Verdugo v. Target Corp.
59 Cal. 4th 312, 173 Cal. Rptr. 3d 662, 327 P.3d 774 (2014)
Rule of Law:
Under California common law, a retail business owes no duty to acquire and make available an Automated External Defibrillator (AED) for the use of its patrons absent a showing of heightened foreseeability regarding the risk of sudden cardiac arrest on the premises.
Facts:
- On August 31, 2008, Mary Ann Verdugo was shopping at a Target department store in Pico Rivera, California, with her mother and brother.
- While inside the store, Verdugo suffered a sudden cardiac arrest and collapsed.
- Target employees called 911, and paramedics were dispatched from a nearby fire station.
- It took several minutes for the paramedics to reach the store and additional time to reach Verdugo inside.
- Target did not have an Automated External Defibrillator (AED) on the premises.
- Paramedics were unable to revive Verdugo, and she died at the age of 49.
- Target sold AEDs on its own website for approximately $1,200 but did not provide them for use in its physical stores.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Target in the Los Angeles County Superior Court.
- Target removed the action to the United States District Court.
- The District Court granted Target's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
- Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit certified the question of state law regarding the existence of the duty to the Supreme Court of California.
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Issue:
Does the common law duty of reasonable care that a commercial property owner owes to its business customers include an obligation to obtain and make available an Automated External Defibrillator (AED) for use in a medical emergency?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye
No, the common law duty of reasonable care generally does not require a retail business to acquire and maintain an AED for customer use. The court reasoned that while businesses have a special relationship with patrons requiring them to provide aid (such as calling 911), the duty to provide precautionary medical equipment depends on a balancing of burden and foreseeability. Drawing an analogy to cases involving third-party criminal acts (such as Ann M. and Delgado), the court determined that because acquiring, maintaining, and training staff for AEDs imposes a significant non-minimal burden, a duty exists only if there is a 'heightened degree of foreseeability' of the harm. The court found that sudden cardiac arrest, while generally foreseeable, does not meet the 'heightened' standard for a general retail store. Furthermore, the court noted that the legislature has specifically mandated AEDs in fitness centers but not retail stores, suggesting this is a policy decision best left to the legislature.
Concurrence - Justice Werdegar
No, a duty to provide AEDs should not be imposed, but the majority's reasoning relies on an unnecessary analogy to criminal acts. Justice Werdegar argued that the 'heightened foreseeability' rule derived from third-party crime cases should not apply to medical emergencies. Instead, the court should have applied the traditional Rowland v. Christian factors directly. Under Rowland, the burden of requiring AEDs is high and uncertain, and the policy goal of preventing harm is already addressed by legislative action encouraging voluntary AED use through immunity statutes. Therefore, creating a new tort duty was unjustified, but not because of the specific 'heightened foreseeability' test used by the majority.
Analysis:
This decision significantly limits the scope of a business owner's duty to aid patrons, distinguishing between the obligation to summon medical help (which is required) and the obligation to provide advanced medical equipment (which is generally not). By importing the 'heightened foreseeability' standard from premises liability cases involving criminal acts, the court set a high bar for plaintiffs seeking to impose duties requiring expensive or burdensome safety measures. The ruling illustrates judicial deference to the legislature regarding public health mandates, effectively halting the expansion of common law duties to include modern medical technology in retail settings unless specific, high-risk circumstances exist.
