Wainwright v. Greenfield
1986 U.S. LEXIS 41, 88 L. Ed. 2d 623, 474 U.S. 284 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
Using a defendant's post-arrest silence after receiving Miranda warnings as affirmative evidence of sanity violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Miranda warnings contain an implicit promise that silence will carry no penalty, and using such silence to rebut an insanity defense is a fundamentally unfair breach of that promise.
Facts:
- David Greenfield committed a sexual battery in the woods near a beach in Sarasota, Florida.
- Approximately two hours after the assault, Officer Pilifant identified Greenfield on the beach based on the victim's description and placed him under arrest.
- Officer Pilifant read Greenfield his Miranda rights from a standard card.
- In response to the warnings, Greenfield stated that he understood his rights and wanted to talk to an attorney before making any statement.
- The Miranda warnings were repeated twice more, once while driving to the police station and again by a detective at the station.
- Each time he was asked if he wanted to waive his rights, Greenfield declined, stating he wanted to speak with a lawyer first.
Procedural Posture:
- Greenfield was charged with sexual battery in the Circuit Court for Sarasota County, Florida, where he entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
- At trial, over defense counsel's objection, the prosecutor used Greenfield's silence as evidence of sanity, and a jury found him guilty.
- Greenfield, as the appellant, appealed to the Florida Court of Appeal for the Second District, which affirmed the conviction, finding no error.
- The Florida Supreme Court granted review and remanded the case to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of an intervening decision.
- On reconsideration, the Florida Court of Appeal again affirmed the conviction.
- Greenfield filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court, which denied the petition.
- Greenfield, as the appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed the District Court's decision and found the prosecutor's comments to be a constitutional violation.
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Issue:
Does a prosecutor's use of a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence as evidence of the defendant's sanity violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
Yes. Using a defendant's post-Miranda silence as affirmative evidence of sanity violates the Due Process Clause because it is fundamentally unfair to breach the implicit assurance in the Miranda warnings that silence will not be used against the accused. The Court's reasoning in Doyle v. Ohio, which barred the use of silence for impeachment, applies equally here. The fundamental unfairness stems from the government implicitly promising a suspect that exercising the right to remain silent will not be penalized, and then using that very silence as evidence in its case-in-chief to overcome a defense. Whether the silence is used to impeach credibility or to rebut an insanity plea, the breach of the implicit promise and the resulting penalty are identical. The state's legitimate interest in presenting evidence of a defendant's rational behavior can be served through other means, such as describing their demeanor, without commenting on their exercise of constitutional rights.
Concurring - Justice Rehnquist
Yes. While the majority's conclusion is correct, its reasoning is overly broad; the prosecutor's error was much narrower than the Court of Appeals suggested. A defendant's request for a lawyer, unlike pure silence, is not 'insolubly ambiguous' and is highly relevant evidence of their mental state and coherence when an insanity defense is raised; the Miranda warnings do not implicitly promise that such a request will not be used. However, in this case, the prosecutor did make a brief, improper comment on the defendant's actual silence ('he will not speak'). Because this specific comment violated Doyle and the State did not argue that the error was harmless, the judgment must be affirmed.
Analysis:
This decision significantly expands the protection established in Doyle v. Ohio, which prohibited using a defendant's post-Miranda silence for impeachment. Wainwright v. Greenfield clarifies that the Doyle rule is not limited to impeaching testimony regarding guilt but also applies when the state uses a defendant's silence as affirmative evidence in its case-in-chief, specifically to rebut an insanity defense. This holding solidifies the 'fundamental unfairness' rationale of Doyle, emphasizing that the government cannot breach the implicit promise within the Miranda warnings regardless of the purpose for which the silence is used. The case sets a clear precedent that the act of invoking Miranda rights cannot itself be turned into a piece of evidence against the accused.
