Village of Carterville v. Cook
4 L.R.A. 731, 129 Ill. 152 (1889)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant whose negligence creates a dangerous condition is not relieved of liability for an injury, even if the negligent act of a third party concurs with the defendant's negligence to cause the harm. When an injury results from the concurrent negligence of two parties, both are liable.
Facts:
- The Village of Carterville maintained a much-used public sidewalk.
- A section of this sidewalk was elevated approximately six feet above the ground.
- The elevated portion of the sidewalk was not protected by a railing or any other type of guard.
- The plaintiff, Cook, a 15-year-old boy, was walking along this elevated section of the sidewalk.
- Another boy inadvertently or negligently shoved a second boy.
- This second boy was pushed into Cook, which jostled Cook and caused him to fall off the unguarded sidewalk.
- Cook sustained a serious limb injury from the fall.
Procedural Posture:
- Cook sued the Village of Carterville in the circuit court (trial court).
- Following a trial, judgment was entered in favor of Cook.
- The Village of Carterville (appellant) appealed the decision to the Illinois Appellate Court.
- The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Cook (appellee).
- The Village of Carterville then appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
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Issue:
Is a municipality released from liability for its negligence in failing to guard an elevated sidewalk when the concurring negligent act of a third party is the immediate cause of a person's injury?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Scholfield
No, a municipality is not released from liability for its negligence just because the negligent act of a third party contributed to the injury. The court reasoned that the intervention of a negligent third party does not break the causal connection between the municipality's negligence and the resulting injury, any more than a random accident would. Drawing on precedents like Joliet v. Verley, the court affirmed the principle that if an injury is the combined result of an accident and a city's negligence, and the injury would not have been sustained but for the city's negligence, the city is liable. The court explicitly held that where a party is injured by the concurring negligence of two different parties, both are liable and may be sued jointly or separately, citing Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Shacklet.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the doctrine of concurrent causation in Illinois tort law, particularly in the context of municipal liability. By rejecting the more restrictive Massachusetts rule, which would absolve a defendant in such situations, the court established a precedent that a defendant's negligence remains a proximate cause of an injury even when a third party's act is a more immediate cause. This ruling makes it more difficult for a negligent party to escape liability by pointing to the intervening act of another. It reinforces the principle that as long as a defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in causing the harm, they can be held fully liable.
