Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Kilgore
85 Ark. App. 231, 148 S.W.3d 754, 2004 Ark. App. LEXIS 160 (2004)
Rule of Law:
For simple negligence claims where the causal link between the defendant's actions and the plaintiff's injury is within the jury's common comprehension, expert testimony on proximate cause does not require specific 'magic words' such as 'reasonable degree of medical certainty.' Furthermore, the collateral-source rule generally prohibits admitting evidence of third-party payments for medical expenses, even when a plaintiff testifies to personally incurring costs, unless such evidence is used for an exception other than merely mitigating damages by revealing insurance coverage.
Facts:
- On or about November 19, 1998, John Kilgore presented a prescription for Cephal-exin and Claritin D 24 Hour at the Siloam Springs Wal-Mart pharmacy.
- Instead of his prescribed medication, Wal-Mart mistakenly dispensed a bag containing Triamterene Hydrochlorothiazide and Synthroid, medications for another customer also named Kilgore.
- John Kilgore ingested six Triamterene Hydrochlorothiazide capsules and two Synthroid pills over approximately two days.
- Kelli Ann Kilgore discovered the medication error after John Kilgore's symptoms failed to improve.
- As a result of the medication error, John Kilgore allegedly developed post-traumatic stress disorder.
- John Kilgore testified that his prescriptions were personally costing him between $600 and $630 per month.
- John Kilgore claimed that he and his wife personally paid for the medication and had canceled checks to evidence the amount he had paid.
- The underlying jury verdict awarded John Kilgore $829,999 and Kelli Ann Kilgore $10,001.
Procedural Posture:
- Appellees John Kilgore and Kelli Ann Kilgore filed a negligence suit against appellant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., in circuit court on November 20, 2000.
- At the conclusion of the appellees’ case, Wal-Mart moved for a directed verdict, which the circuit court denied.
- Wal-Mart renewed its motion for directed verdict at the close of all evidence, but the circuit court again denied it.
- After a four-day trial, the jury returned a total verdict in favor of John Kilgore and Kelli Ann Kilgore in the amount of $840,000.
- Judgment was entered on September 12, 2002.
- Wal-Mart filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, a motion for a new trial, or a motion for a remittitur, all of which the circuit court denied.
- Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. appealed the decision of the circuit court to the Arkansas Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a court err by upholding a jury verdict in a negligence case where expert testimony on proximate cause did not explicitly state 'within a reasonable degree of medical certainty' but the causal link was within common comprehension, and by applying the collateral-source rule to prevent cross-examination revealing insurance payments for medical expenses despite the plaintiff's testimony of personal payment, when the primary aim is to mitigate damages?
Opinions:
Majority - Larry D. Vaught, Judge
No, the circuit court did not err in denying Wal-Mart's motions for a directed verdict or in preventing cross-examination regarding collateral-source payments. First, Wal-Mart failed to properly preserve its argument regarding the experts' lack of 'reasonable degree of medical certainty' by not stating specific grounds in its motion for a directed verdict, rendering the issue unreviewable. Even if preserved, the argument would fail because this was a simple negligence claim, not governed by the Medical Malpractice Act's stricter burden of proof. In simple negligence claims, expert testimony is only required when the negligence and standard of care are beyond a jury's common knowledge. The court found that the jury could reasonably conclude that ingesting the wrong medication and learning of its potential harm constituted the trauma leading to John Kilgore's post-traumatic stress disorder. Arkansas law does not require 'magic words' for expert opinions, judging them instead on their entirety. Furthermore, Wal-Mart had previously asserted that the case was not medical malpractice. Second, the collateral-source rule prohibits evidence of payments from other sources unless relevant for a purpose other than mitigating damages. While an exception exists to impeach a plaintiff's testimony about personally paying medical expenses, the court determined that Wal-Mart's attempt to introduce evidence of insurance co-payments was solely aimed at mitigating its damages, which is precisely what the collateral-source rule is designed to prevent. A plaintiff is entitled to testify about incurred medical bills, regardless of whether they are paid from personal funds or insurance, as they remain responsible for the debt. Allowing such cross-examination would 'eviscerate the core protection of the collateral-source rule.' The court therefore affirmed the circuit court's decision on both points.
Analysis:
This case clarifies crucial aspects of negligence law and evidence rules in Arkansas. It establishes a clear distinction between the evidentiary standards for simple negligence and medical malpractice claims, particularly regarding the 'magic words' requirement for expert testimony on proximate cause. The ruling strengthens the application of the collateral-source rule, reinforcing that its impeachment exception cannot be used merely to reveal insurance coverage and mitigate damages. This ensures that defendants cannot unfairly benefit from a plaintiff's insurance, which could otherwise undermine the principle of full compensation for injuries.
