Wainwright v. Torna
1982 U.S. LEXIS 82, 455 U.S. 586, 71 L. Ed. 2d 475 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
The Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel does not extend to discretionary state appeals, and therefore, a defendant cannot claim a constitutional violation when their retained counsel fails to file a timely petition for such a review.
Facts:
- Torna was convicted of several felonies in a Florida state court.
- His convictions were subsequently affirmed by an intermediate state appellate court, the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida.
- Torna's retained counsel intended to seek further review by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Florida Supreme Court.
- Torna's counsel failed to file the application for certiorari within the legally mandated time period.
- Due to the untimely filing, the Florida Supreme Court dismissed the application for review.
Procedural Posture:
- Torna was convicted of felonies in a Florida trial court.
- The Third District Court of Appeal of Florida, an intermediate appellate court, affirmed his convictions.
- The Florida Supreme Court, the state's highest court, dismissed his application for review as untimely.
- Torna filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, naming Wainwright (representing the state) as the respondent.
- The U.S. District Court denied the habeas petition.
- Torna, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the District Court's decision.
- Wainwright, as petitioner, sought and was granted a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a criminal defendant have a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel when their attorney fails to file a timely petition for a discretionary review in a state's highest court?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. Because a criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to counsel to pursue discretionary state appeals, they cannot be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by their attorney's failure to file a timely petition for such an appeal. Citing Ross v. Moffitt, the Court reasoned that the right to counsel attaches only to trial and the first appeal of right. Since review by the Florida Supreme Court was discretionary, Torna had no underlying constitutional right to counsel for that proceeding. Without a right to counsel, there can be no corresponding right to the effective assistance of counsel. The Court also dismissed any due process concerns, stating that the deprivation of the opportunity to seek review was caused by Torna's private counsel, not by state action.
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
Yes. A defendant is denied due process when they are deprived of their right to seek discretionary review because of their attorney's error, especially after reasonably relying on the attorney's promise to file the appeal. Justice Marshall argued first that Ross v. Moffitt was wrongly decided and that defendants should have a right to counsel for discretionary appeals. Alternatively, even if Ross stands, the failure of counsel implicates the Due Process Clause because it is fundamentally unfair to deny a defendant review due to their lawyer's mistake. He contended that sufficient state action exists because the state structures the entire criminal appellate process, including its rigid deadlines, and under Cuyler v. Sullivan, the state's conduct of the criminal process implicates it in the outcome.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the boundary of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, explicitly confining it to the trial and the first appeal of right. By refusing to extend this right to discretionary appeals, the Court reinforces the holding of Ross v. Moffitt and limits the avenues for federal habeas corpus relief based on attorney error. The ruling creates a bright-line distinction: where there is no constitutional right to an attorney, there can be no constitutional claim for that attorney's incompetence. This impacts defendants by placing the risk of attorney error during discretionary appeals squarely on them, rather than making it a basis for a constitutional challenge against the state.
