Veroline v. Priority One EMS
18 So. 3d 1273, 2009 WL 3247434 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
To state a claim for bystander recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress under La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6, a plaintiff must have directly viewed the injury-causing event or arrived on the scene of the event soon thereafter, before the victim's condition has substantially changed. Arriving at a hospital after the victim has already died does not satisfy this temporal proximity requirement.
Facts:
- Heather Veroline injured her knee at Toledo Bend Lake, and an ambulance from Priority One was dispatched.
- Her brother, Joshua Paul Veroline, witnessed emergency medical technicians place Heather in the ambulance.
- Joshua and his friends followed the ambulance in a separate vehicle on the twenty-mile trip to the hospital.
- During the journey, the ambulance, traveling fast with its lights on, passed Joshua's vehicle.
- An unspecified negligent event occurred inside the ambulance that resulted in Heather's death.
- By the time Joshua arrived at the hospital, Heather had already been taken to the emergency room and had died.
- Joshua did not see his sister alive at the hospital and only viewed her after she was deceased.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiffs filed a Petition for Damages against the defendants in a Louisiana trial court.
- The defendants filed a Peremptory Exception of No Cause of Action, arguing the plaintiffs' allegations did not constitute a valid legal claim.
- The trial court sustained the defendants' exception and dismissed the plaintiffs' lawsuit with prejudice.
- The plaintiffs, as appellants, appealed the dismissal to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit.
- The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment, finding the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action, and remanded the case.
- The defendants, as applicants, sought a writ of certiorari from the Louisiana Supreme Court, which the court granted.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff who follows an ambulance carrying his sister and arrives at the hospital to find she has already died state a valid claim for bystander emotional distress under La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6, which requires the plaintiff to either view the injury-causing event or come upon the scene soon thereafter?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. A plaintiff arriving at a hospital after a loved one has died does not satisfy the statutory requirement of viewing the injury-causing event or arriving on the scene soon thereafter. The court reasoned that La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6 is intended to compensate for the 'immediate shock of witnessing a traumatic event' that causes severe and apparent harm, not the general 'anguish and distress that normally accompany an injury to a loved one under all circumstances.' Joshua did not witness the negligent event in the ambulance. Furthermore, he did not 'come upon the accident scene soon after it had occurred and before any substantial change had taken place in the victim’s condition,' as his sister had already died upon his arrival at the hospital. The court concluded that Joshua's experience, while tragic, falls into the category of anguish for which the bystander recovery statute was not intended to provide a remedy.
Analysis:
This decision narrowly construes the temporal proximity requirement for bystander recovery claims under Louisiana law. It clarifies that the 'scene' of the injury is the location of the negligent act itself, not a subsequent location like a hospital where the consequences are discovered. The ruling reinforces that the statute is meant to cover the unique trauma of directly perceiving a horrific event or its immediate aftermath, distinguishing it from the grief of learning about a death. This precedent significantly limits potential claims in scenarios involving medical transport or other situations where the injury occurs out of the plaintiff's sight, thereby protecting defendants from a broader scope of liability for emotional distress.
