Veno v. Meredith
2 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1702, 357 Pa. Super. 85, 515 A.2d 571 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
A statement of opinion is not defamatory if it is based on disclosed, non-defamatory facts and does not imply the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts. Furthermore, in Pennsylvania, the employment-at-will presumption is not overcome by an employer's vague, aspirational statements or by an employee relocating or forgoing other job opportunities, as these do not constitute sufficient additional consideration.
Facts:
- Carl T. Davies, a reporter for The Free Press newspaper, authored an article suggesting a Bucks County judge might have a conflict of interest due to his business dealings.
- The article was published on the front page on December 28, 1979, while Carl A. Veno was the managing editor.
- The newspaper's owner, Charles M. Meredith, III, deemed the article unfair to the judge and ordered Veno to discharge Davies.
- When Veno refused Meredith's order, Meredith discharged both Veno and Davies on December 28, 1979.
- On December 31, 1979, Meredith published an editorial apologizing to the judge, stating the article was 'not thoroughly researched' and 'unfair,' and that the writer and editor were no longer with the newspaper as a result.
- On January 2, 1980, the new editor published an editorial vowing to maintain fairness and avoid 'vendettas' or 'witchhunts.'
- During Veno's employment, Meredith had co-signed a $5,400 note for Veno's home purchase and told Veno, 'we're both going to retire together.'
- Veno had given up a prior job, moved his family to take the position at The Free Press, and had forgone other job opportunities during his eight years of employment there.
Procedural Posture:
- Carl Veno and Carl Davies filed a complaint in a Pennsylvania trial court against Charles M. Meredith, III, Ella C. Meredith, and The Free Press, alleging defamation and wrongful termination.
- The defendants (appellees) filed preliminary objections in the form of a demurrer to the defamation claims.
- The trial court sustained the demurrer, dismissing the defamation causes of action.
- Veno and Davies' post-trial motions to overturn the dismissal of the defamation claims were denied.
- The case proceeded to trial solely on the wrongful termination claims.
- At the conclusion of Veno's case-in-chief, the trial court granted a compulsory nonsuit against Veno.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of Davies on his wrongful termination claim.
- Veno's post-trial motions to remove the nonsuit were denied.
- Veno (appellant) appealed the dismissal of his defamation claim and the entry of the nonsuit on his wrongful termination claim to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
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Issue:
Do editorials criticizing a former employee's article as 'unfair' and 'not thoroughly researched' constitute defamation when they are based on the disclosed facts of the article itself, and does an employer's oral assurance of long-term employment and assistance with a home loan constitute sufficient additional consideration to overcome the at-will employment presumption?
Opinions:
Majority - Cavanaugh, J.
No. The editorials are protected opinions, not defamatory statements, and Veno's employment was at-will, making his termination non-reviewable by the court. For a statement of opinion to be actionable defamation, it must imply the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts. Here, Meredith's editorials were based on the disclosed facts of Davies' article, which the public could read and evaluate for themselves. The characterizations of the article as 'unfair' or 'not thoroughly researched' were opinions derived from those disclosed facts, not assertions based on secret information. Regarding the wrongful termination claim, Pennsylvania strongly adheres to the employment-at-will doctrine. The employer's statements about retiring together were vague and aspirational, not a clear promise of lifetime employment creating a 'just cause' contract. Furthermore, Veno's actions—relocating for the job, forgoing other offers, and receiving help with a loan—are not considered sufficient 'additional consideration' to overcome the at-will presumption. These are typical detriments incurred by salaried professionals and do not represent the kind of substantial hardship or benefit required to alter the at-will relationship, especially after eight years of employment had already passed.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the high threshold for defamation claims against expressions of opinion, solidifying the principle that criticism based on publicly known facts is protected speech. It clarifies that for an opinion to be libelous, it must create a false impression by implying a basis in undisclosed, defamatory facts. The decision also affirms the robustness of Pennsylvania's employment-at-will doctrine, illustrating that only very clear and specific promises, or truly substantial additional consideration beyond the normal sacrifices of taking a job, can create an exception. This makes it significantly more difficult for employees to challenge terminations based on informal assurances or typical career decisions.
