Vieth v. Jubelirer
541 U.S. 267 (2004)
Rule of Law:
A claim that a legislative districting map constitutes an unconstitutional political gerrymander is nonjusticiable because there are no judicially discernible and manageable standards for resolving it.
Facts:
- Following the 2000 U.S. Census, Pennsylvania's allotted seats in the U.S. House of Representatives were reduced from 21 to 19.
- At the time, the Republican Party controlled both houses of the Pennsylvania General Assembly and the Governor's office.
- The General Assembly, allegedly under pressure from national Republican figures, undertook the task of drawing a new congressional district map.
- On January 3, 2002, the General Assembly passed its plan, which was signed into law as Act 1.
- Richard Vieth, Norma Jean Vieth, and Susan Furey, all registered Democratic voters in Pennsylvania, alleged the new map was 'meandering and irregular' and ignored traditional redistricting criteria.
- The voters claimed the map was drawn solely for the purpose of maximizing partisan advantage for the Republican party by 'packing' and 'cracking' Democratic voters.
Procedural Posture:
- Richard Vieth and other Democratic voters sued the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and state officials in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, challenging the state's 2002 congressional redistricting plan (Act 1).
- The complaint alleged both malapportionment (one-person, one-vote violation) and unconstitutional political gerrymandering.
- A three-judge District Court panel dismissed the political gerrymandering claim as nonjusticiable but allowed the malapportionment claim to proceed to trial.
- Following the trial, the District Court found that Act 1 was unconstitutionally malapportioned.
- In response, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted a remedial map, Act 34.
- The plaintiffs challenged Act 34 before the District Court, again arguing it was an unconstitutional political gerrymander.
- The District Court denied the plaintiffs' motion and rejected their challenge to Act 34, reaffirming its earlier dismissal of the gerrymandering claim.
- The plaintiffs then filed a direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the dismissal of their political gerrymandering claim against Act 34.
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Issue:
Is a claim that a state's legislative redistricting map constitutes an unconstitutional political gerrymander a nonjusticiable political question?
Opinions:
Plurality - Justice Scalia
Yes. A claim alleging unconstitutional political gerrymandering is a nonjusticiable political question. For eighteen years since Davis v. Bandemer, which held such claims were justiciable, no court has been able to identify a judicially discernible and manageable standard to apply. The standards proposed by the Bandemer plurality, the appellants here, and the dissenters are all indeterminate and unworkable. Unlike racial gerrymandering, where race is a suspect classification, partisanship is an ordinary and expected element of the political process of redistricting. Without a clear constitutional standard to determine when partisanship has gone 'too far,' the issue is best left to the political branches, and Bandemer was wrongly decided and should be overruled.
Concurring in the judgment - Justice Kennedy
Yes, this claim should be dismissed. While agreeing with the plurality that no judicially manageable standard for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims has yet been found, the Court should not foreclose all possibility of judicial relief in future cases. A suitable standard might emerge over time, perhaps based on the First Amendment or aided by new technologies, that could allow courts to correct egregious partisan gerrymanders. Because no such standard exists today, the appellants' claim fails, but declaring the issue permanently nonjusticiable is an unnecessary and premature step that could erode confidence in the judiciary.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
No. Political gerrymandering claims are justiciable, and the standards developed in racial gerrymandering cases provide a manageable framework. When a legislature's predominant or sole motivation for a districting plan is partisan advantage, forsaking all neutral principles like compactness and respect for political subdivisions, it violates its constitutional duty to govern impartially under the Equal Protection Clause. The bizarre shape of a district can be strong evidence of an impermissible partisan purpose. The claims of voters in specific, grotesquely drawn districts, like Susan Furey in District 6, should be allowed to proceed.
Dissenting - Justice Souter
No. Political gerrymandering claims are justiciable, but the standard set forth in Bandemer has proven unworkable. The Court should start anew by establishing a five-part prima facie test for claims targeting individual districts. A plaintiff would need to show: 1) membership in a cohesive political group; 2) the district disregards traditional districting principles; 3) a correlation exists between those deviations and the group's population distribution; 4) a hypothetical, more neutral district could be drawn; and 5) legislators acted with discriminatory intent. The burden would then shift to the state to offer a legitimate, non-partisan justification for its plan.
Dissenting - Justice Breyer
No. Political gerrymandering claims are justiciable in certain circumstances. While political considerations are a normal part of districting, they become an unconstitutional abuse that violates the Equal Protection Clause when they result in the 'unjustified entrenchment' of a political party that lacks majority support. Courts can identify such abuses by looking for strong indicia, such as a party consistently winning a majority of the statewide vote but failing to win a majority of legislative seats, especially when combined with radical departures from traditional districting criteria. When such extreme circumstances exist, courts can and should provide a remedy.
Analysis:
This decision created significant legal uncertainty by effectively closing the federal courthouse doors to political gerrymandering claims without a majority opinion to declare them permanently nonjusticiable. The fractured ruling, with Justice Kennedy's pivotal concurrence, left the core holding of Davis v. Bandemer intact in theory but practically unenforceable. This ambiguity encouraged state legislatures to engage in more aggressive partisan map-drawing, knowing that federal judicial oversight was severely limited. The plurality's declaration of nonjusticiability, combined with Kennedy's invitation for future litigants to propose a better standard, ensured that the constitutional debate over partisan gerrymandering would persist for years.
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