Wakeland v. City of Urbana Modified on Denial of Rehearing
333 Ill.App.3d 1131, 776 N.E.2d 1194 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
A municipal zoning ordinance is presumed valid and will be upheld unless the challenger proves by clear and convincing evidence that it is arbitrary and bears no substantial relation to public health, safety, or welfare. A property owner does not acquire a vested right in a prior zoning classification merely by purchasing property; they must have made substantial expenditures or changes in position in good-faith reliance on the probability of development under that classification.
Facts:
- In 1985, the City of Urbana created an enterprise zone to encourage development and in 1986, developers Howard and Craig Wakeland purchased three lots within this zone.
- The lots were zoned R-4 (medium-density, multiple-family residential) and contained old houses, which the Wakelands intended to eventually replace with a large apartment building.
- For over two years after purchasing the lots, the Wakelands continued to rent out the existing houses and took no substantial steps toward development, such as preparing blueprints, buying materials, or applying for permits.
- Beginning in 1988, the city undertook a comprehensive study called the 'Downtown to Campus Plan' to address the proliferation of apartment buildings and preserve the historical character of single-family residential areas.
- In 1991, following the plan's recommendations, the city passed an ordinance down-zoning the Wakelands' lots, along with 200 other properties, to R-2 (single-family residential).
- One of the houses on the Wakelands' lots burned down in 1995, but they did not rebuild anything in its place.
- In 1998, neighbors Daniel Folk and W Randall Kangas offered to purchase the three lots from the Wakelands for $150,000, but the Wakelands declined the offer.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1995, Howard and Craig Wakeland petitioned the Urbana planning commission and city council to rezone their lots back to R-4, but their requests were denied.
- On October 2, 1995, the Wakelands sued the City of Urbana in the state trial court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the R-2 zoning was unconstitutional as applied to their property.
- Daniel Folk and W Randall Kangas, who were nearby homeowners, were granted permission by the trial court to intervene in the lawsuit on behalf of the city.
- After conducting a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the City of Urbana, finding the Wakelands had not met their burden of proof.
- The Wakelands, as appellants, appealed the trial court's decision to the appellate court.
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Issue:
Does a municipal ordinance that down-zones a property from multi-family (R-4) to single-family (R-2) residential use, as part of a comprehensive plan to preserve neighborhood character, constitute an unconstitutional and invalid exercise of zoning power as applied to a developer who purchased the property but took no substantial steps toward development?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Appleton
No. The municipal ordinance down-zoning the property is a valid and constitutional exercise of the city's zoning power. To successfully challenge a zoning ordinance, a plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it is arbitrary and unrelated to public welfare, a burden the Wakelands failed to meet. The court evaluated the ordinance using the multi-factor test from La Salle and Sinclair, finding the city's decision was justified. The city engaged in a careful, comprehensive planning process to preserve the unique, historical character of the Main Street corridor and protect it from the negative effects of increased density, such as traffic and noise. While the Wakelands' property value was diminished, this factor is not determinative and was outweighed by the substantial public benefit. Crucially, the Wakelands had no vested right in the previous R-4 zoning because they had not taken any substantial steps in reliance on it; merely purchasing the property with an intent to develop is insufficient to prevent a municipality from amending its zoning regulations for the public good.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the high degree of judicial deference afforded to municipal zoning decisions, particularly when they are supported by a comprehensive, long-term community plan. It clarifies the requirements for establishing a 'vested right' in a zoning classification, confirming that mere purchase of land is not enough; a property owner must demonstrate substantial, concrete actions taken in reliance on the existing zoning. The decision empowers municipalities to proactively manage development and preserve neighborhood character through down-zoning, even at a significant financial cost to individual landowners who have not yet begun development. This precedent makes it more difficult for developers to challenge zoning changes based solely on economic loss or speculative future plans.
