Vlandis v. Kline
412 U.S. 441 (1973)
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Rule of Law:
A state statute creating a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of non-residency for the purpose of charging higher university tuition, without affording an individual any opportunity to rebut the presumption, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Facts:
- Connecticut state law required non-resident students at its public universities to pay higher tuition and fees than bona fide residents.
- The law defined a non-resident as any unmarried student whose legal address was outside Connecticut for any part of the year preceding application, or any married student whose legal address was outside Connecticut at the time of application.
- This classification was permanent and irrebuttable for the student's entire period of attendance at the university.
- Appellee Margaret Marsh Kline was a California resident when she applied to the University of Connecticut, but she subsequently married a lifelong Connecticut resident and established a permanent home in Connecticut.
- Kline obtained a Connecticut driver's license, registered her car in Connecticut, and became a registered Connecticut voter.
- Appellee Patricia Catapano, an unmarried student, applied from Ohio but moved to Connecticut before classes started, also obtaining a state driver's license, car registration, and voter registration.
- Despite both women presenting multiple indicia of bona fide Connecticut residency, the University permanently classified them as non-residents under the statute, forcing them to pay higher tuition and fees.
Procedural Posture:
- Appellees Margaret Marsh Kline and Patricia Catapano filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut against the Director of Admissions at the University of Connecticut.
- The suit alleged that the Connecticut statute governing residency for tuition purposes violated their rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
- A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the case.
- The District Court unanimously held that the statutory provisions creating an irrebuttable presumption of non-residency were unconstitutional and enjoined their enforcement.
- The District Court ordered the appellant to refund the excess tuition and fees paid by the appellees.
- The appellant, the Director of Admissions, filed a direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.
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Issue:
Does a state law that creates a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of non-residency for university tuition purposes, based on a student's legal address at or near the time of application, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Stewart
Yes, a state law that creates a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of non-residency violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Statutes creating permanent irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored because they are not necessarily or universally true in fact. Citing precedents like Stanley v. Illinois and Bell v. Burson, the Court reasoned that due process requires an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence to rebut a presumption, especially when a significant property interest (money for tuition) is at stake. The state's justifications for the presumption—cost equalization, favoring established residents, and administrative convenience—are insufficient to overcome this constitutional requirement. The state has reasonable alternative means to determine a student's bona fide residency, so it cannot rely on an arbitrary and conclusive presumption that denies individuals a fair opportunity to prove their resident status.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Marshall
Yes, the law violates the Due Process Clause. I join the Court's opinion but write to express serious doubts about the constitutionality of any durational residency requirement, such as a one-year waiting period, for receiving in-state tuition benefits. Such requirements raise significant Equal Protection Clause questions under precedents like Shapiro v. Thompson and Dunn v. Blumstein, which limit a state's ability to create different classes of residents. Because the Court resolves this case on due process grounds, it does not need to reach these equal protection issues, which should be reserved for a future case. The majority's holding does not represent a return to substantive due process, as the dissent claims, but is properly about the procedures by which a state determines residency.
Concurring - Mr. Justice White
Yes, the Connecticut law is unconstitutional, but the judgment should be based on the Equal Protection Clause rather than the Due Process Clause. I have difficulty distinguishing this case from Starns v. Malkerson, where the Court affirmed a one-year residency requirement, on due process grounds. However, the Connecticut statute invidiously discriminates between different classes of bona fide state residents without a sufficient justification. The state's interest in administrative convenience is not strong enough to justify this 'bizarre pattern of discrimination.' The discrimination is invidious and therefore violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Dissenting - Mr. Chief Justice Burger
No, the law does not violate the Due Process Clause. The Court's decision is an example of 'hard cases make bad law.' The majority improperly applies a form of strict scrutiny, traditionally reserved for fundamental rights, to the Due Process Clause. The state has a legitimate interest in restricting subsidized education to its own residents, and this statutory scheme is a reasonable way to achieve that end. The Court should not use constitutional adjudication to correct the 'unseemly results' of every imperfect state statute.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Rehnquist
No, the law does not violate the Due Process Clause. The Court's opinion represents a return to the discredited Lochner-era doctrine of substantive due process, where courts substitute their judgment for that of legislatures. The Connecticut statute is a constitutionally permissible means of ensuring that the state subsidizes the education of its own young people—those with a prior connection to the state—rather than those who come to the state solely for educational purposes. The statute's distinction is entirely rational and does not create an 'irrebuttable presumption' of residency in the traditional sense, but rather establishes a criterion for eligibility for a subsidy.
Analysis:
This case established the peak of the 'irrebuttable presumption' doctrine as a tool of procedural due process. It stands for the principle that when a state creates a classification based on a presumed fact that is not universally true, it must provide individuals an opportunity to rebut that presumption. This decision limits the government's ability to use administrative convenience to justify conclusive determinations that affect significant property or liberty interests. Although the doctrine's application was narrowed in later cases, Vlandis remains a foundational case for understanding how due process constrains the use of statutory presumptions and classifications.
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