public schools for 'meditation.'
- During the 1981-1982 school year, teachers of Ishmael Jaffree's minor children in the Mobile County public schools led their classes in daily vocal prayers and other religious activities.
- Jaffree's children were allegedly subjected to ostracism from their peers if they chose not to participate in these religious observances.
- Ishmael Jaffree repeatedly requested that the school officials stop the devotional services, but his requests were unsuccessful.
- In 1981, the Alabama legislature enacted a new statute (§ 16-1-20.1) authorizing a period of silence for 'meditation or voluntary prayer.'
- The sponsor of the 1981 statute, State Senator Donald Holmes, testified that his sole purpose for introducing the bill was to 'return voluntary prayer' to public schools.
- In 1982, Alabama enacted a third statute (§ 16-1-20.2) authorizing teachers to lead willing students in a prescribed prayer to 'Almighty God.'
Procedural Posture:
- Ishmael Jaffree sued members of the Mobile County School Board in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, alleging that religious practices in his children's schools were unconstitutional.
- Jaffree amended his complaint to add a challenge to three Alabama statutes, including § 16-1-20.1, which authorized a moment of silence for 'meditation or voluntary prayer.'
- The District Court granted a preliminary injunction, finding that § 16-1-20.1 was an unconstitutional effort to encourage a religious activity.
- Following a trial on the merits, the District Court reversed its earlier position, held that Alabama was not prohibited by the Establishment Clause from establishing a state religion, and dismissed the complaint.
- Jaffree, as appellee, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, with Wallace (Governor of Alabama) as appellant.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, holding that § 16-1-20.1 and another related statute were unconstitutional because they had the purpose and effect of advancing religion.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' judgment regarding the constitutionality of § 16-1-20.1.
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Issue:
Does an Alabama statute authorizing a one-minute period of silence in public schools for 'meditation or voluntary prayer' violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
Yes, the Alabama statute violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Applying the first prong of the Lemon test, which requires a statute to have a secular legislative purpose, the Court finds that Alabama's law fails. The legislative record, particularly the testimony of the statute's sponsor, Senator Donald Holmes, reveals that the enactment of § 16-1-20.1 was entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion. The pre-existing 1978 statute already permitted a moment of silence for meditation, which was sufficient for any secular purpose like fostering contemplation. The only effect of adding the words 'or voluntary prayer' in the 1981 statute was to convey a message of state endorsement and promotion of prayer, which is inconsistent with the government's required neutrality towards religion.
Concurring - Justice Powell
Yes, the statute violates the Establishment Clause. This concurrence defends the three-pronged Lemon test as the coherent and established standard for Establishment Clause analysis. While moment-of-silence statutes are not per se unconstitutional, this particular Alabama statute lacks any clear secular purpose. The legislative history and the findings of the lower courts demonstrate that the sole purpose was religious. Had there been a plausible secular purpose alongside the religious one, the statute might have been permissible, but the record here shows none.
Concurring - Justice O'Connor
Yes, the statute violates the Establishment Clause. This concurrence proposes refining the Lemon test by introducing the 'endorsement test,' which asks whether a government action has the purpose or effect of endorsing or disapproving of religion. Under this test, the Alabama statute fails because its text, history, and the state's own concessions show its sole purpose was to endorse prayer as a favored activity. By adding 'or voluntary prayer' to an existing moment of silence law, the state sent a clear message that children should use the time for prayer. However, a moment of silence statute that is neutral and does not endorse prayer over other quiet activities would likely be constitutional.
Dissenting - Chief Justice Burger
No, the statute does not violate the Establishment Clause. The majority's holding manifests hostility, not neutrality, toward religion. Merely including the word 'prayer' as one of several options during a moment of silence does not constitute a state endorsement of religion, just as legislative chaplains do not. The Court improperly relied on the post-enactment, personal statements of a single legislator to invalidate the entire statute. The statute permissibly accommodates the private, voluntary religious choices of students without coercing others and is not a step toward establishing a state religion.
Dissenting - Justice White
No, the statute does not violate the Establishment Clause. A statute that authorizes a moment of silence for 'meditation or prayer' is not unconstitutional. If a state can mandate a moment of silence, it should also be able to inform students that praying is a permissible activity during that time. This dissent also expresses support for a fundamental reconsideration of the Court's Establishment Clause precedents.
Dissenting - Justice Rehnquist
No, the statute does not violate the Establishment Clause. The 'wall of separation between church and State' is a misleading metaphor based on bad history that should be abandoned. A historical review shows the Framers of the First Amendment only intended to prohibit the establishment of a national church and prevent the government from preferring one religious sect over another. They did not intend to require strict government neutrality between religion and irreligion. The Lemon test is unmoored from this history and has produced unprincipled results. The Alabama statute's generalized endorsement of prayer is permissible under a proper historical understanding of the Clause.
Analysis:
This decision solidified the 'purpose' prong of the Lemon test as a critical barrier to laws perceived as promoting religion in public schools. It established that even a facially neutral statute like a moment of silence law can be unconstitutional if its legislative history reveals an exclusively religious purpose. More significantly, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion introduced the influential 'endorsement test,' which shifted the focus of Establishment Clause analysis to whether government action conveys a message that religion is favored or that nonadherents are outsiders. This framework became central to the Court's subsequent religion-clause jurisprudence.
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