Volland-Golden v. City of Chicago
89 F. Supp. 3d 983 (2015)
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Rule of Law:
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1), prior testimony from an unavailable declarant is admissible against a party in a civil case if that party's predecessor in interest had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony. A 'predecessor in interest' does not require strict privity but is satisfied when the prior party had a 'commensurate stake' and a similar motive in the outcome of the proceeding.
Facts:
- On February 25, 2012, two City of Chicago police officers conducted a traffic stop of John Volland.
- The officers allege they stopped Volland for driving on the wrong side of the street, that he was hostile, and that he pushed one of them, requiring them to use force to arrest him.
- Volland alleged the officers stopped him without reason, and when he said he would call their supervisor, they pepper-sprayed him, dragged him from his car, beat him while handcuffed, and arrested him.
- Following the incident, the officers filed police reports stating Volland had accosted them.
- Based on the officers' account, the State of Illinois brought criminal charges against Volland for resisting a peace officer and simple battery.
- During his criminal trial, Volland testified at length regarding his version of the events and was subject to extensive cross-examination by an Assistant State’s Attorney.
- On May 31, 2014, after his acquittal in the criminal trial but before his civil trial could conclude, Volland died of natural causes, making him an unavailable witness.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Illinois prosecuted John Volland in the Circuit Court of Cook County on charges of resisting a peace officer and simple battery.
- On January 28, 2013, a jury acquitted Volland on all criminal charges.
- On February 25, 2013, Volland filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the two police officers and the City of Chicago in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
- Following Volland's death on May 31, 2014, his sister, as executor of his estate, was substituted as the plaintiff.
- The plaintiff filed a motion in limine to admit Volland's prior criminal trial testimony into evidence.
- The defendants filed a cross-motion in limine to bar the same testimony, arguing it was inadmissible hearsay.
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Issue:
Does the prior criminal trial testimony of an unavailable witness fall under the hearsay exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) when offered in a subsequent civil rights lawsuit against police officers, where the State was the opposing party in the criminal trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Shadur, J.
Yes. The prior criminal trial testimony of the unavailable witness is admissible under the hearsay exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1). The rule requires that the party against whom the testimony is offered (or a predecessor in interest in a civil case) had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony. Here, the State in the criminal trial qualifies as a predecessor in interest to the defendant officers in the civil suit. The court rejected a strict privity requirement for 'predecessor in interest,' finding it sufficient that the State had a 'commensurate stake' in the outcome of the criminal prosecution as the officers now have in the civil action. Furthermore, the State had a 'similar motive' to develop Volland's testimony. Applying the four factors from United States v. Feldman, the court found the motives were similar because: (1) the prior proceeding was a criminal trial with a higher burden of proof, giving the State an even stronger incentive to discredit Volland; (2) the State's trial strategy on cross-examination was to discredit Volland's story, just as the defendants would; (3) the stakes were commensurate; and (4) the core factual issues in both the criminal charge of resisting arrest and the civil claim of excessive force were identical, turning on who was the aggressor during the encounter.
Analysis:
This opinion solidifies a broad, functional interpretation of the 'predecessor in interest' requirement under FRE 804(b)(1), rejecting a formalistic privity-based approach. By focusing on whether the prior party had a 'commensurate stake' and 'similar motive,' the court makes it easier to admit former testimony in subsequent litigation, particularly in the context of civil rights suits that follow related criminal proceedings. This precedent is significant for § 1983 plaintiffs, as it allows crucial testimony from a now-unavailable party (often the victim) from a prior criminal trial to be used, ensuring that the core factual dispute can be fully presented to the jury in the civil case.
