No, Velazquez is not legally responsible for Alvarez's death. The court said that while the death wouldn't have happened 'but for' the race, Velazquez didn't legally 'cause' the death. Alvarez made his own choices to turn around, drive way too fast while drunk, and not wear a seatbelt. The court decided it would be unfair to blame Velazquez for Alvarez's own 'near-suicidal' actions. It's different than if they had hit an innocent person; in that case, both racers would be in big trouble.

The court decided that even though Velazquez was part of the race, he should not be blamed for Alvarez's death. The court said that Alvarez basically killed himself by driving so dangerously on his own. It would not be fair to hold Velazquez responsible just because he was also in the race. 

The court explained that someone should not be punished for another person's death if the danger they created was not the main cause of the death or if it would be unfair based on the specific situation. 

The court said this case was different from a situation where an innocent bystander gets killed because of a drag race. In that case, the racers could be held responsible. But when a racer causes their own death by being reckless, it's not right to blame the other racer who was just participating in the same race they both agreed to.

We decided that even though Velazquez was part of the race, he should not be blamed for Alvarez's death. We said that Alvarez basically killed himself by driving so dangerously on his own. It would not be fair to hold Velazquez responsible just because he was also in the race.

We explained that someone should not be punished for another person's death if the danger they created was not the main cause of the death or if it would be unfair based on the specific situation.

We said this case was different from a situation where an innocent bystander gets killed because of a drag race. In that case, the racers could be held responsible. But when a racer causes their own death by being reckless, it's not right to blame the other racer who was just participating in the same race they both agreed to.

In order to establish that a defendant's conduct was the "cause in fact" of a particular harm, the State usually must demonstrate that "but for" the defendant's conduct, the harm would not have occurred.

—"[e] ven where a defendant's conduct is a cause-in-fact of a prohibited result... Florida and other courts... have... declined to impose criminal liability (1) where the prohibited result of the defendant's conduct is beyond the scope of any fair assessment of the danger created by the defendant's conduct, or (b)[sic] where it would otherwise be unjust, based on fairness and …

—a Florida appellate court reasoned that when a driver's death was caused only by drag racing the defendant, `the defendant's participation in the subject "drag race" was not a proximate cause of the deceased's death because, simply put, the deceased, in effect killed himself by his own volitional reckless driving—and, consequently, it would be unjust to hold the …

—finding a victim's death was caused by his own conduct, not the defendant's participation in the race

Non-final orders denying pretrial motions to dismiss on the grounds that the undisputed facts did not establish a prima facie case of guilt are reviewed, not by way of prohibition, but on direct appeal once the defendant has a final, appealable order.

I dissent from reversal, however, because the record contains no evidence of the most basic, core requirement of criminal liability: that the defendant's recklessness was a legal cause of the death—or, putting it in the alternative, familiar way—that the death would not have occurred "but for" that recklessness.

However, the court still declined to allow the prosecution, noting that in some situations public policy and fairness considerations preclude the imposition of criminal liability even if the defendant's conduct is deemed to be a "cause in fact" of the prohibited result.

W] e have no trouble in concluding that the [reckless driving] element of this offense is clearly established on this record

—then US criminal courts may use a “substantial factor” test in which, for instance, two separate defendants acting independently, commit two separate acts, each of which alone will not bring about the prohibited result, but when considered together, will.

No, a defendant's participation in a drag race does not constitute a proximate cause of a co-participant's death under these circumstances. While the defendant's conduct was a 'cause-in-fact' of the death under the 'but for' test, it was not the 'legal' or 'proximate' cause required for criminal liability. The court distinguished this case from situations where an innocent third party is killed, in which all participants would be liable. Here, the deceased was a willing and foolhardy participant who, in effect, killed himself through his own volitional, reckless, and 'near-suicidal' actions. Policy and fairness considerations dictate that it would be unjust to hold the defendant criminally responsible for the death of a co-participant who was the primary agent of his own demise.

No. We hold that while Velazquez's participation in the illegal drag race was a cause-in-fact of Alvarez's death, it was not the proximate cause because Alvarez, in effect, killed himself through his own volitional and reckless driving. We reason that it would be unjust to hold Velazquez criminally responsible for Alvarez's death under these circumstances.

We emphasize that criminal liability should not be imposed where the prohibited result of the defendant's conduct is beyond the scope of any fair assessment of the danger created by that conduct or where it would otherwise be unjust based on fairness and policy considerations.

We distinguish this case from situations where an innocent third party is killed as a result of a drag race, in which case the participants could be held criminally liable. However, we find that when a co-participant in the drag race engages in reckless conduct that leads to that co-participant's own death, it is unfair and unjust to hold the surviving racer criminally responsible when the sole contribution was participating in the mutually agreed-upon race.

Velazquez v. State

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Issue:

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