Walker v. Superior Court
763 P.2d 852 (1988)
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Rule of Law:
A statutory exemption for spiritual treatment in a misdemeanor child neglect statute (Penal Code § 270) does not provide a defense to felony charges of involuntary manslaughter and child endangerment when a parent's failure to provide medical care for a seriously ill child results in the child's death.
Facts:
- Defendant Laurie Grouard Walker was a member of the Church of Christ, Scientist, which believes in prayer-based healing.
- On February 21, 1984, Walker's four-year-old daughter, Shauntay, became ill with flu-like symptoms.
- Four days later, Shauntay developed a stiff neck, a symptom of a more serious illness.
- Consistent with her religious beliefs, Walker chose to treat Shauntay with prayer instead of seeking medical care.
- Walker enlisted an accredited Christian Science prayer practitioner and a Christian Science nurse to attend to the child.
- Over the course of her 17-day illness, Shauntay received no medical treatment, lost weight, and grew disoriented.
- On March 9, 1984, Shauntay died of acute purulent meningitis.
Procedural Posture:
- The People charged Laurie Grouard Walker in the trial court with involuntary manslaughter (Penal Code § 192(b)) and felony child endangerment (Penal Code § 273a(1)).
- Walker filed a motion to dismiss the charges, which the trial court denied.
- Walker petitioned the intermediate appellate court (Court of Appeal) for a writ of prohibition to halt the prosecution, which was summarily denied.
- Walker petitioned for review in the state's highest court (California Supreme Court), which granted review and transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal with instructions.
- The Court of Appeal, after further proceedings, again denied Walker's petition.
- Walker filed a second petition for review with the California Supreme Court, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does a statutory exemption for parents who treat their children with prayer in lieu of medical care under the misdemeanor child support statute, Penal Code § 270, bar a criminal prosecution for involuntary manslaughter and felony child endangerment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Mosk
No. The exemption for prayer treatment in the misdemeanor child support statute does not bar prosecution for felony manslaughter and child endangerment when a child's life is at risk. First, while Penal Code § 270 does permit prayer as an alternative to 'medical attendance' to avoid misdemeanor liability, the statute's purpose is primarily fiscal: to ensure parents provide routine necessities so the state does not bear the burden. The felony statutes for manslaughter (§ 192(b)) and child endangerment (§ 273a(1)), by contrast, are designed to protect children from grievous bodily harm and death. The legislative history shows that lawmakers, when amending § 270, were aware of potential felony liability under these other statutes and chose not to extend the prayer exemption to them. Second, the defendant's conduct can constitute criminal negligence, which is judged by an objective standard of what a reasonable person would do, not the defendant's subjective good faith. A jury can determine if failing to provide medical care to a child dying over 17 days was criminally negligent. Third, the prosecution does not violate the Free Exercise Clause because the state's compelling interest in protecting the life of a child outweighs a parent's religious freedom. Finally, the statutory scheme provides adequate due process and fair notice, as the purposes of the misdemeanor support statute and the felony endangerment statutes are distinct, and a reasonable person would understand that the limited exemption for non-support does not apply when a child's life is in jeopardy.
Concurring - Justice Mosk
I agree with the majority opinion that the prosecution can proceed, but I write separately to address an issue the majority did not reach: the religious exemption in Penal Code § 270 itself violates the Establishment Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The statute grants a preference to specific religions by requiring that the spiritual treatment be provided by a 'duly accredited practitioner' of a 'recognized church or religious denomination.' This language discriminates against individuals whose faith is personal or who belong to religious groups that are not 'recognized' or do not 'accredit' practitioners. Because government must be neutral among religions, this denominational preference is subject to strict scrutiny and fails, as there is no compelling state interest in such discrimination. Furthermore, the statute fosters excessive government entanglement with religion by requiring courts and law enforcement to determine what constitutes a 'recognized' church.
Concurring - Justice Broussard
I agree that the defendant can be prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter. However, I dissent from the holding that she can also be prosecuted for felony child endangerment under § 273a. The two statutes, § 270 and § 273a, are 'in pari materia' (on the same subject) as both concern child endangerment. Section 270 specifically governs a parent's 'omission' to provide necessary medical care, while § 273a should be interpreted to apply to active conduct that harms a child. More importantly, if the prayer exemption in § 270 does not also apply to an endangerment charge under § 273a for the exact same conduct (failing to provide medical care), the exemption becomes meaningless. It would mean that a parent who relies on the exemption could always be prosecuted for child endangerment, even if the prayer treatment was successful, which defeats the clear legislative intent to provide some protection.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a critical boundary on the free exercise of religion, clarifying that a parent's right to choose spiritual healing does not override the state's compelling interest in protecting a child's life. The court's distinction between a fiscal, misdemeanor support statute (§ 270) and felony statutes aimed at preventing serious harm (§§ 192(b), 273a(1)) creates a clear legal framework. It signals to parents and religious groups that while the state may accommodate prayer for minor ailments, this accommodation ends when an illness becomes life-threatening. The ruling solidifies the principle that parental responsibility is judged by an objective, reasonable person standard, preventing subjective religious belief from serving as an absolute defense to charges of criminal negligence.
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