Waddington v. Sarausad
555 U.S. 179 (2009)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under the deferential standard of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a state court's decision is not an "unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law" when it concludes that jury instructions quoting a state statute are not unconstitutionally ambiguous and that there is no reasonable likelihood the jury misapplied them, even in the face of a prosecutor's potentially confusing closing argument.
Facts:
- Cesar Sarausad was a member of the 23d Street Diablos gang.
- Following a confrontation with the rival Bad Side Posse gang at Ballard High School, the Diablos decided to return to the school to retaliate.
- The Diablos went to a gang member's house, where Brian Ronquillo retrieved a handgun because they were angry the rival gang had called them weak.
- Sarausad drove a car with Ronquillo in the front passenger seat and other gang members in the back, heading back to the high school.
- During the drive, Ronquillo tied a bandana over his face and readied the handgun.
- Upon arriving at the school, Sarausad slowed the car to about five miles per hour.
- While the car was moving slowly, Ronquillo fired 6 to 10 shots into a group of students, killing one and wounding another.
- After the shooting, Sarausad sped away from the scene.
Procedural Posture:
- Cesar Sarausad was convicted by a jury in a Washington state trial court as an accomplice to second-degree murder, attempted murder, and assault.
- Sarausad, as appellant, appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals, which affirmed his conviction.
- The Washington Supreme Court denied Sarausad's petition for discretionary review.
- Sarausad's subsequent petitions for state postconviction relief were denied by the Washington state courts.
- Sarausad filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court.
- The District Court granted the writ of habeas corpus.
- The State of Washington, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment granting habeas relief.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit's decision.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Is a state court's determination that a jury instruction quoting the state's accomplice liability statute was not unconstitutionally ambiguous, and that there was no reasonable likelihood the jury misapplied it despite a prosecutor's potentially confusing closing argument, an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Thomas
No. The state court's decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law. A habeas petitioner faces an especially heavy burden when challenging a jury instruction that quotes a state statute, and to succeed, must show both that the instruction was ambiguous and that there was a reasonable likelihood the jury applied it unconstitutionally. Here, the instruction was not ambiguous, as it directly tracked the statutory language requiring knowledge of "the crime." Furthermore, when viewed in the context of the entire trial record, including the arguments of both prosecution and defense, there was no reasonable likelihood of misapplication. The prosecutor's arguments largely focused on Sarausad's specific knowledge of the shooting, and the jury's questions do not prove ultimate confusion, as the judge's direction to re-read the constitutionally adequate instructions was a proper response under this Court's precedent.
Dissenting - Justice Souter
Yes. The state court's finding was an objectively unreasonable application of federal law. The jury instruction quoting the statute was ambiguous, a fact demonstrated by the Washington courts' own prior conflicting interpretations of the law, including the appellate court's initial mistaken belief that an "in for a dime, in for a dollar" theory was correct. This ambiguity was compounded by the prosecutor's closing argument, which explicitly and erroneously told the jury that knowledge of a lesser crime (assault) was sufficient to convict for murder. The jury's repeated questions to the judge about accomplice liability demonstrated profound and unresolved confusion, which the judge failed to remedy by simply directing them back to the same inadequate instruction.
Analysis:
This decision significantly reinforces the high barrier for federal habeas relief established by AEDPA, particularly in cases challenging state-court jury instructions. It underscores that under AEDPA's deferential standard, a federal court cannot grant relief simply because it disagrees with the state court's conclusion; the state court's application of federal law must be "objectively unreasonable." The case clarifies that arguments of counsel, even if potentially misleading, are less likely to be found to have unconstitutionally "infected" a trial than flawed instructions from the judge. It also affirms that a judge's direction to re-read a constitutionally adequate instruction is generally a sufficient response to a jury's question.
Unlock the full brief for Waddington v. Sarausad