Vermont v. Brillon
2009 U.S. LEXIS 1780, 556 US 81, 173 L. Ed. 2d 231 (2009)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
For the purposes of a Sixth Amendment speedy trial analysis, delays caused by a defendant's assigned counsel are attributable to the defendant, not the State, because appointed counsel act as the defendant's agent and are not considered state actors in this context.
Facts:
- In July 2001, Michael Brillon was arrested and charged with felony domestic assault and being a habitual offender in Vermont.
- Over the nearly three years between his arrest and trial, Brillon was represented by a total of six different court-appointed attorneys.
- Brillon's first attorney, Richard Ammons, was granted a motion to withdraw after Brillon fired him just four days before the scheduled jury draw.
- Brillon's third attorney, Gerard Altieri, was allowed to withdraw after Brillon moved to dismiss him and subsequently threatened his life during a court hearing.
- Brillon also filed motions to dismiss his fourth attorney, Paul Donaldson, complaining of unresponsiveness and lack of competence.
- The various changes in representation and periods of inaction resulted in a delay of almost three years before Brillon's trial commenced in June 2004.
Procedural Posture:
- Michael Brillon was charged in Vermont state trial court.
- The trial court denied Brillon’s pre-trial motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial.
- After a jury trial, Brillon was convicted of felony domestic assault and being a habitual offender.
- The trial court denied Brillon’s post-trial motion to dismiss for want of a speedy trial.
- Brillon, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Vermont Supreme Court, the state's highest court.
- The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding a violation of Brillon's Sixth Amendment speedy trial right, and ordered the charges dismissed.
- The State of Vermont, as petitioner, petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial require attributing delays caused by a publicly-funded, court-appointed defense counsel to the State?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ginsburg
No. The Sixth Amendment does not require attributing delays caused by assigned counsel to the State because appointed counsel act as the defendant's agent, not as a state actor. Delay caused by a defendant’s counsel is charged against the defendant, and this principle applies equally whether counsel is privately retained or publicly assigned. The duties and obligations of a lawyer to their client are the same regardless of the source of payment. While a systemic breakdown in the public defender system could be charged to the State, such a breakdown was not present here. Furthermore, a defendant's own deliberate actions to disrupt proceedings, such as firing and threatening his lawyers, should be weighted heavily against him in the speedy trial balancing test.
Dissenting - Justice Breyer
The dissent does not directly answer this question, arguing instead that the Court should have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. The dissent contends that the Vermont Supreme Court did not actually attribute delays solely caused by counsel's inaction to the State. Rather, the delays were attributable to periods where Brillon effectively had no counsel due to systemic issues, such as an attorney's contract expiring or the public defender's office lacking funding to assign a replacement. The dissent argues that the state supreme court should be given leeway in determining whether a delay stems from individual counsel's actions or a failure of the state's public defender system.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the application of the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial right in the context of indigent defense, establishing a uniform standard for attributing delays. By holding that appointed counsel are agents of the defendant, the Court prevents a two-tiered system where defendants with public defenders could benefit from delays that would be attributed to defendants with private counsel. The ruling reinforces the principle of attorney-client agency and places the onus on the defense, as a unit, for its strategic or negligent delays. However, the Court leaves the door open for a different result in cases involving a demonstrated "systemic breakdown" in the public defender system, creating a potential exception that future litigants may explore.
Gunnerbot
AI-powered case assistant
Loaded: Vermont v. Brillon (2009)
Try: "What was the holding?" or "Explain the dissent"