Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.
D.C. No. 2:12-cv-08315-MWF-VBK (2015)
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Rule of Law:
An actor's individual performance within a motion picture does not constitute a separate copyrightable "work" when the performance is intended to be merged into the unitary whole of the film and the actor does not fix the performance in a tangible medium. A claim for copyright infringement cannot be used to remedy personal harms, such as death threats or emotional distress, that are unrelated to the economic and expressive interests copyright law is designed to protect.
Facts:
- Cindy Lee Garcia responded to a casting call for a film titled 'Desert Warrior' and was paid $500 for a small role.
- Under the direction of filmmaker Mark Basseley Youssef, Garcia performed two lines of a script for what she believed was an adventure film.
- Youssef later used Garcia's five-second performance in a different film, an anti-Islam polemic titled 'Innocence of Muslims'.
- Youssef dubbed over Garcia's original lines with an inflammatory question: 'Is your Mohammed a child molester?'
- Youssef uploaded a trailer for the film to YouTube, which is owned by Google.
- After the film was translated into Arabic, it sparked international outrage.
- An Egyptian cleric issued a fatwa calling for the death of those involved in the film, and Garcia subsequently received multiple death threats.
Procedural Posture:
- Cindy Lee Garcia first sued Google and Mark Basseley Youssef in California state superior court (a trial court of first instance) alleging various state law torts.
- The state court denied Garcia's motion for a temporary restraining order.
- Garcia voluntarily dismissed her state court action.
- Garcia filed a new lawsuit against the same defendants in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, alleging federal copyright infringement.
- Garcia moved for a preliminary injunction against Google based solely on her copyright claim.
- The U.S. District Court denied the motion, finding Garcia was unlikely to succeed on the merits of her copyright claim.
- Garcia, as appellant, appealed the denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with Google, as appellee, defending the district court's decision.
- A divided three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and issued a mandatory injunction ordering Google to remove the film.
- The Ninth Circuit then granted Google's petition for rehearing en banc, vacating the panel's opinion and injunction.
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Issue:
Does an actor hold an independent copyright in her brief performance within a larger film, sufficient to justify a mandatory preliminary injunction requiring an internet service provider to remove the entire film from its platform?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge McKeown
No. An actor does not hold an independent copyright in her performance within a larger film under these circumstances. Garcia's copyright claim is unlikely to succeed because her performance is not an independent 'work of authorship' but rather a contribution to a unitary whole—the film. The Copyright Act and the U.S. Copyright Office's longstanding practice treat a motion picture as a single integrated work, and allowing individual actors to claim copyright would create a logistical nightmare. Furthermore, Garcia did not 'fix' her performance in a tangible medium herself, and because she was deceived about the film's nature, the fixation by the filmmaker was not done 'by or under [her] authority.' The harms she suffers—death threats and emotional distress—are not the type of economic or expressive harms that copyright law is designed to remedy.
Concurring - Judge Watford
No. While not deciding the broader copyright question, Garcia is not entitled to an injunction because she failed to demonstrate irreparable harm under the proper legal standard. Specifically, she did not establish the required 'causal connection' showing that removing the film from YouTube would likely eliminate or materially reduce the threat against her life. The fatwa was issued because of her perceived role in the film's creation, a fact that would not change even if the injunction were granted, and the film would almost certainly remain accessible on other parts of the internet.
Dissenting - Judge Kozinski
Yes. An actor does hold a copyright in her performance because it is an original work of authorship that becomes fixed in a tangible medium at the moment of recording. The majority's narrow definition of a 'work' wrongly denies copyright protection to individual creative contributions to a larger composite work, contrary to precedent like Effects Associates. Garcia's performance was creative, and she did not need to personally operate the recording equipment to be its author. The 'parade of horribles' feared by the majority is overstated, as contracts and the work-for-hire doctrine typically resolve these rights, and the harm to Garcia—a direct threat to her life—is clearly irreparable and justifies an injunction.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the legal principle that a motion picture is a single, unitary copyrighted work, rather than a collection of separately copyrighted contributions from each actor and crew member. It significantly limits the ability of individual contributors to exercise control over a film's distribution through copyright claims, thereby preventing a 'copyright of thousands' scenario that could paralyze the film industry. The ruling also strictly construes the 'irreparable harm' requirement in copyright cases, reinforcing that the alleged harm must be related to the core purposes of copyright law, such as protecting economic rights, and not purely personal harms like reputational damage or physical threats.
